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1. Introduction 
 As is the case with other retirement insurance provisions around the globe, the 
Jordanian Social Security Corporation (JSSC) was established in 1980 to provide its 
participants with acceptable degrees of certainty regarding their future income after 
retirement. Without such a provision, workers will most likely underestimate and disregard 
the funds needed to finance their needs during old-age. The relative youthfulness of the 
scheme's members has allowed the accumulation of huge amounts of funds to the extent 
that they have already exceeded one quarter of the Jordanian national income. Although 
this is a key requirement from both the financial management and pension insurance 
perspectives, it has resulted in undesirable financial challenges to the system. The benefits 
awarded under most of the provisions provided by the JSSC have proved to be neither 
rationally designed, nor financially viable. These challenges, however, are scarcely 
recognised by the scheme's sponsors since the low scheme's dependency ratio helps the 
scheme to achieve financial surpluses and hence accumulate more funds. The moral hazard 
effect inherent in our argument provides no strong reason why policy makers with a short 
term perspective should think intensively and seriously about the long term financial 
viability of pension schemes. 
From a pure financial point of view, this will not continue forever as the scheme 
dependency ratio will continue increasing as a result of falling-down in mortality and 
fertility rates in which retirees will stay longer in retirement while less workers would be 
available to financially support their benefits. Frankly speaking, these variables shouldn’t 
receive so much attention if the system insurable benefits were well designed. This 
theoretically can be done through combining a better elemental mixture between solidarity 
aspects of pension insurance and equity principle among the scheme sponsors. If the latter 
principle is regarded as an essential component of the members' benefits at retirement, the 
solidarity rules can then take place as a complementary component rather than a reciprocal 
one. In that sense, scheme participants who couldn’t accomplish, for any acceptable 
reason, an adequate level of retirement benefits according to their equity fair should be 
supplemented with complementary elements. The latter elements, however, are most likely 
and rationally to come to the expense of other participants whose benefits at retirement are 
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more than adequate. Thus, the resulted sight can be generally viewed as all members 
getting as much as financially fair, but getting or sharing some complementary needs.  
The most vexing and challenging reason for reforming the JSSC is not only due to the fact 
that most of the scheme members are getting far more than fair but also the financial 
viability of the scheme has been subject to their behavior. Ignoring the religious and ethical 
influences on the behavior of some participants, other scheme participants are always 
thinking about the possible ways to maximize the utility of their participation. Although it 
is not easy for all participants to reach the best decision regarding this fact, they still can 
approach inevitable consequences from the perspective of the scheme's financial viability.  
We should admit here that the optimal combination between solidarity and equity elements 
is not viable any more in the context of JSSC as it would be for newly established schemes. 
The main difference between the two cases is the unfunded liabilities that have implicitly 
appeared on the scheme balance sheet in which they should be financed by someone. 
Under the absence of external financing, these liabilities should find a way in order to be 
internally financed via the contributions of subsequent participants, the accumulated 
reserves and the general cost reduction policies. Although this is likely to result in 
distorting the optimal split between equity and solidarity, a well designed reform strategy 
would arrive on better consequences than those that would arise when continuing with the 
current conditions. Thus the measures of any reform strategy should reflect the best 
achievable combination between the different insurable and financial aspects such as, 
participants' equity, adequacy, intergenerational fairness and last not least importantly, the 
scheme's future financial viability.  
Most of the studies done on the JSSC were completely technical and confidential but none 
of them was even partially theoretical. The main concern of these studies is on how to 
improve the medium-term financial viability of the scheme without giving the requested 
requisite attention to other insurance aspects. These studies have resulted in incessant 
recommendations and implementations of only minor changes to the scheme parameters, 
as a result of which uncertainty became the main character of the scheme. Frankly 
speaking, the major concern of the JSSC reforms was oriented towards increasing the level 
of future revenues and/or decreasing the level of expenditures regardless of the 
consequences on the members of different cohorts. Thus, the present study meets the 
necessity for a reform strategy based on a theoretical framework. Moreover, to my 
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knowledge, this study is the first of its type for Jordan as well as for other Arabian 
countries. 
As regards the thesis’ specific interest, it attempts to answer two main questions: The first 
one particularly relates to JSSC and asks whether gradual transition to Fully Funded or 
Quasi Actuarial schemes could result in better insurance and financial conditions. The 
second question, on the other hand, is more theoretically oriented and has a general 
perspective. It inquires into whether all reform strategies (in Jordan or elsewhere) that 
imply a complete transition to a fully funded scheme could result in a better combination 
of financial viability, efficiency, adequacy of participants and intergenerational equity, or 
whether each scheme has its own specific criteria that constrain the extent of reform. 
To motivate interest and methodological understanding regarding the issue of pension 
sustainable reform strategies, Chapter One of this thesis spots on some of the basic 
financial facets of pension schemes such as financing methods, retirement benefit 
calculations, risk and return aspects. The globally implemented sustainable reform 
approaches are concisely presented in this chapter in order to figure out the extent in which 
pension schemes have been successfully reformed and how the schemes specific characters 
affected the paths and options for reform. Lastly in this chapter, a series of arguments and 
literature discussions regarding the consequences of sustainable pension reform are 
presented according to their thematic consequences.  
The first section of Chapter Two reviews and analyses the financial experiences of the 
scheme as well as the development of scheme's participants from the time the JSSC was 
established until two years before the study was completed. The second section of this 
chapter performs some financially-based evaluation measurements of the scheme reserves 
with respect to domestic and international benchmarks.  
Chapter Three presents an empirical modeling framework that is entirely developed by 
the author to analyze the structural weaknesses and advantages that are inherent in the 
design of different insurance provisions provided by the JSSC. These aspects are 
considered with respect to two measures of generosity. The first measure, on the one hand, 
mirrors the generosity from a pure adequacy standpoint represented by the replacement 
rates promised by the current law to a hypothetical participant. The second measure for 
generosity, on the other hand, signalizes the extent in which benefits accrued under the 
JSSC's current law diverge from the full equity principles and among the scheme's 
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participants with respect to several variables. The measures considered for such a judgment 
are the implicit Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on pension contributions, the Net Present 
Value (NPV) of benefits and contributions, the implicit contribution rate and the generosity 
ratio. After the scheme's features are being diagnosed by these measures, the chapter poses 
some reform criteria's and performs general equity and adequacy implications of two 
proposed strategies. The first strategy acquires benefits to be fully funded by the own 
contributions of hypothetical participants in the sense that rates of return continuously 
accrue on the remaining contribution balance. While the second reform strategy implies 
that rate of returns is awarded on contributions only along the accumulation phase.  
Chapter Four switches the perspective from the participant's level into the scheme's 
aggregate level. As in the previous chapter, the empirical outcomes are entirely produced 
by self developed models that are based on the actuarial methodologies. The first model in 
this chapter intends to forecast the future population (until 2050) of Jordan structured on 
sex and one-years age increments. The outcomes of this model are then used as the main 
inputs of the labor market model in which the employment level of both genders are 
projected for the rest of this decade and along the coming four decades. The last model of 
this chapter which is the Financial Model interacts the scheme financial, distributional and 
legal characteristics to generate long term forecasts regarding the scheme's financial 
conditions under the status quo and both proposed reform conditions. In addition to that, 
the chapter performs the development in the adequacy and equity measures of the insured 
participants according to the current law and reform scenarios. Lastly in this chapter, a 
sensitivity analysis is held to estimate how the outcomes of the baseline assumptions 
would differ if some of them are changed.  
The concluding chapter of this thesis summarizes the outcomes and the implications of 
the entire study. It also presents some guidelines to reform the JSSC with their theoretical 
entailments.
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2. Pension Financing and Reform: Theory and 
Practice 
 
2.1 Financial Aspects of Pension Schemes 
2.1.1  Pension Financing 
 Nearly half of the mandatory pension schemes around the globe are financed on the 
basis of Pay As You Go (PAYG) (Palacios and Pallares-Miralles, 2000). In such schemes, 
current workers are responsible to pay the benefits of current pensioners. The key 
parameter for this sort of funding scheme is that workers contribute a fraction of their 
income which is capable to cover all the proceeds accrued toward current retirees. The 
following funding equation simply shows how funds are transferred directly from the 
income base of employed participants to the pockets of pensioners. 
It can evidently be ascertained from the above definitional equation that the financial 
features of a pure PAYG system depends upon a five sets of variables in which some are 
determined exogenously out of the funding equation and others might be set endogenously 
within the equilibrium condition of this equation. For instance the employed population, 
that is the only contributor of a pure PAYG scheme, affects the system balance more than 
vice versa. Such a conclusion is more applicable once the degree of mandating the 
employed population is high, and the level of contribution rate is low that it cannot have a 
substantial effect on the labor market stability. Other variables such as the level of benefits 
and in most often cases the contribution charges are endogenously determined by the 
funding equation.  
For fewer burdens on the working generation and more stable benefits for the retired one, 
PAYG requires a continued rapid population and wage growth rates (Davis, 1998). The 
system dependency ratio which is often defined as the ratio of retired population to the 
working one, and the system replacement rate which reflects the ratio of average insured 
income to the average pension, puts forward the stability of financing the system in a major 
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view. The increase of either ratio implies some extent of difficulties, unless 
proportionally, the increase of one is being offset by the fall of another.  
However, in a fully funded scheme, pension benefits are always financed through the 
pensioners' own assets. Contributions are invested either individually or centrally by 
the scheme sponsors and afterward annuitised at the time of retirement to entirely 
cover the participant expected life span after retirement. Thus, there is no explicit 
relation between the system dependency ratio and replacement rate on the one hand, 
and the level of replaced benefits. Contrary to the former mentioned scheme, a fully 
funded scheme is financed internally via the assets that have already accumulated in 
the pension fund or in the participant's own account if contribution reserves are held 
individually. Despite the way these accounts are held, collected contributions in such a 
scheme are deemed as savings while in the PAYG they are considered as transferred 
taxes.  
2.1.2 Benefit Calculation 
 After the short illustration on how pension systems meet their financial 
obligations, a view must be shown on the approaches used to determine these 
obligations. Most commonly, PAYG schemes depend ultimately on Defined Benefit 
(DB) formulas, in which an eligible retiree receives a pension amount that is 
determined by a specified benefit formula which links an individual reference salary 
and years of service to a payout function. In practice, there are three forms of DB 
plans. The first form is the fixed fee- PAYG system, where the gross system cash 
proceeds are distributed equally among all beneficiaries. In such a plan, individual's 
pension salary is endogenously determined by the systems' funding equation. 
Consequently, the level benefits adjust periodically to ensure the exact distribution of 
the system total revenues on the current retirees. The following equation indicates how 
the system dependency ratio, replacement rate, and contribution rate integrate all 
together to determine the level of benefits:  
t
Np
t
Yc
t
Nc
tt
B ⋅⋅θ=                                        ( 2.1)                                      
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Where B is the flat benefit at time t, Nc: number of contributors, Yc: Average income 
of contributors. Np: the number of pensioners. Assuming tθ  and Yc are constant. For 
example, the increase in the number of contributors proportionally more than the 
increase of pensioner would result in an increasing level of benefits.  
The second form of DB formulas is the Earnings-based PAYG system. This form 
works in an opposite manner of the Fixed-fee PAYG form since benefits paid to 
retirees are a fixed fraction (b) of their earnings in the preceding period. The rate of 
contribution, on the other hand, regardless how much is paid by contributors and by 
their employees has to adjust endogenously to ensure the system overall balance. In 
addition to the above mentioned forms of benefit determination, benefits could also be 
fixed to an absolute term. In such a case, contribution rate has to move exactly as in 
the latter mentioned case.  
Most of the funded pension schemes, on the other hand, apply another type of pension 
benefit formula which is known as Defined Contribution (DC) formula (Mitchell and 
Fields, 1996). According to such a sort of pension calculation, benefits for pensioners 
at the time of retirement are linked directly to the contribution made by them and by 
their employers.
1
 In a DC plan, these contributions are invested, typically by 
professional money managers. As a result, relatively highly-paid workers who pay 
more into their pension accounts would have higher retirement accumulations than do 
those who earn less and consequently pay less into the plan. Also, since under a DC 
plan the pension benefits are linked directly to what is contributed, these plans tend 
not to guarantee minimum benefits nor redistribute across pay and service categories. 
At retirement, the DC benefits are payable in one of two forms. Some DC plans 
provide for the annuitization of investment accumulations so as to guarantee retirees a 
steady stream of retirement payments until death. Alternatively, some systems provide 
for retirees to take some or all of their accumulations in the form of a lump sum 
defrayment. Finally, several systems offer a choice between the annuity and lump-sum 
forms (Blostin, 2003). Moreover, aside from the form benefits are paid, the present 
value of benefits should be close to the corresponding value of the contributions being 
                                                                  
1 In some countries schemes, regardless how benefits are calculated, the employers do not share the contributions of 
their employees e.g. Croatia and Kazakhstan, Argentina, Chile. In some others, employers pay all the contribution 
imposed on their employees for pension insurance purposes, e.g. Lebanon, Turkmenistan, and Cuba. (ISSA, 2002; 
ISSA, 2003b).  
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paid by each participant at the time of retirement.
2
 Thus, the Net Present Value (NPV) 
of benefits and contribution for each participant at any point of time must equal zero 
or at least not far from it.  
2.1.3 Risk 
 Situation of risk arises when agents are not sure what state of nature among several 
possible states will take place in the future. Agent only knows the probability with 
which each state can occur (Starmer, 2000). Pension schemes plans are no exception 
in this context, since uncertainties are the major fear and concern of all agents 
participating in them. However, the types of risks associated with each pension plan 
differ from those appearing in others. Thus, it is worth mentioning the main risk types 
that might impede some of the participants from contributing to any of the mandatory 
pension plans inspite of their importance. 
2.1.3.1 PAYG Scheme Risks 
♦ Demographic Risk. As mentioned in advance in this chapter, the stability of both 
contribution rates and pension benefits largely depends on the size of the contributing 
population and the retired one. From there on, demographic changes play an 
imperative role in shaping the future of such schemes. From an individual point of 
view, this sort of risks initially originates from the uncertainty and instability of their 
pension benefits as the response of pension sponsors to demographic changes is hard 
to be guessed. From the global experience, unfunded schemes sponsors have handled 
the burden of increasing dependency ratios in different ways. Some countries have 
raised the level of contribution to offset the unwanted increase in the pension benefits 
bill; others for instance, reduced the level of replaced income for pensioners. Many 
other policies have been implemented around the glob to absorb the financial burden 
of demographic changes. therein a general overview on how the financial imbalances 
facing the unfunded pension provisions due to demographic transitions can be met: 
                                                                  
2 We cannot say that the NPV of benefits and contributions exactly equals zero. it might be less or greater than zero 
depending on several factors in which the selection of annuity contract and the ratio of  actual life span after 
retirement to the expected one are among them. if the scheme member chooses to get a lump sum amount at the 
time of retirement, however, NPV for benefits and contributions is likely to approach zero.  
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a) Increase the burden on the working population as well as their employers by 
raising-up the contribution rates that have to be paid by the employees on 
behalf of their employers to maintain the system's financial neutrality. Such a 
solution would imply some extent of uncertainties for the working participants 
regarding their disposable income, while the employers might face some 
uncertainties regarding the cost of their production and thus their profitability.  
b) Decrease the level of replacement rates by reducing the level of pension benefits. 
Therefore, the certainty of today's pensioners and today's workers (future 
Pensioners) about their living standard would not entail enough probabilities.   
c) The scheme sponsor can combine both options in order to distribute the costs 
among the scheme agents. In such a case, income uncertainties would spread 
over the scheme agents (Pensioners and Contributors) since both of them are 
not sure about the policy choice on how the burden of demographic changes 
would be distributed between them.  
The above general measures discern how the wide range of policy options in response 
to demographic instability, have put the scheme agents under a shadow of uncertainty 
in which neither the scheme contributors know how much they will pay in 
contributions and receive as pension in the future, nor the pensioner could surely guess 
how the level of his benefits are likely to remain protected. Generally speaking, the 
negative demographic changes, the upward moving dependency ratio in our context, 
would always imply a deadweight loss for the schemes' members in terms of the net 
present value of their own benefits over contributions, regardless workers or 
pensioners would bear the loss (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 1998). 
♦ Economic Risk. This kind of risk arises from a set of factors which might affect 
the systems' sustainability through different routes and paths. One of the most 
important channels of affection comes from the fact that the general base of pension 
contribution in most countries, if not all, is highly correlated with the performance of 
the economy. Thus during the recession periods, system average wages tends to grow 
in low rates or even decline to lower levels. Accordingly, the average replacement rate 
of the system which affects inversely its revenues will rise up and call for some 
adjustment in the system parameters. Moreover, the higher degree of income 
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uncertainty would be reflected mostly on pensioners whenever the system they belong 
to applies a fixed-fee benefit formula. Any vulnerability in the contribution proceeds 
would touch directly the level of individuals' pension benefits. In an endogenously 
determined contribution rate with exogenously specified benefits, the major part of 
risks would be carried out by contributors more proportionally than by pensioners. 
Another channel of risks appears when the scheme agent's structure is highly affected 
by the state of the economy. The uncertainties regarding the future economic prospects 
and specially the level of employment would never put the schemes' participants in a 
good insight about their future disposable income.  
Another example on the influence of economic instability on the income uncertainty 
for both contributors and pensioners is inflation. The less the pensions salaries are 
indexed with inflation, the more risks are borne by pensioners. For instance, the hyper 
inflation in Argentina, Eastern Europe, and East Asia among other countries has 
eroded the real value of pension benefits (Mitchell and Fields, 1995). Even though 
pension salaries are fully indexed with inflation, some degrees of income uncertainties 
may arise for contributors if their wages are not fully indexed with inflation.  
♦ Political Risks. Many economists have defined political risks as the vulnerability 
of the rate of return paid explicitly or derived implicitly on workers contributions via 
the promised benefits due to political decisions or acts. Some others define such types 
of risks as the changes in benefits rule before or after retirement that are induced by 
political process (McHale, 2001). It is important here to distinguish between the 
induced political risks and the pure risks (Blake and Turner, 2003). The political 
uncertainties can actually follow the uncertainties in economic and social measures 
exactly as in the case of uncertainties motivated by demographic instability. While the 
pure uncertainties are those induced directly by political interests in which 
governments move in the favor of majority in the presence of democracy, or according 
to their own interest in the absence of majority rules. For instance, according to the 
median voters theory, if the majority of the pension scheme participants are more close 
to the retirement age than they are from the average age of joining the scheme, then 
the uncertainties becomes more for contributors than for pensioners. That can be 
logically explained if the votes are rationally used to serve the interest of their voters. 
From a pure financial point of view, it can be said that rational workers always try to 
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maximize the profitability of their current and future contributions by regarding past 
contributions as pure sunk cost (Leers et al 2001). Therefore, majorities in democratic 
countries use their best efforts to conserve minimum degrees of uncertainties at the 
expense of higher ones for the minorities.  
2.1.3.2  Funded Scheme Risks 
 The way that fully funded schemes are financed and benefits are calculated, has 
put these schemes under different sorts of uncertainties from those observed in the 
unfunded schemes. Some kinds of risks, however, may arise in both sorts of schemes 
as their sources and affection channels spread widely among market conditions and 
agents positions. Generally speaking, funded pension provisions are more likely to 
face the following forms of uncertainties that might affect in a way or another the 
profitability's of the scheme participants, more precisely, the explicit and implicit rate 
of return on their contributions: 
♦ Investment Risks. In the funded schemes, retirement benefits depend substantially 
on the market performance of the assets that the pensioners' contributions are invested 
in. Attempting always for a higher rate of return does not seem to be as an efficient 
behavior in the respect of certainty. If the pensioner tries to virtually boost his 
retirement benefits, he should then recognize that such an aim would be always at the 
expense of doubtfulness. Even though his aim is unbiased to a higher level of returns, 
uncertainties will still occur, however, in a lesser extent.  
Completely diversified pension portfolios could put the assets only subject to market 
risks instead additionally the assets specific ones. The market prompted risks comprise 
the uncertainty that faces all the assets invested in the market in the same direction 
such as inflation and economic recession, etc. Pension benefits or more specifically the 
returns on pension assets are also subject to timing risk. This type of risks corresponds 
to the uncertainties that collegiate the selected time for transacting assets. For instance, 
a pensioner purchases fixed income securities just before interest rate jumps up 
(Macnicol, 2004). Nevertheless, the degrees at which risks are exchanged with return 
vary between countries and correlate with others.  
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♦ Mortality Risks. This type of risks originates mainly by the funded pension 
system, when the individual takes the risk of under-estimating his own life expectancy 
and by then allowing for some probabilities that his pension assets would be outlived 
early before his death (Chen and Milevsky, 2003). From an individual point of view, 
this would most possibly force the pensioner to reduce his standard of living as one of 
the sequences of the depletion in retirement oriented assets (Lin and Cox, 2004). 
The continuing improvement in the health and living standards on the one hand, and 
the heterogeneity of mortality rates among individuals on the other, has put the issue 
of longevity risk in a front priority and concerns of many policy makers as well as 
funded schemes' participants. The uncertainty of the participant regarding whether he 
will live below, on or above the average life expectancy has been designated by some 
risk management literature as an individual mortality risk (Valdes-Prieto, 1998). This 
sort of risk can be, however, eliminated by purchasing life annuities that provide 
frequent income streams for the pensioner along his retirement, regardless how long 
the pensioner would stay alive. These annuities as widely practiced, can be classified 
as one of the financial tools that transfers the longevity risks form the individuals to 
private insurers or annuity issuers (Drinkwater and Sondergeld, 2003). Many pension 
and risk specialist raise several critical issues regarding the avoidance of longevity risk 
through in bidding annuities. Among them, is the adverse selection that emerges when 
only high income earners who likely live longer than average tend to buy annuities, 
while low income earners under-estimate their value and prefer to insure against this 
sort of risk by themselves (Bodie, 1990).   
♦ Political Risks. At first glance, fully funded schemes in general, and particularly 
those who apply a defined benefits formula appear far from being subject to political 
risks. This view seems logical if we know in advanced that pension accumulated assets 
in such schemes are individual rights rather than government wealth. Thus 
governments have no real access to these funds to finance the needs of other parties or 
programs.  
A deeper look to these schemes discerns some unseen political impacts on either the 
participants or the governments themselves. As regards the government, the 
underperformance of financial market that the participants' contributions are invested 
in, may generate a never wanted pressure on governments to supplement those who 
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couldn’t have accumulated adequate assets for their retirement. The participants' 
accumulated assets on the other hand, could inversely and indirectly be influenced by 
some political, economical and institutional facts. For instance, governments may seek 
to lower the level of interest rate and thus indirectly affect the rate of return on the 
market assets (Turner 1997, Parnczky, 2002). The most common experiences on how 
political risks can affect fully funded schemes is the reserves depletion of the former 
German funded pension scheme after the hyper inflation in 1923 and during the 
second war . 
2.1.4 Rate of Return (ROR) 
 As initially stated by Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966), the PAYG financed 
schemes compensate the participants contribution with an implicit rate of return that 
equals the growth rate of their total wage bill. However, one can show by simple 
mathematical instances that such a conclusion might not always persist in the context 
of differently stylized PAYG schemes. For illustrative purposes, assume that there are 
only two periods with two retiring and two working generations. According to the 
fixed- Fee PAYG system, as being clarified in advance, the total receipts collected 
from the working generation by an exogenously determined salary fraction are 
distributed equally among pensioner. Putting that directly in our illustrative example, 
the working population (A) at the first period pays a (Cr) fraction of his salary as 
pension contributions that are totally and directly distributed to the retired generation 
(A) in that period. Mathematically speaking, the first step of our derivation takes the 
following form:  
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
A YpNpYcNcCrTC ⋅=⋅⋅=                                        ( 2.2  
Where: t
A
TC Total contributions paid by generation A. Nc: is the number of working 
generation in period t. Yc: The working generation average Income. Np: The number 
of pensioners. Yp: the average income of pensioners.  
Since the average pension in a Fixed-Fee scheme is endogenously determined by the 
funding equation (2.2), YP can be calculated as follows:  
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The last parenthesized part of the above equation represents the inverse of 
Dependency Ratio (DR), the fraction that indicates for the ratio of retired participants 
to the working generation. While the first part of the same equation stands for the 
average contribution paid by each worker of the working generation A in period t.   
Now imagine the situation where the working generation of period (t) to retirement at 
period ( 1+t ). The pensions of this generation as our example assumes would be paid by 
the new working generation (B). 
1t
A
t
A
1t
B
1t
B
1t
A Yp.NcYc.Nc.CrTP
++++
==                                          (2.4) 
The right side of the above equation comprises the number of contributors of 
generation A as they were contributor in period t and got retired in the period directly 
after. The average pension of each retiree of generation A would exactly be 
determined by the same way that average pension in the first period is being 
calculated:  
)NcNc(YcCrYp tA
1t
B
1t
B
t
A
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A
+++
⋅⋅=                                        ( 2.5) 
To simplify the understanding of our example, let us assume that the average income 
of generation B in period 1+t  comprises the average income of generation A in period t 
indexed by its periodical growth rate, and the sum of generation B is proportionally 
related to the sum of generation A: 
 )1(YcYc t
t
A
1t
B λ+⋅=+                                          ( 2.6) 
And  
)1(NcNc t
t
A
1t
B ρ+⋅=+                                        ( 2.7) 
Where tρ :  The growth rate of working generation. tλ : Wage growth rate. 
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Before going through our derivations, two connotations of ROR should be 
distinguished in this context. The first should reflect the generational rate of return that 
each generation gets over the total contributions it has paid for the retired generation 
one period before: 
1)TCTP(ROR tA
1t
A
1t
A,G −=
++                                         ( 2.8) 
Substituting mid of equation (2.2) and right side of (2.4) in the equation (1-6), 
considering equations (2.6) and (2.7), the generational ROR would take the following 
form:  
tt
Neglible
tttt
1t
A,G .ROR ρ+λ=ρλ+ρ+λ=+ 321                                        ( 2.9) 
From the above equation, one can find that the generational ROR under a fixed-Fee 
PAYG approximately equals the sum growth rates of participants' average wage and 
their size (number). This simplified conclusion seems similar to Samuelson and Aaron 
attribute to the ROR awarded under a PAYG schemes.  
The second concept of ROR, which is also necessary to be expressed here, is the 
individual ROR which reflects the participant profitability when contributing to Fixed-
Fee PAYG scheme. Mathematically speaking, the individual ROR comprises the 
proportional difference of what participant pay as contribution and the amount he gets 
as pension:  
1)Yc.CrYp(ROR tA
1t
A
1t
A,I −=
++                                         ( 2.10) 
By substituting equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) in the above, we get the following 
simplified expression which symbolizes the implicit ROR awarded on the individual 
pension-oriented contributions:  
tt
1t
A,IROR ρ+λ=+                                ( 2.11)  
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As being ascertained on the generational level, the individual's ROR that is implicitly 
given on his contribution according to such a presided scheme comprises the growth 
rate of contributors wage bill. From that on, it can be said that under a Fixed-Fee based 
PAYG system both concepts of ROR seem to be consistent with the former view about 
the ROR accrued on the pension contributions paid under a pure PAYG system.  
The next step of our analysis switches now to derive the same concepts considered for 
the fixed fee PAYG based system to the Earning based one, where the individuals' 
pensions are exogenously determined by their own historical earning levels and the 
contribution rate is endogenously and periodically adjusted to restore the equilibrium 
of the PAYG funding equation.  
To do so, we have to reformulate our illustrative example to simply perform the latter 
case of PAYG system. First, let us assume that there are two generations and two 
periods. At the first period, the working generation B pays the benefits of the retired 
generation A.  Thus, the funding condition in period 1 can be formulated as follows: 
t
A
t
A
t
B
t
Bt
t
B Yp.NpNc.Yc.CrTC ==                                        (2.12) 
At the second period, generation (B) becomes retired and is paid by the subsequent 
working generation (c) in period 2. 
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Consequently, the implicit ROR given on generation B contributions can be performed 
as follows:  
1)TcTp(ROR tB
1t
B
1t
B −=
++                                         (2.14) 
By substituting the right end terms of equation (2.12) and the right end in equation 
(2.13) in equation (2.14), the generational ROR can be expressed by the following 
term:  
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Where 1+tθ : is the average pension growth rat in period t+1 . tRR  : Dependency ratio in 
period t.  
What can be followed from the above equation is that, the generational implicit rate of 
return depends mainly on the lagged dependency ratio and also on the growth rate of 
average pensions. This looks a bit different than the general view about the ROR 
accrued on contributions that are charged under PAYG financed pension schemes.   
Regarding the individual ROR under such a scheme, one can derive it by imagining 
the proportional rewards on the contributions paid during his employment through the 
benefits he gets as pension. Simplifying that in the context of our example, each 
individual of generation (B) would be supplemented with an extra amount of money 
which comprises the difference between his average pension in period (t+1) and the 
contribution he has paid to finance the pensioners of period (t). To rationally perform 
that, the ROR on the individual's level should be interpreted with respect to the 
number of pensioners at period (t), their average pension and the number of 
contributors (generation B) at period (t).  
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Given that 
t
B
t
A
t
At
Bt
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Yp.Np
Yc.Cr = , and by substituting it in the above equation, the 
individual ROR would take the following expression:  
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Equation (2.17) indicates that when the PAYG system is implementing the earning 
based approach for calculating pensions, the Implicit ROR on pension contributions, 
either on the generational level or on the individual one, would ultimately depend on 
the average pension growth and the system dependency ratio. What is worth to 
mention here, is that the average pension growth rate under such scheme, follows 
exogenously many factors at which the individual's historical earning profile is one. 
However, if the individuals' benefits in a PAYG financed schemes are exogenously 
fixed by the scheme sponsor, then the generational and individual ROR would 
identically take the following form: 
t
1t
B,GI
DR
1
ROR =++                                         ( 2.18) 
If the sponsors of the latter mentioned type of PAYG index the individuals' benefits 
with a pre-specified rate, let say for instance the cost of living index, then the 
generational and individual ROR would  look exactly as in equation (2.17) except that  
1+tθ  would reflect the indexation factor instead of average pension growth rate. 
As regards the awarded ROR under the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) 
schemes, it can be easily recognized that both measures of ROR, either on the 
individual level or on the generational one, would follow explicitly the notional 
interest that the participant contributions are marginalized with.
3
 If for instance the 
notional interest rate is measured by the economic growth rate, then the ROR given on 
participants' contribution would mirror that rate. What is worthy to remind here, is that 
the ROR equals the notional rate only if that rate is awarded on contributions during 
the accumulation phase and on the remaining balance during the withdrawing stage 
                                                                  
3 This NDC pension scheme type is more clarified in section 2.2.2  
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(retirement period). Otherwise, the implicit rate would for most, be lower than the 
notional rate.  
Funded schemes with centralized managed reserves provide the participants with a 
ROR that fully reflects the financial profitability of the contribution assets after the 
cost of running-out the scheme activities is being deducted. If the participant 
contributions are individually invested, however, then ROR would most likely vary 
among the scheme participants as contributions can be invested in different tools and 
by different agents. In addition to that, the risk exposure may differ between the 
funded schemes participants as well as their investment agents, making their pension 
assets subject to different rates of return.  
2.2 Pension Reform in International Context 
 No one can confute the fact that public pension schemes around the globe have 
been reformed by many methods and approaches. To the extent of our knowledge, 
most of these reforms have aimed in a way or another to prevent the failure of 
financial viability of the scheme they were applied on and in some cases to improve 
the adequacy and the equity measures of their participants. Generally speaking, reform 
strategies have been classified under two major approachable groups according to their 
comprehensiveness and frequency, the parametric reforms and structural ones.  
Parametric reforms, on the one hand, refer to the changing in one or other of the 
pension rules parameters such as adjusting the eligibility requirements, contributions 
size and distribution, and accrual rate, etc. Such adjustments comprise the majority of 
reform strategies that pension schemes around the globe have experienced during the 
last century and throughout the first half of this decade. Few countries, however, have 
altered their schemes structurally in the sense that the way to which these schemes are 
financed and benefits are calculated, is totally changed.  
The main concern of this study, however, is not essentially on the way those schemes 
were reformed rather how these reforms are financially sustainable. Although 
sustainable reform strategies inherent mostly in the structural ones, there are some 
evidences that they can result within small parametric changes. 
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2.2.1 PAYG-Defined Benefit to Fully Funded 
 Prior to the ninth decade of the last century, most of the Latin America countries 
were running their scheme on the basis of one pillar DB-PAYG system (Schmidt-
hebble, 1999). But as in many other countries, such a system had proved impertinent, 
unstable and inefficient, among many other challenges. 
In 1981, Chile took a brave decision to make a revolutionary switch of their PAYG 
system to privately managed fully funded scheme. From this year on, the Chilean 
pension system has been administered by several private fund companies, namely 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP). 
The participation of new members, who joined the system after the reform strategy 
was firstly implemented, has been mandatory regardless whether they are employed by 
public or private entities. The only exception in this matter is the self employed 
persons who have been given the choice to participate or not. As regards the old 
participants who joined the system prior to the reform process, the Chilean 
government gave them the opportunity to choose between staying under the rules of 
the old pension scheme or to switch to the reformed scheme. If the latter option is 
considered by any participant, the government awards him a recognition bond with a 
value that is capable to make the member receive, at the normal age of retirement, a 
pension that comprises 80% of his taxable salary he received between the mid-1978 to 
mid-1979 multiplied by the proportion of actual contributory period to the full one 
(Acuña and Iglesias, 2001).  
Each participant of the reformed system has to contribute from 12.5 % to 13.3% of his 
monthly taxable income to the pension fund he chooses, in which 10% is intended to 
finance the old age benefits while the rest is divided between AFP commission and a 
premium for disability-survivors insurance (Müller, 1999).
4
 Participants, however, 
could optionally contribute for their old age pension account, but for a limited extent. 
Both mandatory and voluntary contributions as well as their investment rewards are 
tax exempted while pension benefits are subject to the same tax structure of other 
types of income (Vittas and Lglesias, 1998).  
                                                                  
4 Actually, the employer collects the contributions from his employees and then distributes them to the private 
pension funds upon the choice of participants.  
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When participants reach the eligible age of retirement, they have to choose between 
either options to convert their accumulated contribution and the investment returns on 
them to pension benefits.
5
 According to the first option, each member can purchase a 
life annuity that provides him with life-long monthly benefits. If the participant's is not 
interested in such a way, he could then keep his account at the AFP and withdraw his 
monthly benefits from that account according to a predetermined plan. If the 
participant's own accumulated assets, however, couldn’t provide him with a monthly 
annuity that comprises one-quarter of his average income (or three-quarters of 
minimum wage) then the Chilean government is obliged to support him with the 
remainder (GBO, 1999).
6
 
Other Latin countries experiences, generally speaking, haven’t gone so far from the 
Chilean approach. The other experiences, however, are found in Peru (1993) and 
Columbia (1994) where the political resistance and bureaucratic procedures have 
prohibited them from applying a large portion of Chilean module. Workers in both 
countries had and still have the choice to select between the government provision and 
the new individual account system.  
The Mexican's approach was a bit closer to the Chilean's one since all private sector 
workers have been obliged to join the new funded scheme. A more comprehensive and 
diversified reform module took place in Argentina in 1994 through the implementation 
of what is called Multi-pillar reform approach.  
The newly initiated two-pillar scheme in Argentina provides participants with two 
types of benefits. The first type which is provided by the first pillar dominates to 
support all participants who accomplish the minimum age of retirement and have 
contributed to the system for thirty years at least, with a flat benefit that comprises 
28% of their average wage (Rofman, 2002).
7
 As regards the second pillar, scheme 
members are given the choice to opt either the following options:  
                                                                  
5 The retirement age in the Chilean reformed pension scheme is 65 for men and 60 for women. 
6 This is only available for those who have contributed to the scheme at least for 20 years.  
7 The contribution rate for this pillar is 16% of participant gross insurable salary, paid by his employer. 
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a) They can join the new PAYG government pillar at which each contributory year 
intends to generate for each participant an additional monthly salary of about 
0,85% of his reference salary. 
b) A fully funded benefits in which the accumulated contributions (with their 
investment returns) of each participant after the administrative costs and the 
disability–survivors insurance fees are being deducted, are converted to life-
long annuity. 
Table 2.1 shows some basic elements of approaches that have already been the reform 
implemented in some Latin American countries.  
Table 2.1:  FF reform features in selected countries  
  
Chile Peru Colombia Argentina Uruguay Mexico  Bolivia 
El 
Salvador 
Start of Reform 1981 1993 1994 1994 1996 1997 1997 1998 
PAYG Scheme Closed remains remains remains remains closed closed closed 
Private funded System 
Affiliation of 
New Workers 
Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Contribution 
Rate % 
 
10 8   * 10 7,5 7,5 
6,5 
+subsidy 
10 4,5  * 
Commision and 
Insurance% 
2,94 3,72 3,49 3,45 2,62 4,42 3 3,5 
Past 
Contributions 
RB RB RB CP No recognition life 
time switch 
CP RB 
 
Dissability& 
Survivors 
Pension 
Private Private Private Private Private Public Private Private 
Minimum Rate 
of Return 
Relative Unregulated  Relative Relative Absolute NO No Realtive 
Minimum 
Pension 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No  Yes 
Source: Queisser (1999).  
*: Contribution rate will be increased gradually to 10%. 
RB: Recognition Bonds.  CP: Compensatory pension.  
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2.2.2 PAYG-DB to PAYG-DC 
 Instead of changing both the way that benefits are calculated and financed in 
order to maintain the future financial viability of pension schemes, some countries 
have switched less comprehensively than we observed in some of the Latin American's 
countries and have only altered  the way benefits are calculated within their schemes. 
In such a reform approach, benefits are no more determined by defined benefit 
formulas but rather more on the funded elements. The main differences between this 
approach and the fully funded one, is that benefits of the former remain financed via 
the ongoing contributions receipts from the working participants and it has no actual 
assets to accumulate in scheme fund nor in the participants own accounts. The second 
main difference is that the rate of return that pension contribution is exaggerated with, 
does not reflect the actual market rate of return on contribution assets, as the case of 
fully funded, but rather reflects other benchmarks such as the growth rate of GDP or 
wage bill, etc. since the contributions accounts and the rate of return on them are both 
notional (not actual) and the benefits are determined by a defined contribution 
formula, such schemes are called Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) schemes.  
The methodological sense of this approach was firstly proposed by Buchanan (1968) 
as a general framework to reform united state pension system at that time. However, 
more than a quarter century latter, European countries, and particularly Sweden were 
the first to implement such an approach. Such a reform is well thought by several 
economists to expand the length of the schemes financial viability as it allows for an 
automatic adjustment mechanism to changes in demographic and economic 
parameters ( Normann and Mitchell, 2000; Boersch-Supan, 2003).
8
 Another crucially 
requested advantage inherent in this strategy is the minimization labor supply 
distortions due to partial elimination of the tax included in pension contributions 
(Lasagabaster, 2002; Franco, 2002). Sweden was the first country to go further with 
such a reform approach. In 1994, 1998 and finally 2001, the Swedish parliament had 
legislated the reform of the Swedish old pension system by replacing it by as totally 
                                                                  
8 This fact appears when the increase in system dependency ratio that is induced by the increase in life 
expectancies, for instance, do not affect the schemes financial viability at the same extent that PAYG schemes  with 
a defined benefit formula  are affected by. The main explanation for this fact is that the increase in life expectancy 
for an individual at a given age of retirement would result in reduced pension benefits since his accumulated 
contributions would be distributed among a longer life span.(Williamson, 2004). What is likely to happen in such a 
case, participants face the increase in their own expected life expectancy by postponing retirement in order to 
accumulate more contributions and distribute them in reasonable life span after retirement.   
24                                                                                                              2. Pension Financing and Reform 
 
new two-pillar scheme (Settergren, 2001). The smallest pillar, on the one hand, intends 
to supplement the pensioners with a defined contribution benefits that are financed via 
2.5 percentage points of their monthly salary charged throughout their entire career 
life. According to the newly legislated pension law, participants are given the choice 
to opt the pension fund they desire their pension contributions to be utilized with.  
The largest pillar, on the other hand, charges a 16 percentage points of the participants 
monthly wages to finance the current retirees, exactly as the case of PAYG system in 
the sense that today's pensioners are financed by today's contributors. The 
newfangledness with this scheme is that the benefits of pensioners are calculated on 
the basis of defined contribution formula with a notional rate of return that mirrors the 
growth rate of nominal wages rather than being calculated according to the old defined 
benefits formula.  
Similar approaches have been also implemented in Poland (in 1999), Latvia (2001) 
and Russia Federation (2002) (Brooks).The what is called Dini reform in Italy 
replaced a singular NDC pillar, instead of multi-pillar, for the old system but with a 
long transition period. Table 2.2 provides some information about how countries have 
moved partially or fully to NDC system. 
Table 2.2: Selected NDC reform features in selected countries.  
Country Italy Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Latvia Mongolia Poland Sweden 
Year Adopted 1995 1997 1996 2000 1999 1999 
Annuity Formula Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Unisex life 
expectancy 
at the time 
of 
retirement 
Notional Interest 
Rate  Five year-
moving 
average of 
GDP growth 
75% of the 
change 
in wage 
level 
Wage Sum Average 
trends in 
wage levels 
75% of the 
quarterly 
growth in 
the wage 
bill 
Average 
trends in 
wage levels 
Indexing of Pension By inflation 
rate  
None By the 
growth rate 
in consumer 
price index 
Unknown By inflation 
rate plus 
20% of real 
wage 
growth 
By both 
inflation 
rate and 
changes in 
the rate of 
economic 
growth. 
Source: Williamson and Williams (2003).  
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2.2.3 Sustainable Parametric Reform 
 To the extent of my knowledge which is based on an extensive global survey, 
reform approaches aim at maintaining the financial viability and sustainability of 
pension schemes via small parametric changes has only been implemented in 
Germany, just one year ago. Throughout the what is called " Rürup Sustainability 
Factor" (RSF), after the name of  the chairman commission that proposed this factor, 
the German pension system would be self financed without allowing the contribution 
rate to exceed a targeted level (Willmore, 2004). 
The core idea of this factor is to internally absorb the financial pressure on the system 
that is induced by the ageing population, via an automatic aggregate benefits 
adjustment. Since the sustainability factor refers mainly to the periodical adjustments 
in the members structure (ratio of pensioner to contributors), pensioners benefits, 
regardless the time their earners have retired, would be linked to the relative annual 
changes in the number of members who receive benefits from the system and those 
who provide the system with the required funds. (Boersch –Supan et al., 2003).  
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Where tAF : The Adjusted benefits with respect to sustainability factor.   
tOF :  Benefits calculated according to the Old Formula. 
1−tSD : One year lagged dependency ratio (Number of equivalence pensioners to 
equivalence contributors). 
With respect to the above equation, the benefits of all retirees would be adjusted 
annually to reflect quarter the proportional change in the scheme dependency ratio. 
The rest burden which is not intended to be counterbalanced by lowering the level of 
pension benefits would be financed through a smooth and gradual increase in 
contribution rate, to the extent that it should not surpass 22 percentage points of the 
participant aggregate income by 2030 and afterward. In order to control the impact of 
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ageing population on the pensioner standard of living, the implementation of RSF 
would be accompanied  by a gradual increase of the normal age of retirement from 65 
to 67 years, to be introduced on a monthly steps over 24 years starting by 2011. 
What is necessary to mention here is that benefits of pensioners are not always subject 
to reduction, unless the dependency ratio continues to increase. If the dependency ratio 
remains constant or decreases, however, pension benefits would remain unchanged or 
automatically step-up, respectively. 
Another advantage of the RSF, from the author's point of view, is likely to appear in 
times of economic depression as the fall in pensioners' nominal benefits that is induced 
by the falling down in employment level, might be partially or fully counterbalanced 
by the downfall in prices. Contrary to the case of depression, the sustainability factor 
might be more harmful in times of long- lasting stagflation , as the pension benefits 
tend to decrease and the prices are more likely to increase, thus worsening the real 
value of pensioners' benefits.  
2.3  Literature Review  
2.3.1 Tradeoffs: Financial Viability, Risk and Return 
 The issue of pension schemes' financial viability has been discussed by many 
academic researchers and policy makers. The emergence of pension reform debates 
has originally followed the fact that most unfunded schemes around the globe would 
never come to stability. Thus, researchers spent great efforts to help interested policy 
makers to arrive at the best outcomes, or at least the less badly-off ones.  
Although some Latin American countries have successfully privatized their pension 
schemes, the potential outcomes of such a reform approach, from a multi-dimensional 
perspective, is still debatable.  
Starting with the optimistic view about privatizing unfunded pension schemes, 
Feldstein (1996) presents several dimensional advantages of privatizing pension 
schemes. At first glance, shifting to fully funded schemes eliminates the future 
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deprivations that most likely to result by the continuous growth in the scheme 
unfunded liability as when no reform take place. In an attempt to acquaint more 
comprehensive implications, Feldstein fences multi periodical gain scenarios of 
implementing a transition towards fully funded provision. In each year the net effect of 
such a policy basically depends on the offset between the real adjusted return on the 
increase in capital stock and the loss of returns that are given implicitly on pre-reform 
paid contributions. The net effect of these contrastingly influencing streams passes 
through three main stages. During the first stage, the extra returns generated via the 
increase in capital could not surpass the implicit rate of return on pre-reform 
contributions and hence the net effect tends to be lower than zero. As time passes, the 
returns on extra accumulated capital stock continue increasing while implicit returns 
on previously paid contributions commence decreasing. After the system stop paying 
benefits to those who contributed to the scheme before the implementation of this 
strategy and the returns on capital stock continue increasing, the scheme then would 
end-up by never ending positive gains.  
In a more comprehensive study, Feldstein et al. (1999) analyze the possible 
multidimensional- financial outcomes of a reform strategy that demands a complete or 
partial transition to an investment based pension provision where contributions 
collected for financing the funded benefits portions are invested in a stock and bond 
mutual funds. The approach they have considered aims at providing the participants 
with a benefits level that is constrained with a minimum floor that is at least as large as 
the level of benefits promised by the pension law pre to reform.  
In the fully funded scenario, the authors suggest an additional supplement of 
contribution rate only of less than one-third of the current contribution rate.
9
 Over 
time, the combined contribution rate will decline gradually until it finally ends with a 
contribution rate that is only needed to finance the participants own pension. The 
probability of maintaining the same promised level of benefits however, took a 
considerable attention in the author's discussions, particularly for younger participants 
who would rely mainly on benefits that are directly subject to market risks.
10
 To avoid 
                                                                  
9 The status quo contribution rate is 12.4%, and the proposed increase above this rate is 3%.  
10 At the beginning of reform implementation, the old aged participants, as the authors simulate, get proportionally 
more of their benefits according to the rules of old system and the rest as an  investment based benefits.  
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such an uncertainty, they initially suggested to increase the level of saving 
contributions for younger cohorts to a level that is capable to absorb some of the future 
unexpected negative fluctuations in the portfolio rate of return, instead of been fully 
absorbed  by the pension benefits. However, coping with the financial market risks via 
charging extra contribution seems not as the first best solution, since it will come at 
the expense of younger generations and does not completely eliminate risks. From 
there on, they proposed a governmental guarantee which provides a participant with 
the difference between the benefits he expects to get according to the old system rules 
and the benefits provided with the reformed one. These guarantees can, as the authors 
argue, be financed jointly by additional taxes and the incremental capital tax revenues 
that result from additional savings. 
In order to avoid interpreting less sensible conclusions about the worthiness of reform 
strategies that involve a transition to funded schemes, Quinn (1997) elucidates that 
pension insurance should never be evaluated only by the angle of returns. Other 
aspects must also be considered in the design of any reform strategy such as providing 
participants with indemnity against certain types of risks and bypass them from the 
large extents of inequalities and inequities. From that on, he proposes to take the 
individual equities, adequacy, security and economic growth on the top of the reform 
targets agenda.  
Miles (1998) reports that the longer run implications of the permutation of funded 
schemes in the place of unfunded ones will prove quite beneficial. But how long it 
takes to reach that longer term position in the privatized pension provisions 
considerably depends on the ability of these provisions to accumulate more funds. 
Another central aspect the author presents in his work is that problematic issues 
inherent in such a reform approach arises more when the reformed scheme 
incorporates more generous features and if it implies greater extents of insurance and 
redistributive characteristics in the sense that either the scheme sponsors or the 
government have to seek for means of financing such features.  
Bosworth and Burtless (2002) examines the foresighted implications of two reform 
strategies aims at prefunding part of unfunded liabilities and also increasing the level 
of national savings. The core idea of the first reform option he has examined is to 
bring the expected actual actuarial imbalance to zero via an immediate increase in the 
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level of contributions collected from the scheme participants.
11
 He suggested investing 
these additional receipts in a special trust fund that would generate the adequate assets 
required to close-down the actuarial imbalance (advance funding). The second option, 
on the other hand, intends to induce the gap between pension outlays and contribution 
receipts to the level zero through reducing correspondingly the scale of pension 
benefits. The implementation of the latter approach, as the authors suggest, should be 
accompanied with an establishment of individual accounts that can provide future 
pensioners with an additional income stream to compensate them for the losses in 
benefits, as one of the consequences of implementing the second reform strategy. Both 
approaches, as they argue have a similar positive impact on boosting savings, but they 
appear different in their entailments on future cohort of retiring workers. Nevertheless, 
their simulations have shown some surprising implications in the context of risk 
perspective. 
By utilizing the historical volatility of equity returns as a scenic for market financial 
risks, the performed findings have shown some surprising implications. For instance, 
the volatility of participants' annuities that are generated by equally distributed 
portfolios of bonds and equities exceeds 40% of the expected annuity. The more 
equity is invested in participant portfolio, the more the uncertainty regarding the 
expected annuity. Some assumable sorts of risks, as they argue, might be even greater 
if the extra funds generated by advanced funding are invested and utilized in the social 
security trust fund. Although the backbone of their argument originates initially from 
an optimistic view, their final conclusion arrives at an unhappy ending. They believed 
that despite the fact that advanced funding through trust fund would have more 
influence on national savings and output than it would be in the case of individual 
accounts, the unexpected high returns on invest might induce schemes sponsors to 
reduce the level of contributions. The rest of their pessimistic story proceeds by their 
believe that such a policy response would be followed with a fall in the level capital 
stock, increased rate of return and thus further reductions in the contribution rate. The 
unpredictable upward and downward fluctuations in rates of return and contribution 
rates crucially influence the stability of pension benefits, participants earning levels 
and accordingly the system itself in away that it is hardly to avoid in the context of 
                                                                  
11 Actuarial balance implies that the net present value of benefits paid to pensioner during the coming 75 years 
matures exactly discounted value of the scheme total assets over the same period.  
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financial market risks. Building on these arguments, they conclude that strategies that 
involve advanced funding via individual accounts are less vulnerable to financial risks 
than if they are done through trust fund. The only way to avoid that extent of risks of 
the latter strategy, as the authors suggest, is by adjusting rationally and prudently the 
contribution rates in response to investment returns.  
Geanakoplos et al. (1998a) use money worth measures to reach general conclusions 
regarding the question of whether privatizing pension plans would increase the rate of 
return for all retirees. They tried to compass his termination by simulating a 
privatization approach on the U.S. pension funds in which the already incurred 
unfunded benefits of the pre-reform generations are financed via the subsequent ones. 
Their findings suggest that the extra rate of return given for individuals' contributions 
after reform would be dissipated by the transition cost. One way to keep the extra 
returns not surceased, however, can take place through inheriting the unfunded 
liabilities to the government or depleting them via cutting- down accrued benefits. 
Following both or either of these solutions, the extra expected returns for future 
generations will come at the expense of either future generations or of today's retirees. 
The authors imagine four superior conditions in which if they exist, the money's worth 
measures can be utilized to net-score the outcomes of privatizing reform schemes: (i) 
the house holder optimally use the available investment opportunities in the market. 
(ii) Intra and intergenerational tradeoffs should be neutralized among beneficiaries 
before and after reform,(iii) the comparison of the cost and benefits of alleged reform 
should basically be based on the money's worth measures. (iv) Finally, with addition 
to the previously remarked conditions, scheme agents must be able to replace all 
pension streams (benefits and contributions) through utilizing money fluxes  
Geanakoplos et al. (1998b) reaches a conclusion well-nigh their ratiocinations but 
from another attribute. Three approachable steps of reforming pension schemes were 
testified by them to reach a conclusion on the salutary of privatization. First, if we 
privatize the unfunded pension planes via creating individual accounts that are 
invested in safe bonds that award a rate of return higher than the implicit rate honored 
under the pre-reformed scheme, then the extra returns on participants' contributions 
would wipe out by their implicit share in financing the transition cost. Considering 
some sorts of idiosyncratic risk factors in the computation of expected returns accrued 
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under the privatized system brings down the rate of return to levels that are lower than 
those observed before reform. They also argue that even if individuals choose to invest 
their pension-oriented assets in market equities that yield higher rates of return, the 
final outcomes will not look as initially observed. This fact is being ascribed by the 
authors to two main arguments. First, adjusting market rates of return to the initial risk 
of bond yield would bring down the level of returns premium. Second, even if the 
market risk adjusted rate of return is optimally raised through diversification 
strategies, the general equilibrium process with a large number of equity bidders 
would most likely land up with a jump in stock prices and hence lowering their yield.
12
 
Nevertheless, if any effort is made to step-up the finally awarded returns for the 
forthcoming future generations through out increasing the funding level of the scheme, 
then these future gains will most likely be at the expense of the current generations. 
Making upon the above mentioned arguments, as they state, social security reform 
debates shall give more attention to the trade-off of generational returns, the risk 
aspects of enlarged stock traders and the issue of choosing the better approach for 
utilizing the privatized accounts.  
Aaron and Reischauer (2000) favor solving the financial challenges of social security 
schemes without any fundamental changes. They diagnose the features and avails of 
pension schemes as crucially requested, since they provide assured and adequate 
income support to old age and disability pensioners as well as their survivors. Pension 
plans also cater a just risk dissemination among different types of participants who are 
subject to various forms of uncertainty such as assets price fluctuations, inflation and 
longevity, among others. However, the problem of financial collapse, according to 
them, can be redressed through optimally utilizing the wealth accumulated in the 
pension schemes buffer funds in a way that maximizes the level of return for 
satisfactory levels of risk.  
Munnell (1999) provides groundbreaking features for pre-funding pensions and equity 
investment. He tried to show that defined contribution approaches are not the only 
stipulation to achieve the goals of prefunding and portfolio optimization, it can also be 
accomplished through defined benefit plans. From that on, he argues that the attention 
                                                                  
12 It is also argued that higher demand for stocks, relative to bonds, should increase the price of stocks relative to 
bonds and thus decreasing the equity premium. For more detailed analysis see (Blommestein, 2002). 
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should be agitated to the events of retirement income. However, his sentiment is a bit 
biased toward defined benefits plans as they allow risk sharing and efficient cost 
management and adequate income security lines for relatively low income earners as 
well as disabled ones. Concurrently, Munnel admits that the assessment of pension 
plans is not a facile task to discuss from the stand point of uncertainty, particularly 
regarding political risks that are hard to imagine in pure PAYG defined benefit plans 
and partially funded DB plans.
13
 
Throughout their ten myths about social security reform, Stiglitz and Orszag (2001) 
put forward some critical arguments against the World's Bank multi pillar reform 
approach. The World's bank approach which is proposed in averting the Old age crises 
recommends a reform process that entails (i) a publicly managed, unfunded DB pillar 
(ii) privately managed, funded DC pillar and (iii) a voluntary private pillar.  
The ten myths they raised throughout their paper come out with a pessimistic view 
concerning the extent in which a second pillar, of a privately funded DC pillar can be 
favored over a well structured DB pillar. For instance, the argument which is often 
raised by many economists, that the rates of return are higher under individual 
accounts may prove not true. Once the cost of financing the unfunded liabilities and 
the cost of managing these accounts are considered, particularly the small accounts, 
the resulted and implied ROR under DB pillar is more likely to exceed that of 
individual accounts. Not far from this myth, the authors indicate that even though 
competition reduces the administrative costs under private DC plans, no one should 
conclude that such a cost would always arrive below its level in DB pillar. The latter 
argument is built upon the experience of Chile and U.K. in which the three major 
types of costs (i) the accumulation cost (ii) alteration cost and (iii) annuitization costs 
have jointly registered a significant level. The other myths in a way or another criticize 
the suitability of having a privately managed DC pillar and recommend a wider range 
view when deciding about the shape of second, in which, all the raised myths have to 
be considered.   
Pennacchi (1998), however, introduces some possible solutions to the issue of income 
uncertainty that has apprehended the attention of Munnell throughout supplementing 
                                                                  
13 For a wider knowledge on the political risks inherent in unfunded schemes, see for instance, Mchale (1999).  
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the reformed schemes with additional guarantee provisions. His simulations have 
considered three distinct types of individual fund rate of return guarantees that are 
evaluated in the context of Option- Pricing theory. The first option is to provide the 
participants with a guarantee of fixed minimum rate of return. As a second applicable 
option, the author also testified the appropriateness of introducing a minimum rate of 
return guarantee that is linked to an index of wide funds performance. The third 
option, is to provide the participants of a mandatory defined benefit plans with a 
minimum pension benefits guarantee. What his simulations have shown is that among 
all sorts of governmental guarantees, participants tend to select adversely and have a 
moral hazard behavior. The best way to eliminate such distortional virtues, as the 
author suggests, is through establishing a risk-based insurance premium. This means 
that riskier individuals have to pay higher insurance premium.   
Therefore, they propose confirming portfolio diversification principle and to pose 
another pillars to the initially unfunded one. Contradicting themselves, the authors 
have finally ended on a pessimistic vista regarding their proposed reform measures. 
they indicate that as time passes away with the multi tier system, high income earners 
will use their best efforts to scale down some of the redistribution characteristics of the 
reformed scheme in order to step-up their own pension rewards. Believing that this 
scenario is most likely to happen, reformers should stimulate a greater attention to 
solidarity issues when they ever think of such an approach.  
Burtless (2000) explains the misconception of the expected consequences of 
transferring retirement schemes from PAYG to systems that are basically based on 
individual accounts. Such a strategy, as he finds, would in most often cases combine 
two major problems. At first, it ignores the burden of dual contribution rates: the 
contribution needed to finance the participants own pension accounts and the implicit 
contribution required to pay for the unfunded liabilities. The second problematic issue, 
he has cogitated in, is the type of risks that accompany the defined benefits system and 
defined contribution ones. In a defined benefits system, risks are allocated and 
distributed among generations so that participants born at the same year having the 
same earning records are equally subject to the same levels of risk. While in a defined 
contribution system, risks can range differently among individuals even though they 
34                                                                                                              2. Pension Financing and Reform 
 
have the same earning profiles and identical investment strategies.
14
 Thus, DB plans, 
according to the authors view, tend to expose a wide variability in outcomes, 
regardless whether participants are homogenous or heterogeneous either in their 
earning records or in the strategy they follow to manage their pension assets. From 
that on, they bet on prudent reserve management strategies in order to make reform 
options that involve advance funding more successful.   
Miles and Cerny (2003) indicate that it is not necessary that any reform strategy which 
combines more funded elements implies always a greater profitability for the schemes’ 
participants, especially if profitability is estimated according to the price of factors 
scarcity.
15
 The core of his conclusion is initially based on the fact that participants tend 
to invest a relatively high proportion of their pension assets in risky tools when their 
future pension income comprises more funded elements than unfunded ones, vice 
versa. Switching the investment strategy of pension wealth towards safer financial 
tools aftermath the reliance on more funded elements, depends ultimately on how the 
returns on safe assets and the risk premium on risky ones would move with respect to 
the change in capital to labor ratio. If the proportional drop in risk free rate of return is 
higher than the rate of deterioration in risky ones, then the switch to safer tools should 
be in a lesser extent, vice versa.  
Williamson (2004) does not fully agree with Miles and Cerny since he thinks that 
moving from unfunded pension plans to plans with more funded elements would face 
many challenges to which the transition cost is among the most significant driver. A 
better alternative reform strategy can be done by following NDC approach. The 
reasons for being optimistic about this option, as the author argues, is that transition 
costs in such a system are internally financed throughout PAYG mechanism. In 
addition to that the author thinks that NDC implies lower administrative costs and the 
pensions of beneficiaries are not vulnerable to the volatility of financial markets.  
Gruber and Wise (2002) emphasize on the future implications of pension reform. 
Their conclusions were based on the question whether the reform strategy would be 
                                                                  
14 In such a case the main source of dissimilarity, as the author attributes, is the timing of retirement.  
15 The higher the availability of production factors, the lower is their prices relative to the prices of other scarce 
factors. For more comprehensive view on how the degree of factors scarcity has affected their prices, see for 
instance O'Rourke et al. (1996).     
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temporary or permanently fix, and how it could affect the overall national saving. 
Parametric reforms as their study finds can alleviate the financial imbalances of the 
unfunded schemes but well have little influence on national savings. In addition to 
that, parametric reforms do not mean that reformed schemes will be isolated from any 
future financial crises. On the other hand, fundamental reforms with the introduction 
of personal accounts are most likely to increase the level of personal saving and hence 
national savings. Such a scenario, according to the authors, is being supported by 
many researchers who found that personal accounts in most cases, do not substitute 
that much for personal savings. Contributions under this sort of schemes are more 
profitable since the investment in the equity market yields greater returns on assets 
when compared with the implicit rate of return provided by PAYG schemes. The 
major risks of transferring to personal accounts scheme, as they conclude, relate to the 
redistribution principle that might be less maintained than it is in the PAYG system. 
Fluctuations in financial markets are also another type of risk at which the benefits of 
some group of participants step rather unstable.   
Sinn (2000) considered the issue of privatizing pension schemes from an anoher angle. 
His finding basically apposes the market funded schemes since theoretically, both 
explicit and implicit taxes before and after reform would be the same. That said 
although market based pension schemes provide a high rate of return, the net present 
discounted value of pension benefits is similar to those achieved under the unfunded 
schemes. The only change pension reform can do, as he argues, is to alter the time 
path of burden across generations, as reforms are always no more than a zero- game 
mechanism.  
Modiglian et al.(2000) support the gradual replacement of PAYG system by fully 
funded one. They show by simulating the U.S. social security scheme that introducing 
funded elements will permanently preserve the welfare objectives of the former PAYG 
and at the same time maintain the current promised benefits. Their conclusion is 
initially drawn on the fact that contributions paid under a pure PAYG are transferred 
directly to finance current consumption. While with new funded elements, 
contributions can be invested in financial tools that will most likely grow largely by 
the time of retirement and yield a return that is capable to bring down the financing 
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needs of the PAYG system.
16
 Keeping on PAYG, as they suggest, not only finically 
unsound, but it might also imply high degrees of insolvency risk especially in the case 
where demographic and productivity movements are less stable than the market rate of 
return on financial assets.  
Through the evaluation of the advisory council plans that aims at ameliorating the 
future financial solvency of the U.S. social security system, Devine (1997) resolves 
that he is not sure enough whether the labor supply can be eventually influenced by 
the mechanism in which the link between individual own contributions and benefits is 
tightened through privatization process. His argument relies principally on a general 
conclusion regarding the workers behavioral responses that follow in different routes 
the workers own characteristics, including age, gender, and skills level. As regards 
age, for instance, younger workers might react to the changes in future prospective 
levels of income in a trifling matter, simply because they discount their own retirement 
income over a long period of time. Such a weak response can also be attributed to the 
probability of being alive until retirement. Devine reports that since this probability is 
positively related to the age of workers, the uncertainty concerning remaining life span 
becomes in a lesser extent young employees when comparing its level for older ones. 
This living fact of the latter argument, anyhow, is evidently supported by widely 
standardized life tables, since they indicate explicitly that mortality rate (Survival rate) 
relates inversely (positively) to someone's age.
17
    
In addition to the factors mentioned above, Devine thinks that the job offering decision 
of workers in some cases can be influenced by the portion of social and funded 
elements in the initial plan and after privatizing it. To illustrate that, the author 
indicates that if the redistributive characteristics of the former plan have been reduced 
at the advantage of more contribution based benefits, then participants might take this 
as a sign of retirement income variability. This as the author believes could make them 
                                                                  
16 This, however, should not be considered as a general principle since the authors have assumed that part of the 
transition cost is supplemented through: 1) the reserves accumulated in the trust fund. 2) The future expected 
surpluses in the scheme total balance. 3) A portion of government surpluses. 4). optimally managed pension 
reserves.   
17 Sometimes it is called death rate. This concept refers to the probability of dying at a specific age. the rates found 
in life tables usually denote for the  number of people who die of a certain disease compared with the total number 
of people at each age bracket. Mortality is often stated as death per 1000 inhabitants.   
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more pessimistic about their living standard during the retirement life span and hence 
more reluctant to pay mandatory contributions.  
2.3.2 Incentives and Savings   
 James (1999) seeks for the trade-off between efficiency and equity that might 
occur as a consequence of moving from unfunded to funded pension schemes. Before 
calling some of his results regarding this issue, it is worth mentioning the 
inefficiencies the author raises as the sources that advocate the need to reform PAYG- 
DB benefits. the author argue that the absence of clear link between benefits and 
contributions is most likely to result in a decreasing level of employment and 
reallocating labor from the formal to the informal sector, among others. Another 
dimension of inefficiency the author contends appears in defined benefit schemes with 
buffer funds that are badly managed. As regard equity, the distortions may arise from 
two dimensional facts. The first comprises the better treatment of high income earners 
over lower earners.
18
 While the second reflects the present values transfer from young 
to older generations.  
Arguing optimistically, James thinks that a great portion of unfunded schemes 
inefficiencies can be alleviated via the transition to fully funded schemes. The clear 
link between participants' benefits and their contributions in funded schemes 
encourages them to contribute more rather than escaping the payment of implicit taxes 
incurred in the unfunded schemes. This of course would remove a great portion of the 
labor market distortions and also enhance participation. Concerning the equity based 
distortions, the author comments that funded schemes enhance capital formation that 
fuels the economic growth and hence contributing in the possible increase of the future 
earnings for the middle and low class earners. Funded schemes also remove some 
types of extra benefits that are implicitly honored to prerogative groups.
19
 Some pre-
reform equity problems in the privatized scheme, however, still prevail and some 
others may also arise. The random fluctuations in the profitability of market traded 
                                                                  
18 At first glance, it might be thought that lower income earners get more generous returns than the high income 
earners get on their contribution. The author however, presents some possible facts that might bring back this 
perception to a reverse conclusion. Among them is that rich participants live more than the average life expectancy 
of poor participants and they also have more opportunities to join pension –credited university periods.  
19 These groups include those who can financially benefit from special sorts of features and opportunities such as 
those who retire early and not discounted fairly.  
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assets during the contributory life, the unpredictable levels of interest rate at the time 
of retirement and the administrative costs implications are among the most important 
equity problematic aspects that have to be considered after implementing such a 
reform strategy. In sum-up, James concludes that while the efficiency gains are more 
likely to appear in the privatized pension scheme, the identity of winners and losers 
reckons on how participants exploit the available opportunities and on how the equity 
principle is regarded.
20
  
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) assure that any reform strategy that implies a stronger 
link between participant’s benefits and contributions than it is implied in the pre-
reformed scheme would surely result in efficiency gains in the sense that implicit tax 
wedges would partially be reduced. However, this conclusion should not be seen for 
all generations since that the efficiency gains by any generation would mostly occur at 
the expense of other generations.   
Via using what is known Auerbach-Kotlikoff dynamic life cycle model, Kotlikoff 
(1995) concludes that efficiency gains are likely to be inherent when pension schemes 
are privatized. The extent of gains or losses( in particular cases) depends mainly on 
several factors among which the way incomes are taxed before the reform process, 
benefits correlate with participants own contributions and the tax instruments used to 
finance the transition cost are the most important. For instance, the maximum level of 
efficiency gains as Kotlikoff finds in his model can be achieved under the following 
conditions and circumstances:  
– A progressive income tax system is initially implemented before reform. 
– The pre-reform linkage between benefits and contributions is low.  
– Consumption taxes are used to finance the transition cost. 
If these conditions were all to exist, the level of initial welfare might increase by 
almost 4.5 percentage points. This level, however, would most likely fall if either of 
these conditions alternatively occurs:  
                                                                  
20 The consideration of equity principle differs among participants and scheme sponsors. Sometimes it is regarded 
as financial neutrality, reducing inequalities or eliminating poverty, among others. 
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– The income tax rate before implementing the reform was independent from the 
level of income base.  
– Income tax rates are increased to finance the transition cost instead of the 
consumption taxes.  
– A perfect pre-reform linkage between individual's pension benefits and 
contributions. 
When Katlikoff has simulated the existence of all the above conditions, the welfare 
level appeared lower than the initial welfare level by roughly 3 percentage points.  
Miles (2000) states that the optimal degree of funded and unfunded elements (flat 
pension) in pension schemes should mainly follow two factors. The first comprises the 
nature of the distribution of rates of return while the other relates to the development 
and efficiency level of annuity markets. The combinational mix between the market 
generated rates of return on behalf of their volatility on the one hand and the extent to 
which the financial market provides perfect annuity contracts, determines the degree 
of reliance on the funded elements. Assuming for instance the contract market 
perfection is constant, the higher rate of return on market assets even though when 
associated with more uncertainty, it is more efficient to include more unfunded 
elements, vice versa. If on the other hand we assume the rate of return on a given level 
of volatility is constant, then it is worth increasing the reliance on the funded elements 
whenever the financial markets became more efficient to provide annuity contracts. 
However, the final combination of both elements should also take into account how 
explicit market rates of return might differ from the implicit ones inherent in the 
unfunded.  
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996) seem not very optimistic regarding the ability of reform 
strategies that involve more funded elements to motivate participants own savings. 
Since precautionary savings positively relate to the degree of uncertainty
21
, the net 
effect of introducing fairly actuarial elements fundamentally depends upon the extent 
of how political risks abridge and market risks increase. If the scale down in political 
                                                                  
21 Some evidences on this fact can be found in Irvine and Wang (2001) and Murata (2003), among several others. A 
contrast evidences have also been concluded by other literatures.  
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risks via the more funded benefits exceeds the jump-up in the market based risks, 
participant's savings are more likely to increase, and vice versa.  
Empirically speaking, Coronado (1998) studied the impact of the Chilean well known 
experience in pension privatization at the beginning of the ninth decade of the last 
century on the individual savings of participants. His findings confirm the perception 
that pension privatization enhances savings since  the move of the Chilean pension 
system from PAYG to the fully funded one has resulted in  increasing saving rates for 
participants who have joined the reformed scheme by almost 7.5% points.
22
 If the 
above mentioned arguments of Mitchell and Zeldes (1996) apply in the context of 
Chilean experience, then one can conclude that the impact of reduced political 
influence on participants was lower than the impact of increasing market uncertainty. 
This conclusion, however, has not been confirmed by Coronado himself, since he 
admits that such a ratiocination cannot be corroborated unless the asset allocation 
among the household is studied. 
A contrast conclusion nevertheless found in an experience that is geographically not so 
far from Chile. Aguila (2003) encounters that the replacement of Mexico old PAYG 
scheme by the fully funded private system in 1997 has not led to an increase in private 
savings. From that she he proposes additional procedures in order to make the 
implemented reform strategy more influential to promote private savings. An example 
on such procedures is to provide the employers and employees with preferable fiscal 
treatment in such a way that enhances their voluntary savings.  
2.3.3 Financial Markets Preconditions 
 In an attempt to initiate a better environment for pension reform, Blake (2003) 
puts forward some financial requirements that are needed to enhance a successful shift 
towards fully funded schemes. The most important condition, in his view, is to have 
financial instruments that accomplish the following two criterias: (i) they should be 
highly correlated with the growth of earnings during the early life of pension fund and 
                                                                  
22 He used the output data from the household income expenditure survey conducted by the National Institute of 
Statistics in Chile. The data were collected over a period of twelve months, from December 1987 through 
November 1988. Saving as the author defines is the household tax-deducted income minus expenditures.  
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(ii) have greater capital value certainty as the retirement date approaches. Both 
features are crucially requested to help targeting the future pension benefits at the time 
of maturity. Further supporting elements, the author proposes, can be guaranteed by 
the government through issuing bonds indexed to the changes in the national average 
earnings.  
More responsibilities on governments for providing a better environment for a 
successful transition to fully funded schemes are classified by Blake under two main 
stages. During the first stage, namely the accumulation stage, governments should 
encourage the introduction of appropriate incentives such as assuring a greater 
transparency in the published performance data in order to promote the efficient 
investment management of pension assets. During the distributional (Payout) stage, 
the requirements seem to be more financial than regulatory. For instance government 
might be requested to issue instruments that enable the annuity providers to hedge 
risks that are beyond their ability. These instruments should be designed in a way that 
enables those providers to hedge special types of risks effectively and economically 
e.g. survivors bonds. 
In another perspective, the investment in information technology projects that aims at 
establishing a better registration system for contributions, monitoring performance 
standards and program efficiency as Mitchell (1997) argues is crucially requested for 
privatizing pension schemes. In addition to these conditions, major steps must be 
considered when the reliance on the funded elements increases. Among these steps is 
to strengthen the banking and insurance sector in order to increase the participants 
confidence in the system. As Blake (2003) did, the authors appoint two major 
responsibilities on governments to support the success of pension privatization. the 
first reflects the liberalization of foreign investment of pension funds whenever the 
domestic financial markets are not  functioning  well in terms of capability, risks and 
returns. 
A second alternative or additional responsibility on governments is to increase the 
issues of government insured bonds when the degree of liberalizing global funds is 
low. The authors aspire from the latter responsibility to expand the functions and the 
capabilities of domestic market.  
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Vittas (1999) however, disagrees with the overestimation of the feasibility 
preconditions that facilitate reaching the desired goals of privatizing pension 
provisions. He thinks that the impacts are more likely to act the one way or another as 
the gradual accumulation of pension fund assets supports the development and 
efficiency of the financial markets. The most important demanding issue in the context 
of feasibility preconditions is to guarantee and maintain macrofinancial stability in 
order to assure the efficient functionality of market securities and institutional 
investors. In order to safely handle the participants accounts and secure a better supply 
of reliable insurance contracts, among others, the author accents that countries subject 
to reform should nurture the more efficient as well as solvent banking and insurance 
institutions. The impact preconditions, as Vittas defines, include the attainments of 
critical mass, the adoption of tributary regulations, the quest for optimizing policies 
and the prevalence of pluralistic structure.   
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3. The Social Security Corporation: Historical and 
Analytical Facts 
3.1 The Pension Insurance System in Jordan 
 Before going through the detailed analyses of the insurance coverage of the Social 
Security Corporation (SSC), the concerned provision in our study, a brief overview on the 
pension system is worth mentioning here. Before the SSC has already been established in 
1980, the government pension system was the only provision that provides a career based 
Old-Age benefits. The coverage of this fund, however, was only provided to civil servants 
working for the government as well as for all members of the armed forces and the public 
security, civil defence and intelligence services.  
The absence of complementary schemes that cover none public employees and employers 
has forced the efforts toward announcing the social security law in 1978 which was the 
root for establishing the SSC in 1980. This law has given the corporation a full 
independency status on a basis of self financing. The commencement of the corporation 
activities had been launched on the basis of mandatory coverage for market based 
economic activities that hire more than 50 employees. But one year later, the government 
decided to expand the coverage umbrella of this corporation to comprehend all companies 
that employ no less than 20 persons. In order to increase the role of the SSC in providing 
old age security as well as other insurable services, the legal authorities took two steps 
further to expand the coverage of the scheme through mandating all companies that engage 
more than ten persons by year 1984 and 5 persons by 1987 to insure their employees and 
employer according to the legislative conditions of the scheme. In addition to that, the 
scheme has started to cover all universities, municipalities and civil employees of the 
armed forces under the same conditions that entitle the private sector participants.  
During the last decade of the past century, the Jordanian government felt the expected 
future financial challenges of continuing with its pension system as the proceeds towards 
civil and military servants started to increase dramatically with a negligible increase of 
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contribution receipts.
23
Accordingly, the less politically viable solution was to shift all new 
recruits who have begun their work as civil servants in the public sector to the SSC. 
Further steps were taken afterward during the second year of this century; among them is 
the permutation of all persons hired after 2003 in the non-civil government branches to the 
SSC.
24
   
The initial SSC law of the 1978 and it is modified version in 2001 allows the corporation 
to provide six types of insurance:   
I- Insurance against natural disability old age and death.  
II- Insurance against work injuries and occupational diseases.  
III- Insurance against temporary disability due to sickness or motherhood.  
IV- Health insurance for the worker and his/her dependent.  
V- Family allowances.  
VI- Unemployment. 
Although the SSC provides only the first two types of insurance coverage, the attention 
toward this corporation has increased substantially from the time it was established 
especially if we know that the substitute provisions are absent and the private insurance 
system in Jordan is still immature and needs imminent reform.
25
  
3.1.1 Members Structure 
 As in other pension schemes, the SSC embodies two types of participants. The first 
type comprises the active members of the scheme. We named them active here in the sense 
that those agents are still participating in the production process of different market based 
activities and paying contributions to the scheme. The other type of members reflects the 
non active participants who are getting financial benefits from the scheme regardless of the 
insurable category they belong to.  
As regards the first type of members, the SSC has experienced a drastic increase in the 
number of active participants. From the beginning of the nineties of the last century until 
                                                                  
23 It should be noted that the contribution rate for the public pension scheme is 8.75% out of total income. The 
operational annual shortfalls in the public pension obligations balance have been always financed from the general 
budget.    
24 Officers, however, are still covered under the rules of the old system.  
25 For a deeper overview about the insurance system in Jordan see Vittas (2004) 
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the end of 2003 the number of contributors has almost doubled. The main cause of such a 
rapid increase in their number relate by a way or another to the increase in mandatory 
coverage, the displacement of new government servants from the public scheme to the SSC 
and the increase in employment level, among others. The proportional increase of the 
employment level, however, was in some years higher and some others lower than the 
proportional increase of covered persons since the proportion of persons who are insured 
under the SSC's umbrella has unsystematically fluctuated during the period 1997-2003, as 
Figure 3.1 depicts. Generally speaking, the SSC seems to be on the right track in terms of 
coverage development as the ratio of employed persons who participate in the SSC 
increased by almost one-quarter within only five years. When the rate of unemployment is 
also considered, the coverage ratio seems a bit lower than observed in terms of actual 
employment.  
SSC Coverage Ratio
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Source: Author's Calculations depending on the SSC annual reports, different issues.  
Figure 3.1: The development of the scheme's parameters 
It can be seen also from the above figure that the growth rate of contributors has fluctuated 
moderately during the same period with no less than four and not more than twelve 
percentage points.
26
 
What is important to state here is that the number of male contributors largely exceeded the 
number of female contributors over the last twenty five years. Such a feature can mainly be 
attributed to the lower female labor force participation rate to which cultural, social 
barriers have apposed to females to share the labor supply in measure of their counterpart 
males. The second possible reason for this feature basically reflects the high proportion of 
active females who are not employed when compared with males. In 2003 for instance, the 
                                                                  
26 For detailed date regarding the development of contributors see appendix.  
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unemployment rate of females was almost 21% while only 12% of the male active labor 
force were unemployed. The coverage ratio for females, on the other hand, unexpectedly 
appears higher than their male counterpart. The possible explanation for this fact combines 
the social and cultural conditions and the SSC's law clauses. To put this in simpler manner, 
some of the cultural barriers prohibit females to work with small enterprises where the 
number of staff is relatively low and motivate them more to work with intensive labor 
activities. Given the fact that SSC's coverage is mandatory for the latter sort of activities, 
females tend to appear more institutionally obligated to participate with the scheme 
insurable services.   
The number of beneficiaries, on the other hand, has also developed considerably from the 
time the SSC was established until recently. The stock of beneficiaries from the old-age 
provision who retired on the normal and early retirement basis have already started to 
increase in accelerating rates by the beginning of the last decade of last century as many 
participants have started to fulfill the minimum vesting period required for retirement. 
27
 
The average annual growth rate in the number of old age beneficiaries has registered 
almost 16% during the period (1998-2003) while the corresponding rate in the number of 
contributors couldn’t have exceeded 7%. This of course as we will see later in this study 
caused part of the increase in the systems’ dependency ratio.
28
  
The number of natural disabled beneficiaries has also increased all along the studied period 
but in a lesser extent than we have observed in the old age provision
29
. Beneficiaries of 
other types of provisions such as with death and disability caused by work were no 
exception in respect to the above observed trends. Figure 3.2 shows conspicuously how the 
relative importance of old age beneficiaries has increased at the expense of other types of 
retirement provisions during the period (1998-2003).  
                                                                  
27 Vesting period is a widely used pension concept in which it reflects the minimum period the pensioner should have 
contributed to the scheme at the time of retirement. Usually vesting period conditions are associated with a minimum age 
of retirement.  
28 We mean by the system dependency ratio: the ratio of pensioners to active contributors.  
29 This can be attributed to the fact that disability pensions are less optional for beneficiaries since they have to pass many 
procedures in which an independent medical committee is involved among others. 
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The development in the structure of Beneficiaries 
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Source: Author's calculations based on the SSC annual reports, different issues.  
Figure 3.2: The development of the scheme's beneficiaries structure 
3.1.2 Financial Balances 
 Generally speaking, the SSC has two main sources of funds, the insurable revenues 
the scheme generates via the contribution rate levied on contributors, and the investment 
revenues from utilizing the reserves that have already accumulated in its fund. As regards 
the contribution part of revenues, the SSC collects two types of contributions. The first 
type represents the monthly fees imposed on participants to insure them against old age, 
death and disability, while it charges the second type to insure them against work accidents 
and injuries.  
According to the SSC's law, a contribution rate of 14.5% of participants monthly wage bill 
which intends to cover them with the above listed provisions of old age security has to be 
shared unequally by the covered participants and their employers. The employee pays only 
5.5% and the remaining part is paid by his employer. From a global perspective, as Figure 
3.3 clearly shows, such rates either the one paid by the employees or by their employer can 
still be considered fair when compared with other countries.  
Among the selected Arab countries, only in Bahrain, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Tunisia 
the insured participant pays less than the Jordanian participant. Lebanon as the only case, 
charges no insurance contributions from the main contributors. None of the selected 
European countries, on the other hand, deduct less than the SSC does from the salary bills 
of it is participants.  
The sentiment differs a bit when the contribution rate imposed on the employer to insure 
his employees in the old age insurance provision is considered. Compared with respect to 
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the contribution rate charged from the insured persons, more Arabian countries charge a 
higher contribution rate from the employers than SSC. These countries are Algeria, 
Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman and Tunisia. Among the selected European countries, 
only in Belgium and Cyprus the employers pay a lower proportion than the Jordanian 
employers pay to insure their own employees.  
Benefits on the other hand are given on the basis of several statuses. In terms of the 
number of beneficiaries and the outlays given for them, old age insurance can be 
considered as the most important provision provided by the scheme. Participants can fully 
acquire their accrued benefits without any deductions if they retire on the normal age of 
retirement. 
 
Source: Author's own representation based on: ISSA (2004) for the selected European countries; ISSA (2003a) for the 
selected Arab-African countries; ISSA (2002) for the selected Arab-Asian Countries.  
Figure 3.3: The level of pension contribution rate in selected Arab and European 
countries  
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As in many other countries, the normal age of retirement differs between both genders. 
However, sixty years for males and fifty-five for females seems a bit lower than those 
observed in other European countries but well-nigh similar to Arabian countries. To make 
our judgment more reasonable, the life expectancies must be introduced to figure how 
normal retirement age proportionally ranks compared to them. The only data we could 
obtain is life expectancy at birth. Although considering life expectancies at the age of 
retirement makes more sense in our context, the use of life expectancies at birth can still be 
meaningful. The logic behind introducing this factor is to evaluate the extent to which the 
normal age of retirement is far from the average end of life spans. Starting there, we divide 
the normal age of retirement by the life expectancy at birth in each country. The higher the 
resulting ratio is, the more coveted is retirement age from the perspective of the financial 
health of the system. If participants live longer after their normal retirement age, they 
would probably absorb more funds from their pension providers. This figure, however, 
shouldn’t be considered for more than a general purpose of international comparison. 
Figure 3.4 reports how such a ratio differs among the selected Arabian and European 
countries. The retirement age for men covered under the SSC old age insurance transpires 
below the average of Arab countries and expectedly lower than for other European 
countries. This in terms of insurance measures means that SSC participants are allowed to 
retire normally at earlier ages than participants in other countries when life expectancies 
are considered for this judgment. Putting this statement in a clearer sense, SSC participants 
spend more time in retirement than participants of pension schemes in most other countries 
spend.  
The extent of disparity increases for women when their after retirement life span is 
compared with counterpart women in other Arab countries as well as in many European 
countries. For instance, a woman in Jordan lives on average seventeen years after 
retirement. While women in Lebanon, Egypt, for instance, live only for eleven and ten 
years, respectively after retirement. In other European countries the possibility to live more 
years after retirement seems to be in contrast to the ones observed in the case of men. 
Generally speaking, although the normal age of retirement for women in the selected 
European countries is slightly higher than of the SSC, women in these countries live longer 
after retirement than Jordanian women do.  
Concerning the possibility of early retirement, fifty percent of the country schemes 
reviewed in our study do not allow their participants to retire early. Pension schemes in 
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Sudan and Kuwait, for instance, apply the same possible earliest retirement age as the SSC 
currently does. The early retirement age of forty-five years in these schemes, however, is 
far less than those observed in other European countries. Except for Greece, the earliest 
retirement age in the selected European countries is not less than sixty. 
30
  
 
Source: Author's own representation based on the same sources of Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.4: The ratio of normal retirement age to the life expectancy at birth in 
selected Arab and European countries 
In attempt to flash out a general view about the development of the scheme financial 
conditions, three concepts are used to do so. Firstly, the insurable balance ratio which 
reflects the proportional level of insurable expenditures to the level of contribution 
receipts, gives a useful signal on the extent to which the proceeds toward beneficiaries are 
covered by other ongoing contributions. Our second concept, namely the operational 
balance, contemplates the ability of insurable revenues to cover the scheme total outlays. 
The last measure we use in our brief analysis of the development in the scheme financial 
                                                                  
30 For country specific data regarding normal and early retirement ages, see appendix.  
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measures is the aggregate ratio. This ratio is a bit similar to the operational ratio except that 
it combines the investment revenues with the insurable ones to totally show how the 
scheme in general is able to cover both the insurable and the administrative expenditures. 
Figure 3.5 renders how the above three measures have developed from the time the system 
was established until the end of 2003.  The curves that represent the historical trend of the 
three concepts have typically been sloped upwardly all along the studied period. This of 
course indicates that the dominator increased proportionally more than the nominator. The 
first ten years after establishing the SSC has experienced continued high growth rates in 
insurable and total expenditures when they are compared with insurable ones. The 
aggregate ratio, on the other hand, had sloped less steeply as the proportional growth in 
investment revenues partially substituted the higher growth rate in total expenditures.    
After 1990, all factors became relatively more stable as the curves that represent them look 
flatter than in the previous decade. This can mainly be attributed to the large increase in the 
number of contributors during the nineties of last century to which the contributions 
collected from them had increased substantially. By the beginning of this century,   
however, the three factors started to accelerate increase as many participants went into 
retirement, particularly on early retirement basis. Broadly speaking, the scheme has already 
commenced to face unwanted financial conditions as the insurable and operational ratios 
on the one hand and the aggregate ratio on the other, exceeded three and two quarters, 
respectively. In 2003, for instance, only one quarter of the system's insurable revenues has 
remained in the SSC's buffer fund.  
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Source: Author's own representation based on SSC annual report, different issues.  
Figure 3.5: The development of the scheme’s aggregate financial measures (1980-
2003)  
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3.2 The Management of SSC Fund Reserves 
 As globally observed, the reserves of mandatory pension schemes are managed by 
either three ways. The first one stands for the partially funded schemes of countries with 
young population where contribution rates are (or had been) set above the implicit PAYG 
contribution rate, which has already allowed them to accumulate reserves in their schemes. 
These schemes have been defined as partially funded since their potential and actual assets 
fail to cover the future implicit liabilities. In such schemes, national governments take the 
responsibility of managing and utilizing the scheme assets. To the extent of our 
knowledge, most of the Arabian countries fall under this type of fund management of 
which is Jordan. Pension schemes of other countries such as Sweden and Switzerland in 
Europe, Japan in Asia, United States in America and Ghana in Africa fall also under this 
type of fund management.    
The assets of fully funded schemes that comply with defined contribution rules, on the 
other hand, are managed either centrally by one management establishment or by multiple 
sponsors. As regards the centrally managed funds, namely known as provident funds, a 
central institution collects the contributions of its members and invests them aggregately 
without any option left for the members to choose the level of risk and return they desire. 
Thus, within the same time interval no heterogeneity occurs between the scheme 
participants with respect to the rate of return they get on their contributions.
31
 Such 
provisions are mostly found in East Asian countries and more particularly in emerging 
markets e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.  
The last case in our context mostly exists in Latin America and few European countries 
where the scheme members have the choice of the contribution management sponsors they 
think that would satisfy their own interest. The structure and the rules that regulate those 
schemes differ from one country to another.  
Table 3.1 depicts the pension funds reserves to GDP ratio in selected countries arranged 
under the management and funding types. Saudi Arabia which has a partially funded DB 
scheme accumulated more than one and one third of its GDP as pension reserves to face 
part of the future liabilities. The second largest pension assets proportion to GDP appears 
in the privately managed-fully funded schemes in Switzerland with almost six-fifth the 
                                                                  
31 We mean here that the ROR participants get in a specific year over their accumulated contributions in the same year. .  
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nominal level of GDP. Concerning provident funds, only Indonesia and Malaysia have 
accumulated more than half of their national output as pension oriented assets, while other 
countries implementing the same sort of schemes couldn’t have accumulated as much as 
one-fifth of their GDP.  The SSC in terms of pension assets relative to GDP, however, still 
stands above the average of the observed partially funded schemes as more than one 
quarter of Jordan's GDP have already accumulated its buffer fund. 
Table 3.1: The pension funds reserves proportionally to GDP in selected countries 
Saudi Arabia* Singapore** Switzerland
Egypt Malaysia** Netherlands
Sweden Sri Lanka* UK
Jordan  Kenya* Australia
Philipines Tanzania Chile**
Canada Swaziland Denemark
Gambia Nepal* Argentina **
Morocco* India El Salvador**
Ecuador Indonesia Bolivia**
Ghana Brunei Uruguay**
U.S.* Uganda* Colombia**
Costa Rica* Zambia Khazakstan**
lebanon Mexico**
Switzerland Hungary**
Tunisia Czech Republic**
Swaziland Peru**
Jamica Poland**
Japan Hong Kong**
Guatemala
Peru
Yemen*
8
3,5
0,4
6
5
4,5
2,5
7,6
7,3
7,2
6,7
2,4
1
0,7
117
87,3
74,7
61
53,5
23,9
11,2
1
64,9
57,3
15,8
12,1
9,4
6,6
4,7
4,5
2,8
5,7
5,4
1,7
1
7,2
7,1
6,9
6,6
9,4
9,4
9,4
8,2
11,2
11,1
11,1
9,6
135,2
33,1
32
27
Partially Funded Defined
benefits
Fully Funded with 
Decentralized Management 
Fully Funded with Private 
Management
Type of Funding and Management
 
Sources:*: Palacios (2003), **: Chan-Lau (2004), for Jordan: By the author, the rest countries: Leglesias and Palacios 
(2001).  
3.2.1 Portfolio Composition 
 The portfolio structure of pension funds serves the attention of contributors, 
pensioners and sponsors, among others. For instance, the increase of members 
responsibility in fully funded schemes with a decentralized managed accounts, pushes 
them further, particularly the more financially educated ones, to worry about the portfolios 
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construction and performance of the portfolios of fund sponsors as it implies in a way or 
another the tradeoff between risk and return they would likely get on their own 
contributions (Arnone, 2004). 
32
 
This attention, however, is less observed in centralized managed fully funded or partially 
funded funds. In the partially funded ones that belong to schemes implementing a defined 
benefits formula, such an attention and concern switches substantially from contributors to 
a prudently thinking scheme sponsors (Blake, 2003). This arises since the fail to achieve 
the optimal combination between different types of investment tools can result in 
decreasing credibility and pension future viability.  
Before analyzing the portfolio construction of the SSC, it is worth spotting on the 
development of its reserves from the time it was established until the most recent available 
data. Figure 3.6 depicts in an apparent sense how the SSC has shared the constitution of 
national savings through the continuous increase not only in the absolute levels of reserves 
but also there proportional levels to GDP.
33
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Source: Author's own calculations and representation based on SSC annual report, different issues.  
Figure 3.6: The development of the SSC's fund reserves proportionally to GDP  
Within only five years after establishing the scheme, the reserves have accumulated to 
almost 6 percentage points of GDP. During the second five years, the scheme has 
continued accumulating additional reserves in its fund to which they have contributed 
almost one-eighth the level of GDP in 1990. From that year afterward, the relative 
                                                                  
32 This issue relates mainly to the degree of individual choice, for a more detailed view on the participant choice in such a 
type of scheme management, see Vittas (1999).    
33 The increase in their absolute levels is not ascertained in that figure. The absolute figures, however, confirms that 
conclusion.   
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importance of the scheme funds with respect to GDP gradually increased with only three 
little folds of declination until it reached three tenth the national output in year 2003.  
During the whole period of consideration these funds were mainly invested in short and 
medium term investment tools. This appears clearly in Table 3.2 as three-quarters of the 
scheme aggregate assets were on average invested in bank deposit accounts and 
securities.
34
 The rest fraction has been none systemically distributed between holding some 
shares of other companies and investing in real estate sector. The whole period average, 
however, indicates a relative preference of holding market shares rather than holding real 
estate investments.  
By the beginning of this decade, however, the fund strategy seems that it has started to 
change the composition and the preference between the main investment categories. This 
can be implied through tracking the changes in the portfolio construction to which the 
proportion of reserves that are put in bank accounts decreased from almost 69 % in 1999 to 
41% in 2003. By contrast, permutation took place in the securities category as roughly one 
third of the aggregate portfolio in 2003 was invested in securities instead of less than one-
fifth in 1999. As regards the proportion held in stock and real estate investment, the 
average holding of these both categories during the last four year of comparison has 
increased by 10 percentage points when compared with whole period average.  
The relative biasness toward bank deposits and securities can be attributed to three main 
facts. The first one reflects the absence of investment and professional bodies within the 
SSC to take the responsibility of utilizing and managing the excess reserves that have 
particularly accumulated during the establishment phase. The concern was more oriented 
towards the insurance and general managerial issues of the scheme. The second reason one 
can imply, is that the accumulation of these funds was and still is associated with never 
ending of general government needs to cover its continuous deficit as well as to finance 
some development projects (Zaghloul, 2004; Augusto and Palacios, 2001).
35
 The third 
debatable fact can be reported to the weak domestic financial market performance 
particularly during the ninth decade of the last century. 
                                                                  
34 It is worthy mentioning here that neither the government nor the private sector entities have established a long term 
maturity bonds in Jordan.  
35 In addition to that, the government has already started to replace some external debt through borrowing internally from 
the domestic market.     
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Table 3.2: The development of the SSC portfolio composition 1980-2003)  
Year deposit security stock 
Real Estate Total portfolio 
1980 74 24 1 1 100 
1981 58 9 33 0 100 
1982 67 11 21 1 100 
1983 60 17 22 1 100 
1984 39 21 18 22 100 
1985 43 26 14 17 100 
1986 39 36 10 15 100 
1987 35 43 10 12 100 
1988 36 40 14 10 100 
1989 39 33 19 9 100 
1990 42 32 18 8 100 
1991 45 36 12 7 100 
1992 52 31 11 6 100 
1993 49 29 15 7 100 
1994 52 26 15 7 100 
1995 51 25 17 7 100 
1996 52 25 17 6 100 
1997 51 26 18 6 100 
1998 53 25 17 5 100 
1999 59 18 18 5 100 
2000 52 20 24 4 100 
2001 50 15 30 5 100 
2002 41 23 30 6 100 
2003 24 33 37 6 100 
Average  48 27 18 7 100 
Source: Author calculation with accordance to SSC annual report, Different Issues.  
The way that public pension reserves are composed among different investment categories 
seems not to be an exceptional feature in Jordan in terms of the biasness toward bank 
deposits and securities. Figure 3.7 reports how publicly managed pension funds in selected 
countries have invested a great portion of their assets in that category.   
The perception that underdevelopment and illiquidity of financial markets serves as a 
barrier against the investment in equities is surely less applicable in countries with highly 
developed financial markets e.g. Malaysia, U.S., since many financials argue that such a 
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factor could mainly encourage the allocation of capital particularly toward the investment 
in market stocks (Wurgler,2000; Cesar, 2001). Among the remaining possible reasons for 
this shared feature is the limited independency in managing these funds aside from the 
government control and needs.  
Deposits and securities as % of aggregate portfolio 
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(2001).  
Figure 3.7 The proportion of public pension fund portfolios invested in securities and 
bank deposits 
Such a distribution pattern, however, does not exist in pension funds that are privately 
managed across several countries. A sample of portfolio composition of privately managed 
pension assets in 10 countries shows how their managers have relatively more reliance and 
preference to hold domestic shares and properties. Three out of these countries, as Figure 
3.7 depicts, have invested more than half of their portfolios in such tools. Six countries 
held more than one-quarter and all of them have invested not less than 10% of their 
portfolios in these tools. What should be added in this context is that these figures exclude 
the acquired foreign equities and prosperities held by these portfolios. If these were also 
considered the figure might appear rather greater. This of course supports the view that 
portfolio compositions are most likely dependent on managerial and institutional aspects 
rather than on market based issues.  
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The investment in equities and properities  as % of total Portfolio. 
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Source: Author's own representation based on Davis (2002).  
Figure 3.8: The portion of portfolios invested in equities and prosperities in selected 
privately managed pension funds  
3.2.2 Profitability  
 The rates of return on pension based assets as well as the degree of their security, 
deserves great attention of several parties regardless how the scheme is financed or 
managed. Scheme members can be affected directly or implicitly by the profitability 
achieved on their own contribution (in the case of defined contribution schemes) or on the 
scheme aggregate fund (Defined benefits schemes). The direct effect in the defined 
contribution schemes appears as the pension benefits upon retirement depend essentially 
on the rate of return raised on their contributions, given the fact that higher benefits could 
mainly be associated with higher degree of insecurity in contrast to more secure ones, offer 
them lower benefits (Byrne, 2004). In partially defined schemes, pensions over a long term 
would implicitly be affected by the returns that are generated on the scheme fund, since 
both risks and return influence the future viability of such schemes and hence the time 
when benefits are cut or rate of contributions are raised.  
Some economists argue that most publicly managed pension schemes face two kinds of 
challenges, the poor investment performance and the never ending growth in liabilities 
(Yang and Mitchell, 2005; APPFU, 2001). From that on, it is crucially requested in our 
context to review the performance of the investment strategy of the SSC from the time it 
was established. The importance of such a request is to figure out whether the scheme 
insurable features are the only part to reform or the investment strategy has also failed to 
help the avoidance of greater reforms.  
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In this section we take the effort to analyze the performance of the SSC fund according to 
three criteria's:  
– The domestic Perspective 
– The Global Perspective. 
– Assets and Liability management.  
3.2.2.1 The Domestic Perspective 
 Such a methodology to evaluate the performance of publicly managed pension 
reserves has been used in many literatures. The use of domestic benchmark performance 
to judge on the viability of funds activities can be useful in the sense that the former 
basically reflects the extent to which the internal investment opportunities could provide 
the investors with the returns they require and more importantly to figure out how the 
profitability of pension funds underperforms or outperforms that benchmark.  
Before proceeding any further with the evaluation process, it would be a good idea if we 
present some facts about the general performance of the SSC’s buffer fund during the 
whole accumulation period. Table 3.3 reports the actual nominal and real rates of return 
generated on the main categorical portfolio composition over twenty-two years of 
historical annual observations. It is obvious that nominal terms give slightly different 
judgments on the development and performance of the different tools at which pension 
assets were invested during the comparison period than the real terms would imply for 
the same period. This of course can trustily be attributed to the instability of price levels 
that have eroded the real values of the observed returns.
36
 During the five years after 
establishment, only money market tools and deposit accounts had generated a positive 
ROR on the money invested in them. In 1989, the aggregate portfolio as well as all 
investment categories had experienced an extremely bad performance as the real ROR 
dropped to almost 18 percentage points below zero. That extent of under-performance, 
however, was associated with the highest inflation rate registered in Jordan during the 
last two decades of the last century which was mainly caused by the domestic economic 
crises that happened in that year.
37
 
                                                                  
36 During that period, the inflation rate had always a positive sign except in year 1987 at which the general price index 
has proportionally declined by only 0.2 percentage points than the year before.   
37 For more information about this crises see Autom and Rahahleh (2003).  
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Surprisingly, even though the investment in bonds have been perceived by many 
literatures as a sign of inefficiency, the historical fact about the real rewards on the bonds 
acquired by the SSC proves exactly the opposite when compared with returns on other 
acquired tools. Ranked as the second in terms of profitability, deposits had added roughly 
two real percentage points on their initial values all along the considered period. Other 
investment tools as clearly appear in the real average figures at the bottom of the same 
table caused deterioration in the real value of money invested in them. Aggregately 
speaking, the portfolio has succeeded to surpass the level of real losses and achieved 
almost a whole period average of one percentage points of real ROR. The revision of 
ROR generated during the last three years of our trend implies some optimistic signs of 
the new investment policy of the SSC since almost all portfolio categories achieved 
positive and high real ROR. 
The central questions remains here, why the SSC’s sponsors didn’t response to the 
frequent losses in the real value of their investments in the market equities and real 
estate? Another question appears in this context; have the SSC's sponsors failed to choose 
the appropriate or optimal combinations of stocks and real estate properties?  
As regards the first question, either the sponsors couldn’t have recognized the facts 
mentioned above, although they were sufficiently apparent, or they were forced to 
continue investing in loosing companies and real estates. It might also be that the banking 
sector was not capable to absorb huge funds as interest earning deposits or the lending 
market particularly the government needs were below the funds supply. If either case had 
really existed during the same period, interest rates could have fallen to lower levels than 
those actually observed during the studied period. Other possible explanations could also 
take place. 
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Table 3.3: The difference between the performance of SSC investment instruments 
and the corresponding market benchmark   
Stock Deposits Securities Real Estate  
Aggregate 
Portfolio Year 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal  Real Nominal  Real 
1980 0 -10 3 -7 9 -2 0 -10 3 -8 
1981 0 -11 8 -4 11 -1 0 -11 6 -6 
1982 2 -4 8 2 7 1 0 -6 7 0 
1983 2 0 8 6 6 4 0 -2 7 5 
1984 1 -3 9 5 6 2 0 -4 5 1 
1985 2 -1 8 5 7 4 0 -3 5 2 
1986 2 2 7 7 7 7 0 0 5 5 
1987 2 2 8 8 9 9 0 0 6 7 
1988 2 -5 7 1 6 -1 0 -6 5 -1 
1989 3 -18 8 -14 9 -13 4 -18 7 -15 
1990 4 -11 8 -7 10 -5 5 -10 8 -7 
1991 4 -4 8 0 9 1 2 -6 7 -1 
1992 5 0 7 3 8 3 6 1 7 3 
1993 3 0 6 2 11 7 7 3 7 3 
1994 2 -1 7 3 9 5 5 1 7 3 
1995 2 0 6 4 9 6 8 5 6 4 
1996 2 -4 10 3 9 2 6 -1 8 1 
1997 3 0 10 6 10 7 3 0 8 5 
1998 2 -1 8 5 13 9 7 4 8 5 
1999 2 1 9 8 9 9 1 0 7 7 
2000 2 2 6 6 8 7 1 0 5 5 
2001 2 0 5 4 9 7 1 -1 5 3 
Average 2 -3 7 2 9 3 2 -3 6 1 
Source: Author's own representation based on Zaghloul (2003).   
Note: The real figures are calculated by the author.  
Concerning the second question of whether the SSC have failed to choose an appropriate 
portfolio mix of real estate and equities, the following analyses would verify this argument 
with a respect to general market benchmark performance. We compare first the equities 
investment of the SSC according to their sectoral distribution with those achieved within 
the Amman Stock Exchange. The latter are measured through implementing the weighted 
average approach. This is similar to the Capital Assets Pricing Model which suggests that 
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an optimal portfolio can be achieved through holding assets proportionally to their market 
value. Thus, we assume that market portfolio holds all the market traded assets with a 
proportion that comprises the value of each asset relative to the market value of all traded 
assets.   
The equity sectors considered for comparison are distributed under four categories:  
i. Industrial sector. 
ii. Banking sector 
iii. Services sector.  
iv. Insurance sector. 
Data considered for comparison cover the period from 1986- 1998. Figure 3.9 depicts the 
annual differences between the nominal returns the SSC raised on their equities from each 
sector and those of the market portfolio during the same year.   
The most surprising implication appears in the figures which represent the difference 
between the ROR generated by of the SSC equities that refer to industrial companies and 
those would occur if the SSC had allocated the industrial equities as market portfolio since 
it was negative across all the considered years. The maximum fail was in 1992 when the 
market industrial portfolio generated almost five percentage points more than the SSC 
corresponding ROR. The case for banking sector based equities is not that much different. 
In ten years out of thirteen, the banking portfolio of the SSC had underperformed the 
market portfolio. For the remaining years, the gap on the favor of SSC portfolio didn’t 
exceed a one percentage point. However, the investment of the scheme in such equities has 
relatively improved in the last seven years of the covered period 
The last five years of our covered period indicate some hopeful implications of the SSC 
investment in the equities of the service sector. The returns on the SSC equities of this 
sector exceeded the return that market portfolio would have had to achieve on its equities.
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Source: Author's own calculations and representation based on Zaghloul (2003). 
Figure 3.9: The gap between ROR on the SSC sectoral portfolio and the corresponding market rates  
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The insurance sector portfolio of the SSC indicates some pessimistic signs and assures that 
the service sector was only an exception in this context. Except only for four years, the 
SSC's portfolio in that sector again failed to reach the market's portfolio performance with 
greater gaps than those observed in other sectors.  
If we alter our analyses to perform some financial performance measures, the picture 
would not change but would rather imply more unwanted conclusions. Table 3.4 reports 
the Mean Return (MR), Standard Deviation (STD) and the Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
calculated for the SSC and market sectoral portfolios (Brighan, 1999; Farrell, 1997).  
Table 3.4: Selected performance measures for the SSC and market sectoral portfolios   
Industrial Banking Services Insurance Portfolio 
Sector 
SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market 
MR 3,0 5,0 2,5 3,5 4,1 3,6 5,5 7,1 2,9 4,2 
STD 1,2 1,3 1,3 0,6 2,7 1,6 2,8 2,3 0,9 1,0 
CV 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,2 
Source: Author calculations considering Zaghloul (2003). 
The whole period MR, as a first fold, implies that market portfolio in all sectors except for 
the service sector had performed better than the actual SSC portfolio did. The over-market 
performance of SSC investments in service sector equities, however, could not be 
considered as a substantial advantage over the market portfolio, since the gap is only a half 
percentage point. To the contrast of that, the underperformance of the SSC investments 
appears enough to serve a significant attention. The gap between the ROR on the industrial 
sector equities held by the SSC and those on the market portfolio, for example, was almost 
minus two percentage points. Interpreting generally, the SSC aggregate portfolio of 
equities belonging to all sectors had failed to generate a return that a market portfolio could 
have had to generate.  
Integrating the MR with volatility measured by the standard deviation of the annual MR 
indicates for an extent of inefficiency when compared with those implied in market 
portfolios. An efficient portfolio implies that sponsors choose the optimal combination of 
asset classes to which MR cannot be raised without an associated increase in volatility, or 
it can be said that there is no way to reduce the degree of volatility without pulling down 
the level of returns (Statman, 2001; Davis, 2001). Thus, if the CV in any SSC sectoral 
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portfolio is greater than of the market portfolio, one could say that SSC's portfolio is not on 
the efficient frontier line. For all sectors and hence for the aggregate portfolio, the 
calculated market's CV appears lower than any of the SSC. Consequently, the SSC 
performed less efficiently than the market did and even far less if other prudently 
structured portfolios are considered.  
3.2.2.2 The Global Perspective 
 If we move further with our analyses to a global perspective, one can ask whether the 
performance of SSC is an exception or a general case when compared with the 
performance of other publicly managed pension funds. 
The available data on the real MR raised through overseas publicly managed pension funds 
indicates a wide disparity. Almost half of the countries in which data have been available 
on them have had a positive real MR on pension assets. While the remaining funds of other 
countries have failed to prevent deterioration of the real value of their initial assets. In Peru 
for instance the real MR on the publicly managed pension was roughly minus forty 
percentage points. This in terms of finance means a lot and signalizes for early bankruptcy. 
The real profitable funds as the figure shows are managed in either OECD countries or 
emerging market countries, Morocco and Jordan were only an exception. In terms of real 
performance, Jordan stands exactly before the last (Philippine) among the countries that 
have generated positive real returns on their publicly managed pension funds. 
Unexpectedly, the tradeoff between returns and risk when the cross sectional aspect is 
considered as a base for judgment seems to differ from investment theories postulates.  By 
calculating the Sharpe ratio (MR/Std) for these funds who have achieved a positive MR, 
one can recognize that the above conclusions would not change that much. Korea, 
Malaysia, Morocco and Sweden remain at the top list since they had not only generated the 
best performance in terms of real MR but they had also minimized the level of volatility 
when compared with other countries that appear in the figure. The rank of India in terms of 
MR, for instance, is within the best performed fund, but considering volatility step her up 
to the best five performing funds. That said, India had generated each MR unit with more 
certainty than the U.S. did. 
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In sum, the SSC's portfolio performance stands in the middle of international figures. Most 
of the emerging and all OECD countries considered in our analyses performed better than 
the SSC in respect of return and risks. It is unfair, however, to list the SSC as one of the 
worst publicly managed pension reserve around the globe.   
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Source: Own representation based on 1) Leglesias and Palacios (2001)  2) Zaghloul (2003).  
Figure 3.10: Comparison between MR and Sharp ratio of the SSC fund and publicly 
managed pension funds in selected countries   
3.2.2.3 Assets Liability Management 
 A partially funded system in principle faces two main financial stages. The first stage 
refers to the accumulation period where the system continues to attain ongoing financial 
surpluses as its total revenues from the insurable provision and the investment revenues 
generated by the accumulated reserves exceed the level of the scheme total expenditures. 
During the second stage, namely the decumulation phase, assets are used to cover the 
scheme outlays that are not funded by its aggregate revenues.  
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Both the assets and liability in defined benefit schemes will hardly remain on their 
estimated levels especially over a longer time horizon. The liability side is subject to many 
variables among which is the change in the system dependency ratio and the growth of 
aggregate wage bill. The assets side, on the other hand, does not involve any higher degree 
of stability and predictability. It is even subject to more sources of volatility such as the 
economic conditions, political stability, confidentiality, even for demographic changes as 
well as for several others (Ross, 1976; Shanken, 1982; Roll and Ross, 1995; Cagnetti, 
2002). Thus, the scheme sponsors should always have in mind how to allocate the assets in 
a way that matches the size and volatility of future liability (Blake, 2003). 
Contrary to the Modern Portfolio theory, risks and returns relation in the context of ALM 
approach is defined in terms of the financial health of the pension plan rather than in terms 
of portfolio performance (Hewitt, 2004). In other words, pension schemes who follow this 
approach allocate their assets and choose their contribution policy in a way that guarantees 
the scheme solvency along the planning horizon (Drijver et al., 2000). 
Generally speaking, the SSC' fund policy seems far from the main principles of this 
approach. Although the system has experienced and is still facing over-solvency 
conditions, most of the reserves were invested in short term matured investment tools. 
from a logical perspective, there is no contradiction between investing in short term 
matured assets and the ALM approach unless yields could have been improved if the fund 
had invested in longer maturity tools. From the of finance theory, Zaghloul (2003) 
concludes that the SSC fund has failed to implement an investment policy that matches its 
assets and the scheme liability, the thing which has caused pure opportunity cost losses. 
These funds if were invested in longer maturity instruments might have had a greater 
extent of profitability. At the same time, we should admit here that the long-term security 
market in Jordan is still not well developed till today. However, other financial market 
investment instruments do exist. 
The main point to express in this context is that as we proceed further with time, the level 
of the scheme solvency falls down and hence the possibility to exploit the extra returns that 
could be achieved through investing in longer term instruments would fall accordingly. 
Anyhow, if the SSC’s sponsors start really to think about matching the scheme assets with 
liability, tactical and strategic assets allocation strategies must also be considered in order  
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to reach a better combination between returns, the size of assets and liability as well as 
their volatility.  
3.2.3 Challenges Facing Optimality 
3.2.3.1 Governance Structure 
 Many of the observed publicly managed pension funds around the globe have 
suffered from the lack of independence to which investment decisions were taken on an 
inefficient basis besides from prudently behaving managers, the thing which has worsened 
their performance. This view is being supported by several facts; among them is the lower 
performance of these funds when compared with the privately managed pension funds 
even at the same level of governance, drawn on legal finds to which privately managed 
pension systems reward more real returns on their reserves than a publicly managed 
pension systems can give at the same governance index.
38
 
In the absence of governance, it is hard to avoid the influence of political factors on 
choosing the appropriate portfolio composition that maximizes the profitability for each 
unit of uncertainty. Several publicly managed funds have invested in development oriented 
projects that privately managed ones would never invest in since they generate lower levels 
of returns. 
As regards Jordan, the degree of independency has never been an exception in the case of 
SSC. Prior to 2001, reserves were fully controlled by the Board of Directors. The head of 
this board, deputy and other five members out of totally ten are appointed by the 
ministerial cabinet. After 2001, however, the government decided to separate the insurance 
and investment administration through an established independent investment unit. Despite 
of the target to initiate this unit on a professional basis, the majority of its board of 
directors is still being selected by the central government. 
The great hope of this unit is built upon the new law which was jointly associated with this 
unit. The articles of this law indicate explicitly that the unit should perform a prudent 
management strategy that would provide the scheme with a high rate of return with an 
                                                                  
38 Mok (2000) argues that evidences on this feature do not really exist when other facts are considered, e.g. financial 
crises. for more detailed analyses on the impact of governance on pension fund performance, see for instance, Hsin and 
Mitchell (1994), Useem and Mitchell (2000). 
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acceptable range of certainty (SSC investment law, 2001). At the same time, one of the law 
articles advises the unit to contribute in the financing process of national projects. Such a 
conflict between targets and conditions on the one hand, and the absence of performance 
measures and guarantees on the other, might induce some tough consequences inherent in 
their performance. 
3.2.3.2 International Investments  
 From a financial point of view, the diversification of returns uncertainty can 
principally be done by investing in assets that do not move jointly in the same direction 
(Bugar and Maurer, 2002). At the time it is possible to eliminate non-systematic risk 
components of any domestic portfolio through diversification, the only way left to 
minimize the systematic risks is to be done via investing in global assets and hence 
improve the efficient frontier of risks versus returns (Bodie and Merton, 2001).
39
 The logic 
behind this argument is that country specific shocks on market returns might move in the 
opposite direction of those originate in others (Solnik, 1974; Brooks and Negro 2002). 
Others argue that the demographic features play an imperative role in this context as they 
affect the return and volatility of investment across other countries. The most common 
observed perception regarding this issue explains the falling down of equity returns in 
some countries by the opposite correlation with population growth (Mackellar, 1998). 
Accordingly to their perspective, prudent investors should seek for markets with less 
rapidly growing populations. 
Another argument prefers easing the restrictions on international investment. It builds its 
suggestions on the fact that domestic markets might be not well developed in the sense that 
they don’t allow for a wide range of investment instruments. The existence of such a 
feature restricts the extent of domestic diversification and the possibility to increase the 
returns for each unit of uncertainty or decreasing the risk for each unit of returns.
40
 
The SSC with regard to some of the facts mentioned above seems more required to invest 
internationally than many others for several reasons. First, domestic market instruments are 
                                                                  
39 Some economists argue that the risks of international investment should also comprise the institutional factors. For 
more details see Batraum and Dufey (2001). 
40 Some studies have verified that investment returns correlate positively the degree of financial development. For 
instance, Dellas and Hess (2002) study on emerging and mature markets of 49 countries that stock returns significantly 
and positively relate to the degree of financial development.   
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till yet not sufficient to absorb all the accumulated assets of the fund in the way that is 
appropriate to the matching principle between assets and liability. Second, besides from the 
efficiency of the sponsor's management of the scheme fund, the historical observations 
have approved that Jordanian financial market instruments have relatively failed to 
generate a competitive return/risk measures when compared with other countries, 
particularly emerging markets. Lastly, but not at least, the Jordan economy in general and 
the financial markets in more particular have been more affected by the political instability 
in the region than many other countries.
41
 Thus it makes sense to seek for more stable 
markets with lower degrees of country-specific risks.  
Before the SSC investment law has become effective by the end of 2000, the SSC sponsors 
were not allowed to invest any portion in international investment instruments. The new 
law, however, allows the SSC to invest internationally under several conditions. In 2003, 
the ministerial cabinet has allowed the SSC investment unit to employ no more than 12% 
of it is aggregate portfolio in the global financial markets. Although this may comprise a 
step towards improving the performance of the fund through international diversification, 
some literatures argue that imposing quantitative restrictions on investment portfolios may 
weaken their performance. 
                                                                  
41 For instance, the tourism sector had largely affected by the war against Iraq and the instability in the West Bank during 
the first three years of this century.   
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4. Measures of Generosity and Potentials for 
Reform 
4.1 Overview 
 The concept of generosity has gained considerable attention from many policy 
makers as well as in much of the literature about pensions. Generally, the concept of 
generosity differs in the dimensions of considerations among the pension schemes 
sponsors and agents. From the financial point of view, sponsors condense on pension 
benefits in the context of monetary value measures e.g. rates of return, present values, etc., 
since these measures accurately address the financial viability of their schemes and the 
fairness of the benefits structure. While for some groups of participants, social adequacy 
measures that are often generalized by the replacement rate criterion, sit at the top of their 
priorities, some other groups of schemes’ participants, withal, might be also more 
concerned with the monetary value measures besides the replacement rate.  
For both concepts, there is either an implicit or an explicit benchmark at which pension 
benefits can be classified as to whether they are generous or not. For instance, the PAYG 
system is financially generous as long as the implicit Rate of Return (ROR) given on 
contributions throughout the pensions they receive, greater than the growth rate of 
contributors wage bill. Replacement rate as a measure of adequacy, in another context, 
compares the level of pensioner income satisfaction during retirement to the level he had 
exactly before retirement.
42
  
As has been done for other countries, this chapter attempts to analyze the benefits provided 
by the Jordanian Social Security Corporation (SSC) with respect to generosity measures in 
the context of scheme sponsors and agents. The importance of that sort of analysis stands 
mainly behind the issue of how these measures interact with each other to jointly alter the 
participants' retirement behaviour and the financial parameters of the scheme.  
                                                                  
42 In some cases, replacement rate is measured by dividing the pension salary on the average salary of the entire career 
life, or the average income of wide economy.   
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In this chapter, we simulate the above-mentioned measures for hypothetical individuals 
with varying earning profiles, ages, gender and marital status. These simulations are 
crucially requested to assess the influences of the unequal treatment of the scheme 
participants on the distributional and financial aspects of the scheme design. Accordingly 
then, we analyze various reform strategies to figure out their theoretical consequences 
beside their empirical implications.  
4.2 The Importance of Generosity Measures   
 It is obvious that mandated pension schemes that rely mainly on human capital 
besides other types of capital, need to be reformed according to changes in the 
demographic structure of their agents. This fact as widely noted is more sensible for 
countries running their pension schemes on a PAYG financing basis where funds needed 
for financing the scheme on-going liabilities are generated through the contributions of 
human assets. In such schemes, the increase in dependency ratio would explicitly affect the 
balance between contributions collected form the working generation and benefits paid to 
pensioners in the direction toward financial deficit. The change of demographic age-
structure has forced, as broadly noticed, many countries to take some actions and 
adjustment in order to restore the funding ability of their schemes. For instance, some 
countries had to increase the contribution rate to meet the additional liabilities, others were 
more concerned about the unwanted sequences of increasing the obligation on the working 
population and therefore they preferred to reduce the level of benefits. However, the latter 
instances represent only two among many parametric reform strategies that have been 
implemented to meet the financial challenges of an ageing population.   
 In fully funded schemes, however, the alterations in the old age insurance members' 
(pensioners and contributors) structure deserves less attention when compared with the 
unfunded ones. The assets at any point in time exactly match the value of pension 
liabilities. The step up in funded schemes benefits payments that result from the increase in 
the ratio of old people (pensioners) to the younger people (workers) would be absorbed 
internally via the already accumulated contributions of pensioners. At any point in time 
and in all cases, the change in pension outlays is always at the expense of pensioners own 
contribution assets rather than workers pooled funds. Thus, the value of assets at any point 
in time, regardless of the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors, equals the total value of 
current pension salaries and the accrued future liability. However, several pieces of 
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literature have argued that an aging population might have an indirect impact on some of 
the financial features of fully funded schemes. For instance, the increase in the ratio of old 
aged people to the younger people, as some argue, would positively affect the capital/labor 
ratio. As a result, the availability of capital will increase relative to labor, and thus 
diminishing the yield on capital relative to wages for labor (Boersch-Supan et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, the relative increase in the number of beneficiaries to the number of 
contributors would result in an increasing supply of non-liquid assets forcing their prices to 
fall. Nevertheless, the matching principle still exists, since in such a case the liabilities of 
the system would proportionally tumble to reflect the actual value and payoffs on pension 
assets. In other words, the fall in the profitability of the accumulated contribution affects 
only the participant's pension and has nothing to do with the system’s unfunded liabilities. 
What one could conclude from our brief description of the interaction between fully 
funded scheme parameters and the market-wide ones is that the fluctuations of the latter 
parameters affect only scheme participants rather than system financial balance. While in a 
PAYG scheme, the direction of effects could pass through scheme participants and in the 
same manner, the scheme viability. 
Some other types of pension schemes finance their ongoing pension liabilities neither on a 
PAYG mechanism nor through entirely pre-funded assets. They can be classified under 
Defined Benefits (DB) partially funded schemes.
43
 Under these types of schemes, the 
scheme sponsors set the contribution rate above the PAYG equilibrium rate. The extra 
contributions collected from the scheme participants accumulate in a buffer fund to meet 
part of the scheme future obligations. Over time, this fund will be drawn down to zero, so 
there is no expectation that such schemes will have capital forever. Thus, maintaining the 
scheme becomes a matter of changing the parameters in order to insure that it never fails to 
have enough money to pay the promised benefits.  Depending upon the nature of 
demographic trends and the state of the economy, the buffer fund could disappear, 
reappear, and disappear again depending on favorable or unfavorable trends in cash flows.  
The following stages describe briefly how the financial life cycle of partially funded 
schemes develop over the time horizon:  
                                                                  
43 In partially funded schemes, a part of current contribution receipts are used to finance the on-going pension obligation 
for current pensioners. Once the contributions shortfall to pay pensions, the trust fund will be used as an additional source 
of revenues to finance current retirees. It is called partially, because the planned assets never match liabilities. For more 
details, see partially.    
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I. At the first stage, the contribution rate is set to a level, which is above the implicit 
rate needed to exactly match the pension benefits proceeds with contribution receipts. 
As a result, the extra amount of money collected from the working population is placed 
and invested in the buffer fund. The fund during this stage is backed with cash flows 
from the insurance surplus and through the return on its assets. It should be clarified 
here that the profitability of buffer fund invested assets matters crucially to the 
outstanding assets balance at the end of the reviewed period, even though the net 
insurance revenues are positive. For instance, if the rewards generated by the fund’s 
outstanding reserves are negative, then the marginal assets accumulation would be less 
than the insurance surpluses. However, to simplify the case we assumed that the 
average return on the fund reserves during this stage is zero at worst. 
II. At the second stage, the implicit contribution rate starts to exceed the actual 
exogenously determined rate, and therefore the insurance revenues from the working 
generation would be insufficient to finance the benefits of the retired one. However, the 
pension liabilities at this stage are still financed through the current cash inflows that 
comprise the investment revenues from the buffer fund and the insurance revenues 
from contributions.  
III.  At the third stage, the total pension receipts are insufficient to face the fast-
growing expenditure toward beneficiaries. As a consequence, the difference between 
current liabilities and current assets during this stage would be covered by selling some 
of the fund assets.  
IV.  At the fourth and last stage, assets disappear due to the acceleration of financing 
needs that cannot be covered by the scheme’s own assets and the system starts to face 
funding obstacles.
44
 In such circumstances, the system would look for some external 
financing, or it starts to work on a PAYG basis in which the deficit would be matched 
eventually by changing some of the system parameters.  
                                                                  
44 Assets refer here to: 1).the current assets that comprise contribution receipts and investment rewards, 2).the remaining 
reserve balance of the pension buffer fund.   
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Figure 4.1: The financial life cycle of partially funded pension schemes  
It is worth mentioning in this context, that several factors might affect the length of the 
above-mentioned stages. First, the bad design of a benefits formula in which it implies 
some degree of generosity toward different groups of beneficiaries. The appearance of 
such appropriateness is stimulated through many factors; among them the upward 
movement in the system dependency ratio. Second, bad investment performances also 
matter, as the returns on investment are a major part of the system assets and flows. 
Thirdly, the state of the economy also influences the financial viability of the DB schemes 
as the deviation of economic parameters from their estimated levels means that the scheme 
has failed to optimally design its features. For instance, if the accrual rate used to calculate 
the old age pension benefit is set at 2 percent for each year of contribution, and if this rate 
was determined by assuming a 6% rate of return on the buffer fund, a half actual ROR than 
assumed would surely affect the financial viability of the system. 
Among the questions that might arise here, is how the financial viability of pension 
schemes and their life cycles relate to measures of generosity. Although it is too early to 
answer such a question, it might be possible to think about some paths of influence that can 
take place here, either directly or implicitly. A generous pension benefit in terms of money 
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worth definition, for instance, affects the pension scheme’s financial viability in both 
directions. The first one, is directly through adding unfunded liabilities to the scheme’s 
balance sheet, since generous here means that there is a portion of benefits that is not 
covered by the pensioner’s own contributions. With regard to the second possible scenario, 
generous benefits can affect the scheme’s financial cycle indirectly through influencing the 
participants' behavior toward early retirement and thus increase the system’s dependency 
ratio sooner than it should be. 
This brief overview on how partially DB schemes work financially, makes the analysis of 
the Jordanian pension system as one of the provisions that runs its activity on the same 
basis, more understandable. Consequently, this paper is intended to demonstrate the 
structural weakness of SSC scheme at the individual level, since some technical studies 
have already warned the system about a lack of funds to finance its future obligation 
toward some of today’s contributors (tomorrow’s beneficiaries). The relative youth of the 
system participants has focused less attention on the bad design of the system. A major 
proportion of contributions collected from the participating employed population has been 
accumulating since the SSC launched its work in 1980. However, the future prospects of 
the SSC' buffer fund seems to be quite pessimistic, as we have seen in the previous section 
of our thesis i.e. revenues collected from active workers have already started to grow at 
rates lower than those out-flowed to the pensioner. Although the system is still running 
under the first stage of the partially funded-DB schemes financial cycle, it seems clear that 
it will not last that long. If the system finances its ongoing liabilities (Pension and other 
insurable obligations) on a pure PAYG basis, the implicit contribution rate needed to zero-
net the total contributions with total benefits has been increasing over the course of the last 
twenty years. As shown in Figure 4.2, the gap between the actual exogenously determined 
contribution rate and the endogenously PAYG implicit contribution is narrowing as time 
passes. One of the factors that have brought this conclusion to the fore is the increase in the 
system dependency ratio. In general, however, there should be no fear from this 
phenomenon in that individual benefits are awarded on fair bases which reflect implicitly 
the term value of their contributions. 
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Source: Author's own calculations and representation based on SSC annual report, different issues.  
Figure 4.2:  Development of the scheme’s parameters 
4.3 Model Overview 
  The author has considered the financial and distributional approach of Bender, to 
develop a model that demonstrates the financial and distributional implications of the 
Jordanian pension scheme.
45
 These models are often used by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others, to analyze wide range aspects of 
pension schemes. As other models, this model relies essentially on a set of assumptions 
that serve significantly the analysis and the major fold of our research. As widely 
recognized by many researchers, assumptions regarding life probabilities are essential for 
modeling some of the financial and distributional aspects of pension schemes. The life 
expectancies that are derived from the population mortality tables are indispensable in 
making predictions regarding the length of the pensioner’s life cycle. This of course is a 
crucial part of our model structure, since without such information, our estimation and 
analysis would be misleading. The figure shows the age and gender based remaining life 
expectancies used in the model for the Jordanian population as extracted from the mortality 
tables taken from both the SSC's most recent actuarial study and the united nation 
demographic database. It is clearly shown in that figure that the life expectancies for 
Jordanian women at any given age are higher than for men. This sort of sexual 
heterogeneity in life expectancies is widely observed in many countries. For instance, in 
developed countries the gap in life expectancy between females and males ranges from 
roughly 5 years in Sweden and United Kingdom, to 8 years as observed in France and 
                                                                  
45 For a detailed view about Bender approach see Khasawneh and Rahahleh (2002). 
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Finland (Gjonça et al., 1999). In developing countries, however, the gaps are slightly lower 
than those observed in developed ones. In Africa, women outlive men by only two to three 
years and have the same life expectancy as men in southern Asia (Shrestha, 2000). In 
Jordan as one of the most developed countries within developing regions, the difference is 
almost three years in favor of women. This sort of sexual heterogeneity can be explained 
by biological and behavioral differences between genders (Waldron, 1995).  
Table 4.1: Age- Gender specific remaining life expectancy 
Age 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
Male 30 29 28 27 26 25 25 24 23 22 21 20 20 19 18 17 17 16 15 14 14 13 12
Female 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 19 18 17 16 15 15 14 13  
Source: Author's calculations.  
The financial assumptions we use in the distributional model, comprise the Real Discount 
Rate (RDR) and inflation rate. The RDR as assumed in the baseline scenario reflects the 
historical facts about the development of the real interest rate on the Jordanian government 
medium-term bonds taking into account the future prospects about the capital market as 
well as monetary policy. In addition to that, the real rate of return on the SSC's buffer fund 
is also considered. The inflation rate used in our model to back-count nominal values of 
contributions and benefits in real terms reflects the average rate at which the consumer 
price index has grown over the last five years. In the baseline scenario, individuals are 
assumed to enter the labor force and pay contributions at the age of 27, regardless of their 
gender status. At the time of retirement, each beneficiary is modeled on the basis that he 
has three dependents since the family allowances under the SSC's law are awarded based 
on the number of dependents. However, a scenario that hypothesizes no dependents is also 
being simulated. 
The model constructs gender-age profiles that calculate dynamically an individual based 
contributions and retirement benefit over his entire career and retirement life, respectively. 
The pre-retirement career salary, according to the baseline scenario, is indexed to an 
assumed annual nominal growth rate of 1%. Moreover, two other scenarios regarding the 
latter assumption were considered. The entire financial obligation accrued by the three 
agents, the SSC, contributors and beneficiaries are modeled according to the current law 
parameters. The contributions are calculated on the basis of the individual total annual 
salary and considering an aggregate contribution rate of 14.5% paid by employer on behalf 
of their employee to cover the old-age insurance fees as stated by the current law. Pension 
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benefits on the other hand, are calculated on the basis of a reference salary that represents 
the average salary of the last twenty four months of contributions prior to retirement. The 
model applies predetermined early retirement penalties on the old-age monthly pension 
benefits of those who retire before the normal age of retirement. The eligibility of early 
retirement, however, is constrained by the minimum allowable age of early retirement 
exactly as stated in the SSC law. Figure 4.3 shows the rate at which early retirement 
benefits are back-counted with. 
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Source: Authors's own representation based on the SSC law.  
Figure 4.3: Early retirement age- gender based discount factor 
After the above-mentioned step, a Cost of Living Allowances (COLA) that comprises 10% 
of the first step product, is added to that product. If the JD value of COLA is less than 30 
JD the difference is added as a scheme subsidy and if the corresponding value exceeds 50 
JD then the remainder is deducted from the final product. The last measure, which is 
considered for benefit determination according to the SSC’s current law, represents the 
family allowances for dependents that are under the financing responsibility of the original 
pensioner. If the pensioner has one dependent, then he can get one-tenth the sum of the old 
age basic benefits and COLA allowances. However, if he has more than one dependent, he 
gets 5% extra family allowance for a maximum of two dependents.
46
   
Concerning the hypothetical individual earning levels over his entire participation life, the 
model simulates three arbitrary levels of pre-retirement income (half the system average 
insured income, one average, and double average) in a way that benefits and contribution 
accrued to each insured individual depend on the development of his earning profile as 
                                                                  
46 See Table 4.2.   
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well as the participant's own character. The initial level of average insured salary for both 
genders, which has been considered in our model, is obtained from SSC's published data 
for the financial year 2003. 
4.4 Generosity: The Adequacy Perspective  
 Many economists and pension specialists argue that the ratio of pension benefits at 
the time of retirement to the level of last earned salary, which is often defined as a 
replacement rate, indicates an extent of generosity (Pestieau, 2003). Their definition of 
generosity denotes mainly the tendency of pension schemes to minimize the retiree income 
losses when compared with his earning level before retirement. The more generous 
pension benefits are viewed according to their capability to substitute a greater portion of 
the pensioner's pre-retirement earning level with after retirement ones. However, as the 
dimension of judgment might differ, some economists argue that replacement rates should 
be cited as a limited indicator of the generosity, or more precisely, the fairness of pension 
schemes benefits (Whiteford, 1995). Those who think in that manner believe that 
generosity from the viewpoint of social and adequacy measures is less correlated from that 
of money worth observers. The gap between these views, however, attenuates differentially 
among different types of pension schemes depending on the extent to which participants 
earning levels over their entire career lives correlate with each others and with the pension 
benefits. Thus, If the actuarial fairness is regarded as a dimension of consideration, RR 
should be carefully considered for generosity judgment when cost and benefit measures are 
meant.  
To continue with our clarification of the concept of social generosity, we refer here to the 
retirement income adequacy. We initially start from a definition of RR in equation (4.1) 
which can tell most of the story.  
SalarytirementReePrMonthlyLast
SalaryPensionMontly
−
=RatetReplacemen                           (4.2) 
Both variables composing the concept of RR are observed one-point at a time. Benefits on 
the first fold, tackle the value of a pension at the time of retirement, but neglect the length 
of retirement, while the other variable under consideration reflects only the last pre-
retirement salary recorded in the pensioner salary profile. The reliance on only these 
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variables crowds out some factors that can be imperative in determining the level of 
generosity from the perspective of monetary value, among them, the actual contributions 
being paid to the system. The latter factor can make the concept of RR less relevant to the 
issue of pension neutrality if the reference wage for benefit calculation is less correlated 
with the development of the pensioner salary over the course of his employment. In 
addition to that, the pension formula (the dominator of equation) by itself could matter 
further in this context. The less correlated accrual rates are with market returns on money, 
the greater is the divergence of benefits from actuarial equilibrium. Thus, comparing 
pension systems across others, in the context of replaced income, does not precisely reflect 
the disparities of plans fairness.  
Nonetheless, RR could still be a superior measure for inter-schemes and cross-schemes 
comparisons, and more importantly, it can serve the exegesis of participant's behavior. The 
issue under consideration should change to reflect the principle of adequacy instead of 
generosity. Generally, pension literature has classified the concept of adequacy into three 
measures. The first, known as Absolute Adequacy, involves an absolute income threshold 
to provide a certain standard of living for their earners. The benchmark for such a measure 
varies from one system to another, and through policies among others. Generally, the most 
commonly used floor for that sort of benefit is the national poverty line or the cost of 
essential goods and services (ABI, 2003). The advantage in providing an agreed level of 
consumption is the protection of some people from living in hunger, while others could 
suffer from a standard of living worse than they had before. This follows the fact that 
guaranteeing a minimum level of consumption does not imply a level of stability in the 
quality of life for those who were consuming far more than this threshold. Thereby, a 
relative adequacy, the second concept being considered, in some schemes aims at 
providing a proportional level of income for beneficiaries relative to their pre-retirement 
career income. Consequently, such a concept reveals a smooth level of consumption over 
the course of beneficiaries careers and retirement lives. This can to some extent raise the 
motivation to enjoy the social security plans that meditate this approach since many 
factors, among which is the appropriateness of the provided benefits, influence individual’s 
involvement in pension provisions. In that sense, this measure seems to be more consistent 
with the Life Cycle hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani that saving is motivated only by 
the goal of an intertemporal income distribution stable enough to permit a steady flow of 
consumption during the life cycle (Banterle, 2002). One of the disadvantages of this 
measure is that it might be possible that a relative adequacy measure could not guarantee 
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an absolute adequacy level of income to a range of beneficiaries. Therefrom a third 
concept was developed in an attempt to overcome the disadvantages of the above-
mentioned concepts. A mixed approach has been implemented across many countries by 
considering both the absolute and relative bases for benefit determination. Choosing an 
appropriate weight for both concepts calls for many considerations. Among them are the 
income distribution of all beneficiaries and the financial viability of the pension provisions. 
 It is worth mentioning here that some defined contribution schemes guarantee an absolute 
minimum rate of return on pension contributions, regardless of the investment performance 
of these contributions. Other schemes guarantee relative returns pegging them to a specific 
market benchmark (Turner and Rajnes, 2002). Although the last two measures are more 
monetary value guarantees than adequacy, they still have some interesting implications in 
the context of the above discussions. 
4.4.1 Old-Age Pension 
 If we consider RR as a superior measure for the stability of the quality of life, this 
tells much in the case of Jordan. Table 4.2 reports how Old-Age (OA) pension benefits are 
calculated according to the SSC current benefits law. The basic pension depends initially 
on the pensioner service credit, reference salary and system accrual rate. The second 
component of pension benefits comprises the cost of living allowances (COLA) and family 
allowances. Each OA retiree acquires 10% of his basic pension as COLA. These 
allowances, however, are subject to a lump sum increase if one-tenth of basic pension is 
less than 30 JD, and also subject to a maximum floor of 50 JD  For example, if one-tenth 
of a retiree’s basic pension equals 20 JD, then he gets extra 10 JD to place him on the 
minimum COLA floor. If one-tenth equals 40, there should be no change. But if his basic 
pension is more than 500 JD, then he is subject to COLA of no more than 50 JD. 
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Table 4.2 The benefit rules under the Old-Age insurance provision 
Conditions Benefits 
Categories
Old-Age Insurance Benefits
For both genders:10% of the basic
pension salary discounted for early
retirement penalty; minimum 30
J.D. and maximum of 50 J.D. 
No Specific Conditions.
Family
Alloawnces
E
ar
ly
 R
et
ir
em
en
t
No Specific Conditions.
For the first dependent 10%, Second
dependent 5%, Third dependent 5%
of ( Discounted Basic pension +
COLA); maximum 3 dependents.
Basic
Pension
Male:age 46; minimum 18
contributory years. Female: age 46;
minimum  15 contributory years. 
For both genders: basic pension
multiplied by (1- age-gender early
retirement penalty rates). 
COLA
2% multiplied by the Reference
Salary and with the Contributory
Years; with a maximum 75% of
reference salary. Reference Salary:
Average salary during the last two
contributory years. 
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Family
Alloawnces
No Specific Conditions.
For the first dependent 10%, Second
dependent 5%, Third dependent 5%
of ( Basic pension + COLA);
maximum 3 dependents.
For both genders: 10% of basic
pension salary; minimum 30 J.D.
and maximum of 50 J.D.
COLA No Specific Conditions.
Basic
Pension
Male: Age 60, minimum 15 years of
contributory service. Female: Age
55, minimum 15 year of service. 
 
Source: Author’s own representation, based on SSC law (2002).47 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the Old-age replacement rate is an increasing function of the age 
at which the pensioner chooses to retire. This happens in Jordan as well as in other 
countries, since pensions for participants whose age is less than the normal age of 
retirement, 60 years for male and 55 for female, are deflated by predetermined penalty 
rates.
48
 However, lump pension margins that are added via the means-tested income policy 
and minimum allowances thresholds, can offset part of the pension income deductions that 
result from early retirement penalties. In terms of the adequacy of replaced income, the 
smooth slope of replacement rate curves over the early retirement age space indicates that 
the level income is an inferior factor affecting the retirement decision. For instance, the 
opportunity cost of retiring at 46 years of age instead of the normal retirement age of 60 for 
men, is only thirty percentage points of the last income earned by the pensioner. 
                                                                  
47 The total growth rate of a participant career salary considered for calculating the reference salary should not exceed 
60% over the last five years of the participant-contributory period.  
48 See Figure 4.3.  
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Requisitely, if the standard of living is a major concern for pensioners, the RR margins 
with respect to retirement age might appear quite high to influence their tendency toward 
later retirement. This appears conspicuously as the RR at the minimum allowable age of 
retirement is almost 40 percentage points less than at the normal retirement age. 
Surprisingly, such an influence might collapse as the lowest level of replaced income 
among others is considered. To clarify this, if the retiree considered that the benefits 
guaranteed by the scheme at early retirement ages fulfills his own adequacy satisfaction, a 
relatively low replacement margin with respect to age of retirement is less likely to pursue 
his retirement. For instance, a man who earns as much as the system average insured 
income and signs off his job at age 46 for early retirement purposes, gets, as the model 
shows, 60 percent of his pre-retirement salary as monthly pension benefits. If he is more 
concerned about the portion of replaced income over other measures and thinks that such a 
level fulfills his own adequacy or needs, a one and half percentage point’s margin 
associated with an additional year of contribution is less likely to act as a disincentive 
factor against early retirement. 
Male
30%
50%
70%
90%
110%
46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73
Age @ Retirement 
RR
AW Half AW Twice AW
 Female
30%
50%
70%
90%
110%
46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73
Age @ Retirement
RR
AW Half AW Twice AW
 
Source: Author’s Calculations, Hazmomics distributional Model. 
Figure 4.4: The Replacement Rate with respect to the Age of Retirement and income 
level scenarios 
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Another issue is that the SSC's law as shown in the above figures discriminates financially 
between genders. The level of replaced income across early retirement ages is relatively 
high for females when compared with males. The replacement gap between both genders, 
as the model shows, decreases gradually with respect to the age of the retiree, but returns 
back after the normal retirement age of women. For average earners, women who retire at 
46 years of age could replace their career income with almost 7 percentage points more 
than their male counterparts could get, while a 5 year delay of retirement for both genders, 
brings this gap down to only 3%. This could be justified by the fact that gap in penalty 
rates imposed on early retiring participants of both genders decreases as the age of 
retirement increase. In addition to that, part of the high gender RR gap at the earliest age of 
retirement can be attributed to the extra COLA margins given to women since their insured 
income is relatively lower than their male counterparts, and hence they benefit more from 
the minimum allowances floor. 
Another factor affecting the level of replacement rate is the level of participants’ earnings 
(income). Some economists refer to such a feature as a case of progressivity, which means 
that the degree of pension income substitution negatively relates to the level of participant-
insured income (Orszag et al., 2000; Kakwani, 1984). The above figure shows that if a 
pensioner whose earnings over the course of his career is lower than system average 
insured income, then it is possible for those who retire after the second half of their fifties 
to replace their career income with an equal pension salary or even more. That could 
happen as some groups of participants can benefit from the mean tested income policy as 
well as the generous dependents allowances. An example of that is the half-average income 
earners who can get as much as one and one tenth times their pre-retirement salary as 
monthly pension benefits. While those who retire at the same age but earn double the 
average insured income of participants, can only get a bit less than their pre-retirement 
salary. This finding not only discerns the progressivity extent of the current law but also  
how the system is creating clear incentives for early retirement and income under-reporting 
for those who earn around the system average insured income.  
Although dependent allowances indicate some social advantages, they generate at the same 
time a sort of heterogeneity in the level of adequacy among the scheme participants. Some 
opponents of this view argue that the latter feature should not be considered as a source of 
heterogeneity, since family allowances add nothing to the concept of generosity but only 
help the deepening of adequacy for the pensioner himself aside from his financial 
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responsibilities toward others. As an alternative view, one can argue that earning based 
benefits do not ignore the issue of individual adequacy in the presence of dependents, since 
initially career income is used to finance the same dependents. Referring again to our 
analyses, the model has shown that family allowances contribute largely to pensioner 
adequacy. The proportional significance of these allowances increase with the age of 
retiree because of the decrease in early retirement penalty rates. The significance of these 
allowances, however, diminishes as the extra JDs given to pensioners to fulfill their 
minimum COLA threshold falls. Consequently, the maximum COLA starts to work 
effectively. The gap between the replaced income level for a male average earner with full 
dependents and for another male with the same circumstances but no dependents, for 
instance, increases from 10 % if they retire at age 46 to roughly about 17 % if they choose 
to retire at the normal age Another sort of heterogeneity that arises via family allowances 
appears apparently with respect to the level of participant-insured salary. The higher the 
average income of a pensioner over his entire career life, the lower is the influence of 
family allowances on his retirement income. Figure 4.5 reports precisely how family 
allowances make some difference in terms of pensioner adequacy when the initial levels of 
insured income are non-homogenous across scheme participants. The difference between 
the RR for a participant, who opts to retire at the normal age of retirement, has three 
dependents and earned the system average insured salary and the RR of a counterpart 
retiree with the same features but has no dependents, is almost 17% points of the last 
earnings exactly before retirement. With regard to female employees, the effect of family 
allowances on the level of replaced income via pension benefits has the same features as 
for males. The only difference that arises here between both genders is that family 
allowances replaces a petty more pension income for females than it does for males, over a 
benchmark of no dependents. This can be accounted for by the heterogeneously 
implemented penalty rates on early retirement as well as the non-assorted levels of insured 
salaries among counterpart genders. Another sort of RR heterogeneity with respect to 
family allowances appears when the level of the insured salaries is also considered. For 
example, full family allowances step-up the RR for those who choose to retire at age 46 by 
9%, 10% and 12% if the participant’s career-earning level is twice, on average and half 
average the SSC insured salaries, respectively.
49
 The gap, however, decreases with respect 
to the age at which the participant chooses to retire, for the same reasons we have clarified 
early in this section. 
                                                                  
49 This example, however, is not shown in Figure 4.5. See Appendix.  
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RR with respect to Age at Retirement and Dependents
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
46 49 52 55 58 61 Age
Male- FA Male- without FA Female- FA Female- Without FA
 
Source: Author's Calculation, Hazmomics Distributional Model. 
Note: FA denotes with family allowances.   
Figure 4.5: Replacement rate for average earners with and without the family 
allowances  
Moreover, evidence of system's encouragement for late participation appears in Figure 4.6 
as the slope of replacement rate curves with respect to the age at which the participant joins 
the system is relatively low.
50
 Tautologically, the elasticity of RR to the length of the 
contributory period might not be enough to encourage participants to contribute more, or 
even if they work for longer, their attempt to cheat the current rules is strongly expected. 
They can do so, by evading the system at the beginning of their career and contributing 
later. The opportunity cost of such a stylized decision is not set as it should be "fairly or 
neutrally" constructed. For instance, a one year less contributory period considered for 
pension calculation, would count only for 1.7 percentage points of a lower replacement 
rate.   
Plotting career earning growth rates on the corresponding RR, shows how participants with 
a high income growth history could replace their career income with a lower proportion 
than can be replaced by a pensioner with a lower income growth history. This can be 
explained by the fact that a major part of pension benefits are subject to a maximum limit 
of three quarters of the reference salary. In addition to that, the marginal increase in 
pension salary as a sequence of family allowances diminishes with respect to income level, 
since the marginal gain for a pensioner benefiting from the minimum level of family 
allowances decreases as the growth of his pre-retirement income increases. On the other 
hand, the slope of the RR curve for both genders as the figure shows is relatively flat when 
                                                                  
50 When subtracting the age at which the participant joins the system from the normal age of retirement (60), we then get 
the contributory period that is considered for pension calculation.  
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it is analogous to early ages of joining the system. This of course has some unwanted 
implications in the context of participation behavior. The normal age of retirement RR gap 
between a male participant who joins the system at the age of 20 and counterpart 
participants who join the system seven years later is only 2 percentage points of pre-
retirement income. It would seem that prudently thinking participants would not contribute 
for an extra seven years in order to get two extra percentage points of replacement rate 
upon retirement. This however applies only in the case where the participant has 30 
contributory years or more credit at the time of retirement. This comes into effect due to 
the restriction on the basic pension at which it should not exceed three quarters of the 
reference salary considered for benefits calculation. From that on, and since the accrual 
rate is 2,5 % for each contributory year, periodical contribution credits that are above 30 
years would not be considered for basic pension calculation. The only issue in this would 
be the possible increase in the participant career income and thus his reference salary for 
pension benefits formula. Such a feature has the same extent of influences on the pensions 
of females although it rarely occurs in reality, especially if we know that only women who 
joined the system before the age of 25 are subject to basic income restrictions compared to 
35 year old men.   However, if the pensioner has less than 30 years of contributory credits, 
then any delay in system participation would result in a decreasing RR at the time of 
retirement. This looks advantageous from the angle of scheme sponsors, since the latter 
case would reduce the incentive for participants to not postponing their membership in the 
scheme’s insurable activities thus generating more revenues for them. The net impact, 
however, depends ultimately on how participants observe the marginal change of RR with 
respect to service credit from an adequacy viewpoint. 
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Male
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20 27 33 37 43
Age when participant joins the system
AW 5% AW 3% AW 1%
Female
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20 27 33 37 43
Age when the participant joins the system
AW 5% AW 3% AW 1%
 
Source: Author’s calculation, Hazmomics Distributional Model. 
Note: (1) This figure considers the normal retirement age that is currently applied according to the current SSC law: (60) 
for Male and (55) for female. 
(2) AW: Denotes the average growth rate career earnings.  
Figure 4.6: RR with respect to the age when joining the Scheme and the growth of 
insured income 
4.4.2 Disability Pension 
 The SSC provides other types of insurance benefits for participants who have 
permanently terminated there careers for medical reasons. There are actually two types of 
natural disability: (1) Total natural disability (2) Partial natural disability. It is worth 
mentioning here that our analysis only applies to the extent the SSC provides naturally 
disabled participants with adequate pension benefits for the rest of their lives. The 
incentive implications should not be seen as in the OA insurance provision, since acquiring 
Natural Disability Pension (NDP) is more institutional and natural than it is optional for 
participants. In addition to other eligibility criteria, the disability cases have to be approved 
by a centralized medical reference. Table 4.3 describes the conditions and the parameters 
considered for determining the NDP benefits upon participant retirement.  
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Table 4.3: Natural disability benefit rules  
.
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Basic
Pension
Same as total disability except that
the medical reference should verify
the case of partial disability instead
of total one.  
37,5% of average monthly salary of
the last 36 contributory months,
with a minimum of 50 J.D.
COLA
No Specific Conditions. Same as for total disability
Family
Alloawnces
No Specific Conditions. Same as for total disability except
that there is no additional care
allowances (the 25% increase) 
T
o
ta
l 
D
is
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y
Basic
Pension
1. A total disability certification of
SSC reference medical committee.
2. Age at the time of acquiring total
disability pension should be less
than the normal retirement age for
both genders. 3. The participants
should have contributed for at least
(5 Years) in which (3 Years) are
consecutive. 4. Job termination
should be attributed to health causes. 
50% of average monthly salary of
the last 36 contributory months,
with a minimum of 50 J.D. 
COLA
No Specific Conditions. For both genders: 10% of basic
pension salary; with a minimum 30
J.D. and maximum of 50 J.D.
Other
Allowances
No Specific Conditions. The participant receives either of
these benefits: i). 0,5% of each
contributory years if his total
contributory credit dose not exceed
119 months. ii) 1% of each
contributory years if he had
contributed for more than 119
months.
In addition to that if the medical
reference decides that the pensioner
needs additional care during
retirement, he acquires a 25%
increase of the sum benefits (basic+
COLA+ other allowances)
Categories
Disability Insurance Benefits
Conditions Benefits 
 
Source: Author's own representation based on the SSC law.  
Utilizing the above parameters and conditions in the distributional model, provides us with 
some surprising results in terms of pensioners adequacy. An average earner participant, 
who becomes partially disabled after fulfilling the minimum period of contributing to the 
system (5 years), gets permanent monthly pension benefits that give him  almost half of the 
salary level he was earning just before retirement. The following figure shows how a 
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hypothetical participant of either gender is supported with a pension income in respect of 
his last earned career salary.  
Male
40%
50%
60%
70%
32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59
Age at Retirement 
Average Half Twice
Female
40%
50%
60%
70%
32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53
Age at Retirement 
Average Half Twice
 
Source: Author’s Calculation, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Figure 4.7: RR with respect to age of retirement and earning level for partially 
disabled pensioners 
The NDP curves as seen above are relatively flat with respect to the age at which the 
participant becomes disabled. This means that the proportional increase in the age of 
retirement has little influence on the portion of career income that is replaced with lifelong 
pension benefits. The difference in the RR for a 10 years gap in retirement age, for 
instance, is no more than 3 percentage points.  
As one of the consequences of the minimum allowances considered in benefit calculations, 
the pensioner earning level while working affects to some degree his disability RR. 
Demonstrating that, the degree of RR that a pensioner would probably get during his 
disability retirement negatively relates to his earning level before retirement. For example, 
the difference between the RR for participants who have earned as much as the system 
average insured salaries bill and those who earn twice as much as the system average, is 
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always positive regardless of the starting age of retirement and gender status of the 
pensioner. It is worth mentioning here that the latter gap, as the model shows, is always 
greater for females than for males. This is, of course, because the average wage for females 
is less than that for males and thus, they benefit from the minimum allowances floor more 
proportionally than males do.   
One important characteristic we interpret here is that as the age at which a disabled 
participant retires reaches the minimum allowable age for early retirement, the relative 
adequacy of benefits that are calculated on the basis of early retirement becomes relatively 
higher than the case of partial disability.
51
 This actually motivates him or her to acquire 
early retirement benefits rather than partial disability compensation. The most possible 
explanation for cases where participants, whose ages are above the minimum age for early 
retirement retiring on a NDP basis is that they could not fulfill the vesting period 
conditions of the SSC's law.
52
 
4.5 Generosity: Money's Worth Perspective 
4.5.1 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
 IRR is one of the most important money measures for pension schemes promises and 
contracts. This concept relates to some extent to the clear image of fairness from a pure 
financial point of view. The IRR is an imperative element for assessing the financial 
viability of pension schemes. It implies a hypothetical rate of return given on actual 
contributions that have been made by a participant during his career life, which makes the 
accumulated assets at the time of retirement sufficient to finance the promised benefits 
when he is elderly. Of course, in a pure PAYG where benefits are awarded on a fixed fee 
basis, fixed benefits or flat rate, no actual contribution or assets exist in reality since all 
proceeds from the working generations are transferred directly to pensioners. Despite the 
fiction of an actual contributions account, the internal rate of return is still a useful concept 
                                                                  
51 This can be observed if we compare the outcomes performed in Figure 4.4 with the ones that appear in Figure 4.7. RR 
for the three simulated levels of participants insured  incomes, for ages of retirement that are above the minimum 
allowable age of early retirement is greater when the participants retire on the basis of early retirement than on natural 
disability pension.   
52 The vesting period for early retirement refers to the minimum contributory years required for early retirement. 
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because it allows us to compare social provision contracts with other types of investments 
that could provide retirement support.  
From the pure view of finance, IRR is the rate that makes the present value of future 
promised benefits equal to the present value of all injected contributions in the system. 
Mathematically speaking, IRR is the discount rate (r) that solves the following equation: 
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Where 
t
B is the value of benefits at age t , AR  represents the age at which the person 
retires, mCr : the contribution rate at age m , m
Y  is the level of income on which the 
contribution is based on, and EA  is the age at which the pensioner starts his career.  
In view of the above equation, many factors might influence the algebraic value of our 
concept. Few of them are uncontrolled by the participants themselves, but others to some 
extent are determined on behavioral bases more than on institutional ones. Nonetheless, the 
favored value of IRR in a pension provision differs substantially from the point of view of 
pensioners and their scheme sponsors. A high IRR for the pensioner implies implicitly that 
benefits would be relatively high, while for the provisions sponsors it means an extent of 
generosity and a fear of financial difficulty.  
Considering a benchmark for comparing returns remains a matter of debate among many 
pension experts. However, some actuaries and pension specialists often use the 
performance of investment funds, hedge funds, and the returns on pension buffer funds, 
among others as bases for comparison. Some others prefer to analyze returns in an 
international context. Anyhow, the concept regardless of the benchmark considered for 
comparison, is still valid. 
4.5.1.1 Old-Age Insurance 
 The simulation of the Jordanian pension scheme not only shows some evidences of 
generosity among all participants, but also a fresh carrot for participants to bail up the 
system as soon as it is institutionally allowable. As seen in Figure 4.8 the implicit rate of 
return given on participants contributions is extremely high if compared with either the rate 
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actually raised through the SSC's buffer fund.  Interestingly, our simulation shows that the 
system is offering more incentives for early retirement than there are for normal retirement. 
Such a conclusion is drawn from the fact that IRR fall with respect to the age at which the 
pensioners choose to start their retirement, although there are fines imposed on the benefits 
for those retiring before the normal age of retirement (Legros, 2003). If a male participant 
earns as much as the average SSC insured salary over his entire career life and decides to 
retire at the minimum allowable age of retirement, the SSC awards him implicitly an 8 or 
9% rate as an annual rate of return on the contribution he had paid to the system. If he 
postpones his retirement decision for five more years, he will get as much as 1% less than 
the rate he gets in the former case. Such a feature calls for special attention in our context. 
It is not debatable that the system is providing an implicit motivation for participants to 
retire early if they count on the monetary value measures in deciding on their retirement. In 
terms of net benefit measures, the defined benefits formula in Jordan ultimately provides 
an implicit subsidy that negatively relates to the age at which the participant chooses to 
retire. The earlier you retire, the more profitable your contributions are. Such a feature can 
work as an incentive engine which forces workers toward early retirement. Supporting our 
view with clear evidence, some participants have already started to recognize this finding 
and have decided not to wait for their normal retirement pensions. In 1996 for instance, 
only 17% of the newly retired participants decided to take their pension early. By 2000 and 
2003 this ratio had increased to 57% and 64%, respectively. Aside from the motivational 
influences of the heterogeneously awarded ROR on pension contributions with respect to 
the age of retirement among both genders, the system is generously compensating the 
participants for their career based contributions, regardless of their level of income or age 
of retirement. This judgment, financially speaking, can be verified through comparing the 
IRR on pension contributions with the inflation-adjusted ROR on the SSC's buffer fund. 
This benchmark reflects exactly the expected returns on participants’ contributions when 
the real performance of SSC's invested reserves remains unchanged as observed over the 
last 15 years. 
Moreover, as Figure 4.8 indicates, the level of participant income mainly affects the 
profitability of contribution accounts. A participant who is earning half the system average 
insured salaries bill, is compensated relatively more for his contribution through his 
pension benefits, than a counterpart participant with the same features but earning more. 
The difference between the ROR given on the contributions of system’s half- average 
earners and on those of system twice average, decreases from 1.5% and 1.7% at the 
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minimum allowable age of retirement to 0.4% and 0.8% at the normal age of retirement for 
males and females, respectively. 
The logic behind this finding is that rates used to discount benefits for females retiring 
early are lower, and the normal age of retirement for females is five years less than of 
males. Moreover, as we have mentioned early in this chapter, the life expectancy for 
females as globally observed is higher than for males, and Jordan is no exception in this 
regard. However, if we consider the ROR on the Amman SE as a benchmark for setting up 
a neutral age of retirement, no males should be able to retire before the age of sixty-nine, 
and it would be even higher for females. Surprisingly, the required age of retirement to 
trim benefits with contributions is only 10 years less than the remaining life expectancy of 
males when the actual ROR on the SSC's pension fund is considered. 
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Age @ Retirement
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AW Half AW Twice AW
 
Source: Author Calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model. 
Note: (1) The SSC ROR represents the average real ROR generated by the trust fund adjusted for the inflation rate  
assumed in our model. 
(2) AW denotes average wage earner  
Figure 4.8: The ROR awarded implicitly on pension contributions under OA 
insurance 
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The problem of generosity with respect to the age of retirement is clarified in Figure 4.9. 
The area which represents the expected benefits for those retiring at the normal age of 
retirement when compared with the area of their contributions is smaller than for those 
with the same circumstances but retiring at the minimum allowable age of retirement. 
Although the absolute level of pension under normal retirement is greater than in the case 
of early retirement, the area of benefits in the former case when divided by the area of 
contribution is lower than in the latter case. 
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Source: Authors calculations, Hazmomics distributional model. 
Note: The figures refer to a hypothetical participant with earning levels that equal average the system-insured salaries.   
Figure 4.9: The area of contributions and benefits at normal and early retirement 
ages 
To sum up, the incentives toward early retirement in the model are difficult to ignore. The 
implications of these incentives are enough to attract the attention of policy makers. The 
increase in the proportion of early retirees among total pensioners not only adds implicit 
liabilities to the system balance sheet as a sequence of generous benefits, but also works as 
an incentive for other workers to follow their counterparts’ decisions, even though the 
wisdom of this hasn’t yet been acknowledged by them. What is worth mentioning here is 
that, although pension contracts are more profitable for low-income earners, the probability 
of early retirement for those with high-income career profiles can be higher than for them. 
This conclusion is drawn from the fact that high-income earners are more concerned with 
the profitability of their pension contract and pay relatively less attention to adequacy 
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measures. In contrast, low-income earners pay more attention to the adequacy of their 
pension salary, which is positively moving, with the age of retirement. The low-income 
earners use a great portion of their incomes to finance ongoing life needs. Generally 
speaking, the tendency toward early retirement would push the system dependency ratio up 
and hasten the appearance of the problem.  
The social signs of the current rules appear seemingly when the individually given IRR are 
considered. These signs emerge when IRR for low wage earners is higher than those how 
earn relatively more. Such a characteristic occurs because of the minimum-maximum 
COLA ceiling amount, and due to the means-tested income policy provided by the current 
rules. The relative importance of the absolute value of minimum allowances and the 
means-tested income is negatively related to pensioner pre-retirement income.  
Within this context, pension schemes can have a range of objectives in addition to that of 
equity. As argued by many, the equity principle should not be considered as a top priority 
for pension schemes, but to some extent among the priorities. If the equity principle is not 
fully applied, the redistribution elements must definitely be instituted. In such a case, rates 
of returns are heterogeneously awarded with respect to several factors. The redistribution 
concept can range within the same generation and can spread over different cohorts. In the 
former sort of redistribution, it is more often that high-income earners solidarize with such 
of lower income. While in the latter one, fairness measurement varies across generations in 
a way that some will benefit financially from the provisions while others will lose. 
Moreover, both measures can take place within the same pension scheme. In such a case, 
the term of fairness is more important than if a single sort of redistribution exists. Briefly, 
the implications of each type of redistribution patterns can be grouped as: 
♦ Intergenerational redistribution: Some cohort get more than fair, others might get as 
fair, and certainly, the remaining cohorts would get less than has been paid as 
contributions (Leimer, 1999). For instance, a PAYG that began with the baby boom 
generation and ended afterward with a slow growing population would imply a 
redistribution of income from the latter to the former generation. Such a case has 
already happened in Germany where the younger generation is paying part of the 
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benefits awarded to the baby boom generation after Second World War (Schnabel, 
1999).
53
  
♦ Intra-generational redistribution: In such a pattern of redistribution, participants 
within the same group get dissimilar returns on their pension contributions (Cohen et 
al., 2001; Oshio, 2004). Generally, this sort of redistribution affects the well-being of 
individuals who differ by gender, level of income, race and education, among others 
(Cubeddu, 2000). For instance, it is often that low-income earners are getting more 
proportionally than those earning relatively more. The degree of redistributions 
depends initially on the system design and objectives. If the social characters serve 
attention in this context, fairness variation among different groups of income earners 
increases.  
♦ Dual-form redistribution: This form of redistribution entails both of the above 
patterns in that one-generation share the cost of another generation, and some groups of 
participants within the same generation share the cost of other generations relatively 
more than others. 
The latter form of benefits redistribution applies clearly in Jordan as shown in Figure 4.8 
Since the IRR given among most groups of earners is relatively high when compared with 
a wide range of benchmarks i.e. market rate of return, wage growth rate. On the other 
hand, pensioners with the lower historical income profile get more implicit rates of return 
than a pensioner with a higher income profile. That is to say, if all groups of earners within 
the same generation are getting more than they should fairly receive and the benefits of 
high career-earning pensioners are relatively fairer such of low career earning pensioners, 
then one could notice that the system is providing both forms of redistribution.  
However, the relatively better benefits awarded to lower income earners when compared 
with higher ones, might prove untrue. As argued in some literature, the level of income as 
well as the level of education affects the quality and the standard of human life, therefore 
improving their mortality patterns (Kenkel, 1991; Evans and Montgomery, 1994; Snyder 
and Evans, 2002). If this fact is considered in this context, the intra-generational return 
                                                                  
53 Schnabel (1999) reports that rates of return that implicitly accrue on participants contributions of the German pension 
system would drop from 3.5% for groups born in 1930 to 0.5% for those who were born in 1980.   
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variation with respect to career income level diminishes among the different groups of 
earners (Aaron, 1977; Friedman, 1972).  
Table 4.4 displays the ROR given implicitly on the contributions of hypothetical 
participants when their own life expectancy deviates from the average life expectancies 
derived initially in our model.  
Table 4.4: Implicit ROR on pension contributions with respect life expectancy 
Gender Earning Level ALE-3 ALE-2 ALE-1
Average Life
Expectancy (ALE)
ALE+1 ALE+2 ALE+3
Half Average 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,2
Average 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,8 5,9
Twice Average 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8
Half Average 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,0 8,1
Average 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,4 7,5 7,6
Twice Average 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,3
Male
Female
 
Source: Author’s calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Note: This rate represents the ROR at the normal age of retirement; Male (60), Female (55). 
Let us start our explanation of the above table, by assuming that high-income earners live 
more than the population average life expectancy (ALE), and low-income earners live 
below that average. If a high income earner lives one year more than the ALE and the half 
income earner lives for one year less for instance, then the latter would get 5.7% as an 
implicit ROR on his contribution while the former would get 5.6%. In this case, the system 
still favors lower income earners among others. Imagine a male with a twice-average 
income profile living two years more and another counterpart male with an earning level 
that is half the system average living two years less than ALE. As it appears in the above 
table, the privilege of the poor earner would switch to the richer one since the after 
retirement life span of the latter group is high enough to offset the predilection of low-
income earners.
54
 These are only to illustrate how variations in individuals' mortality 
patterns with respect to their income level changes the redistributive features of pension 
schemes in general, and the Jordanian system in particular.  
Moreover, the system as the model shows in the Figure 4.8 discriminates financially 
between genders since the implicit rates of return awarded to females’ career life 
                                                                  
54 Duggan and Gillingham (1995) analyzed the extent in which life expectancy differentials with respect to income level 
could reverse the perception that net returns of social security are progressive. Their find suggests that unequal life 
expectancies among participants have little influence on such a feature.    
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contributions are greater than those earned by males at all retirement ages. The justification 
of this result can be generalized by the following implications: 
– The normal retirement age for a female is five years less than for a male. 
– The remaining life expectancy at the normal retirement age is higher for 
females when compared with males. For instance, women who retire at the 
normal age of retirement are expected to live an average of 23 years after 
retirement, while the remaining life expectancy for men who retire at the 
allowable age is only 17 years. 
– Aside from gender-based differences in the normal age of retirement, the 
discount rate used to penalize workers who want to retire early is greater for 
males than for counterpart females. 
Consequently, women retire earlier, live longer and are penalized less than their husbands. 
This indeed implies relatively more profitable pension contracts for women as opposed to 
men. The implications of the above-mentioned points are more explicit than it is implicitly 
recognized by IRR.  
Accordingly, considering all aspects of the analyses, the current rules of the SSC imply an 
implicit subsidy to all participants. This however is not foreseen in the future, as the 
insured population will get older and require more benefits that have to be financed via 
proportionally less contributors, and thus the system’s financial viability will probably 
deteriorate. Such challenges appear to be slightly similar to those that have already 
appeared in some societies with a relatively high proportion of elderly persons at which the 
current generation has no way of escaping the burden of their parents.  
The other important issues that emerge in this context are the implicit incentives for people 
toward playing the system at the beginning of their careers and contributing later. This can 
be a consequence of an increasing IRR as a function of the age at which the participant 
joins the system, or more precisely in such a case, when they decide to join. One example 
from Figure 4.2 shows how the implicit ROR awarded on contributions for those joining 
the system at age 20 can be 6 percentage points less than for those with the same features 
but join the system at the age of 43.  From the perspective of a financial specialist, this gap 
means a lot in terms of fairness and profitability. Concretely, if participants give more 
attention to the profitability of their pension contributions over the expected level of 
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replaced income, then they might move to the informal economy and only contribute for 
the period that maximizes their profitability.
55
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AW 5% AW 3% AW 1%
 
Source: Author's calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
AW: Denotes average growth rate of career earning.  
Figure 4.10 IRR for OA insurance with respect to the age at which the participant 
joins the scheme  
4.5.1.2 Disability Insurance 
 As we mentioned earlier in this section, redistributing benefits across participants 
according to their health conditions is a sort of intra-generational redistribution. The 
importance of analyzing and estimating the monetary value of disability pensions should 
never be regarded as among the factors that affect retirement behavior. This fact however, 
applies only for pension schemes where disability pensions are restricted by legal 
limitations, in which these benefits entitle only participants who are really disabled, and 
                                                                  
55 This might be much easier in developing countries than developed ones. Schnider and Enste (2000) have    reported 
that the size of shadow economies in developing countries ranges from 44% in Africa, 39% in Latin America and 35% in 
Asia. In Jordan, however, Schneider (2004) indicates that the size of underground economy is only one-fifth its GDP 
level, which is nearly half the average developing countries level.  
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Jordan is no exception with respect to this matter. Thus, a participant could not include the 
disability pension as one of the available options that maximizes his own utility unless he 
naturally becomes disabled during his career. Aside from the incentives issues, analyzing 
disability insurance should be performed in a way that informs policy makers as well as 
scheme sponsors about some of the financial implications of providing such a kind of 
insurance.  
Although Natural Disability Pension (NDP) benefits provided through the Jordanian SSC 
are to some extent controlled and decided by an independent medical committee, the 
analysis of the lifelong benefits that a participant can get even if he has contributed to the 
scheme for only five years, demonstrates some surprising financial outcomes. Figure 4.11 
reports how NDP inherent an extremely high ROR on the contributions paid by the 
corresponding pensioner. If the medical committee decides that a male participant, whose 
income approximately matches the system average insured wages, is eligible for NDP, then 
he would earn a monthly pension benefit that comprises almost half of his pre-retirement 
monthly income.
56
 If a disabled person is not covered by the SSC, however, and he wants 
to have the same level of replacement rate that is provided for a covered counterpart male, 
then he should invest the same contribution streams that he has paid and the corresponding 
contributions that his employer has paid on behalf of him in financial tools that yield an 
annual ROR of almost 35%. This of course, is much more than can market assets generate 
in Jordan or even in other countries. Financially speaking, such a rate which comprises 
almost five times the average ROR attained on the SSC's buffer fund would never exist 
unless it is provided as a type of substance. The extent of anxiety decreases as the IRR dips 
sharply with respect to the age of retirement. As in the case of replacement rate, the 
implicit ROR on pension contributions through in NDP for participants who retire after the 
minimum allowable age for early retirement would be lower than if they retire on the basis 
of normal early retirement. This gap between the two cases, however, is not big enough to 
be recognized by the scheme participants. It looks more apparent through the measure of 
RR. Nevertheless, in 2003 the number of new disabled pensioners who retired at an age 
less than the minimum allowable age of retirement were only 39% and 2.4% of the total 
number of new disability and OA pensioners, respectively. From this on, one can say that 
the problem of extremely generous benefits for early retiring disabled persons should not 
be of great concern, since their number is relatively low when compared to other 
                                                                  
56 See Figure 4.7.   
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benchmarks. However, the most important thing to recognize here is that most of the 
disabled pensioners, who retire at ages above 45, could not have completed the vesting 
period that makes them eligible for early retirement. If this hypothesis were true in which it 
can be generalized for all participants, the observed high degrees of generosity would still 
exist. For example, if an average earner from either gender starts contributing to the system 
at 45 and becomes partially disabled 5 years later, then the SSC would award him a 
monthly pension benefit that implicitly yields more than 30% on his or her contributions.
57
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Source: Author’s Calculation, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Figure 4.11 Implicit ROR on the contributions of natural disability pension insurance 
4.5.1.3 Lump-Sum Compensations 
 Under certain conditions at which a participant who retires before reaching the 
normal age of retirement, and at the same time cannot fulfill the minimum service length 
required for early retirement, he can acquire a lump sum amount for the contributions he 
has already paid throughout his participation in the scheme. This amount mainly depends 
                                                                  
57 This scenario is simulated via the distributional model but does not appear in the corresponding figure.  
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on the sum of annual amounts of the person’s previous insured salaries during the period of 
participation. Once the sum is counted, then the participant could acquire as much as: 
– 10% of this sum amount if the total number of contributory months is less than 
60. 
– 12% of this sum if he has contributed for more than 60 but less than 180 
months.  
– 15% outside of the above conditions.  
Counting the above criteria and parameters, the distributional model has estimated the 
implicit ROR on this sort of insurable benefits. What should be clarified before moving to 
our analysis is that there is no difference whether the lump sum payments are provided for 
males or females, since gender, income and age based special treatment no longer exists in 
this type of insurance payments. Thus, we simulate the implicit ROR only with respect to 
the length of service credits and earning growth, though the latter as seen in Figure 4.12 
has a weak effect on the estimated rate.  
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1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
Contributory Years
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Source: Author’s Calculation, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Note: The legend refers to the average career growth rate.  
Figure 4.12: The implicit ROR on lump sum benefits  
At first glance, the cost-benefit analysis as the model explicitly indicates in the above 
figure seems to be favorable for the scheme sponsors. First, an extremely low ROR given 
implicitly on participants contributions’ through a lump-sum payment upon retirement may 
discourage workers from retiring early, thus preventing the stability of agents structure, 
namely the dependency ratio. Secondly, even though participants sacrifice the monetary 
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losses they might incur and decide to retire on the basis of this provision, these losses 
would not negatively affect the financial position of the system but rather improve it. 
However, if participants recognize these implications clearly and at the same time they are 
uncertain of whether they should remain employed or not, then the observed negative 
returns may encourage evasion rather than discourage early retirement.  
4.5.2 Net Present Value (NPV) 
 Another approach for defining the concept of pension fairness is through estimating 
the present value of a pensioner’s benefits that surpasses the present value of his own 
contributions. To clarify further, the latter measure calculates the current value of all 
expected benefits during a person’s retirement life after the current values of all 
contributions made by the same person being subtracted. Although there is some extent of 
similarity between this measure and the IRR measure, the aggregation of NPV (social 
security monetary value) puts another image in our minds. The following formula shows 
mathematically how NPV for pension contracts is calculated: 
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where =RA  : the age at which the pensioner retires; tLE : participant life expectancy at the 
age of retirement; EA : the age at which the participant joins the system; 
m
Cr : the 
contribution rate at age m. mY : Participant income; mr : the discount rate.  
As apparent in the above formula, the NPV is sensitive to several variables, but it is more 
critical to the discount rate. This comes from the fact that contribution and benefits are 
both back-counted with the discount rate, while the life expectancy only affects the amount 
which a pensioner takes as benefits. Nonetheless, despite the extent of similarity between 
this measure and the latter used to reflect generosity (ROR), NPV can play an effective 
role in showing the net gains (losses) from joining the pension provisions. In this context, a 
neutral pension scheme provides its participants with lifelong retirement benefits, at which 
if they are discounted to their current value they will match exactly the discounted value of 
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the benefits they had actually paid to the scheme sponsors. Thus in such a case, the NPV of 
benefits and contributions for each retiree equals zero. While a positive NPV, means that 
the scheme is awarding retirement benefits that exceed contributions and implies a pure 
gift or subsidy from the system to participants. However, if NPV is none of both cases, the 
provision involves some costly measures for pensioners.  
Moreover, the NPV in our paper is presented as a fraction of the last salary earned by the 
participant just before his retirement, exactly like the replacement rate, except that 
nominator is NPV instead of pension salary. This is done in an attempt to make the concept 
clearer for policy makers as well as for foreign researchers, since absolute measures might 
be less understandable under the unfamiliarity of the currencies exchange rates and the real 
value of money for developing countries, among others. The rate used here to discount 
future contributions and benefits is 5%. The selection of this rate seems to be reasonable if 
compared with the actual performance of Amman stock exchange, yield on bonds, money 
market tools and other investment funds in Jordan. However, if the actual rate of return on 
the SSC's pension fund is considered in this context, substantial positive differences would 
occur. 
The distributional model has calculated the NPV of benefits and contributions under the 
current rules of SSC law, considering different scenarios about the earning level, wage 
growth rate, age of retirement, age of joining the system, as well as the number of 
dependents of the original pensioner. Initially, all participants regardless of the scenario 
they belong to are getting a pure gift from the system, except in the case where the average 
earner has no dependents, and has contributed for at least 33 years would be a net loser 
from participating in the system. However, the latter case rarely exists in Jordan. As 
noticed in the previous measures, the rate at which the benefits are discounted for early 
retirement pensions are lower than the actuarial fair rates. Even if we consider the normal 
of age retirement as a benchmark for discounting, despite its unfairness, the early 
retirement discount rates of the current law are still considered unrealistic. This conclusion 
can be drawn depending on the controversy between NPV measure and the age of 
retirement. For instance in the base line scenario, a male who retires at the age of 46 would 
actually get an additional 6 multiples of his last earning level as a pure gift from the system 
than if he retired 6 years later. The gender status also plays a crucial role in determining the 
net benefits from contributing to the system. Among all assumptions regarding the earning 
profiles, females get more salary multiples than males with the same conditions. This can 
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be justified by the higher life expectancy for females, 5 years less than the normal 
retirement age, and also a lower early retirement discount rate. Moreover, the Beveridgean 
character in this regard deserves attention (Borck, 2003). A male participant earning half 
the system average salary gets an additional six multiples of his last salary in today's 
purchasing parity as a net gain from the system when compared with those earning around 
the system average. The relative steepness of the NPV curve for the half-average earners 
reflects the diminishing role of the minimum COLA allowances in providing more than 
should proportionally be provided.
58
 Such a feature can be replicated as a consequence of 
the increase in the reference salary accompanied by the delay of retirement.  
Table 4.5: NPV of benefits and contributions as a multiple of pensioner’s pre-
retirement career salary  
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
Male 2,6 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,4 1,3
Female 3,1 2,9 2,8 2,6 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,5 1,4
Male 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,2
Female 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,4 1,3
Male 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,2
Female 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,2
Male 4,6 4,5 4,4 4,2 4,0 3,7 3,5 3,2 2,9 2,8 2,5 2,2 1,9 1,6 1,1
Female 4,8 4,5 4,4 4,1 3,8 3,8 3,5 3,3 3,0 2,9 2,6 2,5 2,1 1,7 1,3
Male 6,6 6,6 6,5 6,3 6,0 5,7 5,3 4,8 4,4 4,3 3,8 3,3 2,7 2,1 1,3
Female 6,9 6,6 6,4 6,0 5,6 5,7 5,3 4,9 4,4 4,4 3,9 3,7 3,0 2,2 1,5
Male 10,7 10,9 10,7 10,5 10,3 9,8 9,2 8,6 7,9 7,8 7,0 6,2 5,0 4,0 2,3
Female 11,3 10,7 10,5 9,9 9,2 9,5 8,8 8,2 7,5 7,7 6,9 6,6 5,1 3,8 2,4
Twice 
Average
NPV
as %
of
Last
Annual 
 Salary
NPV
(000)s 
J.D.
Age at Retirement
Half 
Average
Average 
Income
Twice 
Average
Half 
Average
Average 
Income
 
Source: Author's Calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
By interpreting the above table, it is crucially important to show here how the use of this 
measure leads us to different implications from those observed in the IRR measure. One 
can decipher that in terms of relative measures in which the NPV as a percentage of the 
present value of participants last earned salary is among them, the system seems to 
discriminate slightly between genders as well as between different groups of income 
earners. These implications, however, have the same signals of those described in the IRR 
measure. If we switch our analyses to interpret the NPV in absolute value terms, the case 
would be completely different. While it is true that the implicit ROR given for low income 
earners and females is higher than that given on the contributions of high income earners 
and males, respectively, the absolute and present value of extra compensation given to the 
                                                                  
58 More proportionally means here that if the 10% COLA allowances is less than 30 JD, then he should get extra 
allowances to push him up to that level. Thus, he implicitly gets more than the 10%.   
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latter groups is higher than for the former. For instance, it is explicitly shown in the above 
table that if a participating male, whose earning level before retirement equals the system 
average insured income, retires at the minimum allowable age of retirement, then he would 
gain a pure compensation gift from the system that comprises 6.6 thousands of today's JD 
While a counterpart male with the same conditions but earning approximately half the 
system average gets only 4.6 thousands JD in today's value. If we switch our analysis to a 
gender based comparison, we would almost come to the same conclusion. We saw in the 
previous section that   females get a higher implicit ROR on their contributions when 
compared with the rate given to their counterpart males, among all ages of retirement and 
the levels of income. According to NPV measure, however, males receive absolute 
compensation (gains) while females don’t. 
The only feature that has no conflict in its implication is the level of generosity with 
respect to the age of retirement. It is clear from the above table that the absolute and 
relative measures of NPV decrease with respect to older ages of retirement, regardless of 
the level of participant earning level before retirement. Such a feature indicates some 
consistency with the IRR measure, since the latter also decreases with respect to the age of 
retirement.  
4.5.3 The Implicit Contribution Rate 
 If participants are more in favor of the current benefits level and expect to get it as 
exactly promised by the current rules, one may ask about the possible ways to offset the 
unfairly awarded benefits to their earners. It would be logical, among the suggested 
options, to increase the aggregate rate of contribution. The variation in the net present 
values of benefits over contributions with respect to the age of retirement as well as the 
years of contributions proves that in principle such a solution might be less viable. 
Nonetheless, if the individual specific contribution rate needed to finance his future 
pension benefits is quite high, the economic efficiency condition of the system will not be 
met. This condition implies that the level of contribution should be justified to a reasonable 
level to avoid the distortional spillovers on the economy of high contribution fees. Among 
these spillovers are the deterioration in producers' competitiveness and the decrease in 
consumers' disposable income.  
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However, although all measures mentioned above have clarified the issue of generosity, 
the analysis of this measure is important. The expected relation between the implicit 
contribution rate on the one hand, age of retirement and contributory period on the other 
hand has made the concept more relevant to the NPV term used in the previous section of 
this chapter.   
The higher the NPV of future benefits, the higher the contribution rate needed to retrospect 
its value to zero. For instance, as shown in Table 4.6 those people retiring at age 46 as 
average earners over the course of their career life, should have been taxed at the rate of 31 
which is 16.5 percentage points more than the current charged rate. While such a rate for 
the same person would only be 2.5 percent more if he chose to retire 14 years later. On 
another level, the less time the beneficiary participates in the system, the more 
contributions he should have paid in order to get the same level of benefits according to the 
current law, and visa-versa. It might be suggested, that a fair contribution rate that should 
be paid by a pensioner who retires after 17 years of employment is roughly 15 points more 
than the actual existing rate. Accordingly, from a financial point of view, some people are 
paying less than they should or it can be said that they are getting more than their fair 
share. 
Table 4.6: The actuarial fair implicit contribution rate 
Age@ Retirement 46 50 55 60
Male 31 28 23 17
Female 36 30 25 18
Age of Joining the 
Scheme
20 27 33 37 43
Male 12 17 22 24 30
Female 18 25 31 35 N.E. 
 Implicit Contribution Rate (%) at the Normal Age of Retirement Male (60), Female (45)
Implicit Contribution Rate (%) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation, Hazmomics Distributional model. 
N.E. denotes female participant is not eligible for retirement because she doesn't fulfill the minimum vesting period at the 
age of retirement.  
4.5.4 Generosity Ratio 
 In addition to all measures of pension fairness mentioned earlier, it is worth 
developing a simple measure that relies on a standard benchmark for cross comparison. 
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The measure that we introduce in this context, states explicitly the extent to which benefits 
awarded to their beneficiaries are being self financed, more or less covered by 
contributions. In order to have such an explicit measure for generosity, several elements 
are essential for calculation. The following three definitions, although their values are 
identical, have different implications: 
First, the ratio of implicit contribution rate sufficient to cover the promised benefits under 
the current law, to the current levels of contribution rates, as follows:  
current
Cr
implicit
Cr
GR =                                            (4.5) 
Where GR: is the generosity ratio, Cr: contribution Rate. 
The ratio of one, for instance, explicitly indicates that benefits are awarded to beneficiaries 
on a fair basis. In this sense there is no difference between the optimal level of benefits and 
the actual level in the sense of financial fairness. If such a level does not hold, either 
contrast has an opposite implication. For instance, half one ratio means that 50% percent of 
the contributions paid to the pension system over the course of employment were unfairly 
absorbed. In another way, the implicit tax rate on income imposed indirectly by the 
pension system constitutes 50% of the rate of contribution. While a ratio of two, for 
instance means that the contributions paid by the pensioner are sufficient for providing 
only half of the current benefits level. 
Second, beyond the issue of contribution rate fairness, the generosity ratio can be 
calculated with a reliance on the level of benefits. For this, two definitions must be in use 
for this context. The following equation illustrates the case: 
Funded
B
Current
B
Gr =                                          (4.6) 
Where B: is the benefit level awarded under the sub-system. 
The dominator of the above equation presumes fully funded based benefits, in which they 
are calculated on the basis of actual contributions paid by the participant during his career 
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life beside the investment returns generated on them. The nominator represents the actual 
level of benefits awarded on the basis of current law. The ratio despite its similarity to the 
first case has another implication. For instance, if the calculated ratio is more, less or equal 
to one, then the benefit formula according to the current law provides more, less and fairly 
neutral benefits, respectively.  
Third, the ratio of the present value of future expected pension benefits to the present 
value of all contributions paid to the system reflects the generosity ratio in the above 
mentioned methods. The explanation of this concept might be more understandable among 
others. Simply, if today's value of expected benefits awarded to a pensioner from the time 
of his retirement until his death, is more than the discounted value of all contributions, the 
provision in such a case is more than fair. Equal values of both discounted financial 
streams imply a value of one as can be clearly deduced from the following equation: 
onContributi
PV
Benefits
PV
GR=
                                        (4.7) 
BenefitsPV : stands for the present value of all expected benefits during the retirement life 
span.  
onsContributiPV : The present value of all contributions collected during the course of career 
life.  
The distributional model has calculated the generosity ratio from an individual point of 
view based on the current rules of the SSC. Nonetheless, if the dominator and nominator of 
any the mentioned equations are given exogenously out of the model, the ratio can then can 
be calculated directly without the need for simulation.  
The analysis has shown as expected, a high ratio of generosity for all average earners that 
retire between the earliest possible age for retirement and the normal age.  The extent of 
generosity for those earning less than the system average seems more. For, it can be said 
that a generosity ratio of 2.2 for a baseline scenario person who retires at 46 has the 
following assessments which must be equally considered: 
– The pensioner is only contributing at less than half the fair contribution rate needed to 
finance his pension salary during his retirement according to the current formula. 
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– If the current contribution rate is considered for calculating the pension salary on the 
basis of actuarial equality, the benefits awarded to their beneficiaries according to the 
current formula is more than double its fair level. 
– The last assessment makes no difference to the others, unless in is clarity. The 
aggregate discounted value of all expected benefits for a participant during his 
retirement span is more than double the amount he had paid as contributions during his 
career life. . 
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Source: Author’s Calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Figure 4.13: Generosity ratio with respect to age at retirement 
However, as seen in the above figure, from an individual viewpoint, the less he contributes 
to the system, the more relatively generous benefits he will earn during his retirement. 
Beyond the implication of such a stream, the system provides a clear incentive for evasion, 
and might come from an idea in which the utility function of participants is a decreasing 
function of the contributory period. It should also be noted that, pension arrangement in 
Jordan provides more incentives for females to evade the system, since generosity ratios 
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relative to the contributory periods have initially higher levels when compared with 
males.
59
 
4.6 Potentials for Reform 
 The fact that the system dependency ratio is on a desired level conceals the fact that 
generous benefits as consequences of bad scheme design has already made the system 
financially unviable.
60
 Consequently, if no changes take place to solve the faults in this 
system, it will be more difficult to reconcile the system’s unfavorable financial imbalances 
afterwards. Before considering the appropriate approaches to the reform of the pension 
scheme in Jordan, it is worth noting some aspects of a better design of a reform strategy: 
♦ Economic and financial affordability A suitable design of a reform strategy entails 
the preservation of economic, social and political aspects. This might come as a result 
of stabilizing the contribution rates at reasonable levels (Gruat, 1997). There are 
several things which need to be protected, among them, the competitiveness of 
domestic against foreign producers and the stability of the labor market (Ney, 2003). 
The social aspects have no less importance in this context. Any upward changes in 
contribution rates in most cases have to be shared by employees and employers; the 
disposable income especially for lower paid earners would be insufficient to provide a 
suitable standard of living for them. Moreover, if the acceptable extent of the above-
mentioned aspects is not met by the reform approach, the implementation of it would 
be politically challenging and hard to have accepted. 
♦ Equity fairness: In this we mean that a strong link between contributions being paid 
during the career life and benefits to be awarded along the retirement period should be 
maintained. Sequences of such a link would have important implications for the 
viability and the efficiency of a pension scheme ( Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1985). 
♦ Adequacy and social solidarity: Achieving the above condition might have different 
sequences if social aspects are considered. For instance, a stabilized contribution rate 
and contributions based benefits would provide the low-income earners with a pension 
benefit which is probably insufficient to meet the minimum standard of living. Thus, it 
                                                                  
59 The figures that represent such a scenario do not appear in the text. However, this can implicitly be concluded from the 
discussions of previous sections.  
60 This fact is proved in chapter five.  
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is crucial to keep on some of the solidarity features that provide insurable benefits i.e. 
disability pension, work death, minimum income, etc. (Casey, 2004; Howse, 2004). 
Therefore, a better reform strategy should ensure acceptable levels of income to avoid 
poverty through enhancing the principle of intergenerational and intragenerational 
solidarity (Council, 2003). 
♦ Intergenerational fairness: In a pure PAYG system with a steadily growing 
population, the implicit rate of return awarded on pension contributions are identical 
across all generations. It is worth mentioning here that such a conclusion is only valid 
for a PAYG system in which the contribution rates are exogenously fixed while the 
pension benefits are endogenously determined through the system funding equation 
which equates the total contributions receipts with aggregate pension expenditures.  
However, in a partially funded system with a defined benefits formula the implicit IRR 
violates across generations. Beyond the overall financial viability, the latter generation 
will receive higher IRR if compared to the former ones since their mortality rates are 
lower than those of their parents. But considering the expected future financial 
challenges, such a feature would less likely to exist.  
4.7 Approaches for Reform 
 Before discussing the reform design, it is worth pointing out here some general 
conclusions we have reached from the above analyses. As discussed in the above sections, 
SSC law is badly designed in many respects. The old age insurance as a major part of the 
corporation activities seems to be financially unviable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
old age formula tends to create implicit incentives for the scheme participants to outplay 
the scheme in order to maximize their benefits with respect to their actual contributions.  
This of course leads to heterogeneity in the scale of rewards among all contributors. 
Secondly, as the means-tested income as well as the minimum and maximum COLA is 
embodied in the old age benefits formula, the probability of ‘income under reporting’ by 
some groups of participants' increases. For instance, those who earn relatively less might 
always have the potential to under report their income to benefit from the lower 
contributions that have to be paid because of lower declared income and from the 
minimum threshold of income and allowances. 
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Another sort of income under-reporting can arise in this context from the fact that the final 
wage used for pension calculation is subject to an adjustment mechanism based on the ratio 
of worker's final wage to his or her wage as recorded sixty contributions months before 
retirement. This comes out as one of the implications of article (43-D) of the SSC's law 
which states that if the final salary is more than 1.6 times his or her wage as it was sixty 
months of contributions prior to retirement, that difference must be subtracted from the 
reference wage used in pension formula. 
The following sections provide brief discussions regarding some reform options and their 
implications on several scheme aspects.  
4.7.1 The Parametric Reforms 
 The parametric reform strategy, which depends ultimately on changing system 
parameters, seems to be unrealistic and less sustainable in the context of JSSC. As 
explained already, measures of fairness and neutrality are sensitive to several factors, with 
the rates of return on assets, life expectancies among them. If new changes to system's 
parameters were based on the expectations of such variables, the effects of the reforms will 
be sensitive to the deviations from expectations. However, one can recognize that the 
above analysis has implicitly shown some important implications of parametric reforms. 
On the benefits side for instance, the model shows how benefits awarded under the current 
law are financially generous. The level of generosity as previously clarified is subject to 
many factors, among them the age of retirement, the age at which the contributor enters the 
system, and the rate used to discount future contributions and benefits. Generally speaking, 
decreasing the level of generosity for all beneficiaries can be done in different ways: 
♦ Increasing the age of retirement: Logically, this would imply that the contributor has 
to pay more in contributions and get less lifelong benefits. On the other hand, delaying 
the age at which participants are able to retire normally, may result in increasing the 
reference wage that the pension formula is based on and certainly the contributory 
period considered in this formula. The net effect therefore, would depend on the net 
balance of the contrast implications. If the present value of the additional contributions 
which have to be paid by contributors plus the present value of benefits saved due to 
delaying the eligible age of retirement is greater than the present value of the increase 
in the level of benefits, it would be financially viable to do so. If the case is the 
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opposite, such strategy would be either less worthy or more costly to implement. This 
can be clarified by using the following mathematical expression to assess this reform 
option: 
Ra ∂
PVC ∂
-
Ra ∂
PVB ∂
OV =                                        (4.8)  
Where OV  denotes the option value for postponing the normal age of retirement. PVB: 
the net present value of future expected pension benefits and PVC: the present value of 
the participant's contributions. Ra: Retirement age.  
If the OV is less than Zero, this implies that it would be financially profitable to the 
pension scheme to delay the retirement age. However, implementing such an option 
regardless of its pure financial implications would not solve the heterogeneity in the 
rates of return among all groups of beneficiaries and would be less effective in 
preventing people from cheating the system.  
♦ Increasing penalties for early retirement: Early retirement in most countries has 
contributed to pushing pension schemes toward bankruptcy. The cost of early 
retirement in OECD countries, as estimated by Herbertsson and Orszag (2003), is 
roughly 7.5 % of their potential output. This brings us to a conclusion on how early 
retirees burden their pension provider earlier in their lives.  Jordan in this context is no 
exception. The ratio of early retirees has increased considerably over the last ten years. 
In 1996 for instance, only 17 percent of new old age pensioners retired early. In 2003, 
this percentage increased to almost 66%. The fear of early retirement would not exist if 
benefits are penalized fairly, but as the model shows for Jordan, the penalty rates on 
early retirement benefits are insufficient to neutralize the rate of returns awarded on 
pensioner's contributions, regardless of the age they retire at. 
A new revision of the penalties imposed on early retirees may improve the system. 
Nevertheless, one adjustment will not solve the problem forever, since any adjustments 
in the penalty rates would be based on the net returns accrued in the buffer fund. The 
implementation of actuarial neutral penalty rates definitely needs a frequent revising as 
the performance of this fund might change periodically. This might be institutionally 
challenging and politically unacceptable. 
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♦ Increase contribution rates: Few economists advocate the increase in contribution 
rates as a first resort in finding a solution to sustaining pension provisions. One of the 
reasons that economists prefer other reform options over an increase in contribution 
rates, is that the latter approach may result in an increase in the informal economy 
especially if the system has some distributional characteristics which provide the 
beneficiaries with minimum allowances and means-tested income. Also, if this option 
is considered in matching the individual discounted value of retirement benefits with 
his own pension assets, the implementation would be applicably difficult.  
Generally speaking, the heterogeneously awarded rate of returns among different 
participants is subject to many variables in which the scheme parameters have to be 
changed and revised as these variables start to deviate from their initial estimations. 
3.7.1. Switching to Fully Funded 
  Strategies that aim at shifting to more funded schemes in order to make the 
unfunded ones more viable have been debated and in discussion for some time. The 
principal idea of implementing such a strategy is to strengthen the link between the 
individual’s benefits and his/her own contributions in order to remove the distortions that 
are often associated with the design of defined benefits provisions. Many economists argue 
that in the absence of external funds to finance the unfunded liabilities of the preceding 
generations, the net present value of the future gains from getting a market rate of return 
that is above the PAYG implicit rate of return would exactly match the discounted values 
of the unfunded obligations of other generation. Thus, a transition to a more funded 
pension scheme would only impact the intergenerational distribution of income and it 
affects the work incentive among generations (Lindbeck, 2002). Others think that the 
transition to more funded schemes increases the welfare of the scheme participants, since 
such a strategy can provide a substantial reduction in tax wedges while maintaining or 
increasing retirement benefits (Feldstein, 1997). However, the consequences of pre-
funding a partially funded scheme are slightly different than those for a pure PAYG 
scheme. The major difference between both cases is that the implicit rate of return in a 
PAYG system is more likely to be lower than the market rate of return. The case would be 
different, of course, for a PAYG system with a lower dependency ratio which has already 
started to be financed through the contributions of a booming generation. Otherwise, the 
growth rate of the wage bill, which is an approximate indicator for the PAYG return, is in 
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most countries lower than the proportional return on investment. In general, the latter case 
is one of the facts about unfunded schemes in more developed countries where the 
population is growing smoothly and average wages are moving steadily. In partially 
funded systems, however, the rate of return that impacts implicitly on pension 
contributions depends initially on the system’s own parameters. In Jordan for instance, the 
rates of return in spite of their heterogeneity among different groups of participants, are 
greater than the weighted average of the market rate of return on the domestic financial 
instruments and exceeds also the system wage bill growth rate. Thus it cannot be said that 
the welfare level for the subsequent generations, measured by retirement benefits, would 
be greater than today's observed level for current pensioners. 
Thinking over a longer term, however, indicates that any reform that involves a stronger 
link between benefits and contributions would improve the initial welfare of the following 
generations as concluded by Feldstein (1997). This can logically be recognized by the fact 
that such reform would reduce the future welfare losses that are likely to result when the 
scheme would not have enough money or assets to finance all beneficiaries. Continuing 
with the current rules, as we will see in the coming chapter, would result in a deep 
reduction of the benefits of future pensioners or sharp increase in participant's 
contributions. However, the sooner the reform is done, the less burden has to be paid by 
future participants.    
Consequently, the outcomes of such a reform strategy on a partially funded scheme are 
multiple. First of all, aside from the issue of transition cost, there will be a drop in the 
benefits level for some or all groups of beneficiaries as their pension benefits will precisely 
reflect the actual contributions and the market rate of return instead of the implicit rate of 
return they get according to the current law. Secondly, the transition cost inferred by the 
stock of current pensioners, or more generally, for those who keep getting their benefits in 
line with the pre-reform parameters, must be paid by somebody . If the government takes 
responsibility for these liabilities, the post-reform participants would only have to bear the 
burden of a lower rate of return that they will get via more fairly awarded benefits. Thirdly, 
if the intra-generational solidarity elements keep appearing in the reformed scheme, the 
extra allowances given to some beneficiaries above their equitable actuarial benefits would 
come at the expense of other participants. 
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4.7.2 Switching to a Quasi-Actuarial System 
 To introduce a new type of reform strategy in which some of the distortional 
outcomes of the current scheme can be eliminated, some actions have to be implemented: 
– Strengthening the link between benefits and contributions, as a straightforward 
way to remove the heterogeneity of rates of returns given to most participants 
and to reduce the generosity of benefits, in which they can integrate together to 
remove the unwanted and costly behavior of some groups of participants. 
– Funding the implicit debt that has already occurred and keeping on solidarity 
elements in such a way that fulfills Pareto optimality.  
– Prevent the low-income earners from being supported with insufficient benefits 
during their retirement span. Thus, any reform strategy should internalize the 
concept of solidarity. 
As we noticed in previous discussions, neither parametric reforms nor a fully-funded 
strategy can achieve the above-mentioned criteria jointly. Therefore, one could think about 
a quasi- actuarial pension scheme, in which benefits are over funded by contribution at the 
time where the strong link between an individual’s own pension assets and liabilities is still 
maintained.  
Nevertheless, one might ask on how could benefits be over funded and at the same time be 
directly correlated to contributions? This is easier than many think. Firstly, if we want to 
achieve the equity principle as a primary rule of reform, the present value of all expected 
future benefits for the pensioner must be a fraction of the discounted value of his 
contributions. Mathematically speaking: 
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 η : represents the fraction to which benefits have to be reduced in a way that  
represent the participant share of the system’s additional costs, definitely, the transition and 
solidarity costs.  
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Among the possible ways to automatically reflect the above condition is through 
computing the ROR only on the pre- retirement accumulated contributions rather than 
additionally on the decreasing balance during retirement as done by the annuitization 
process in fully funded schemes. The reasons behind choosing such an approach are 
twofold. First, it is assumed that the difference between the discounted value of benefits 
under a fully funded approach and the discounted value of benefits under the proposed one, 
would cover part, if not all, the transition cost as well as the cost of solidarity. However, 
the net influence crucially depends on many factors, in which the size of the implicit debt, 
the number and structure of future contributors, future probabilities of retirement and 
investment returns on the SSC's reserves are the most important among them. Secondly, if 
we set the rate of return on a pension contract to reflect only the rate of return on 
contributions’ assets before retirement, this would more likely increase the incentives to 
retire later. The longer the participant stays in employment, the greater the returns he 
would get on his own contributions. Thus, benefits at the time of retirement according to 
this approach can be calculated as follows: 
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While benefits in a fully funded scheme can be calculated as follows, (Harvey and Gray, 
1997): 
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Where
r1
1
Z
+
= , (r) denotes the annual compound nominal ROR or interest rate. If the 
ROR or interest rate is monthly compounded, and m stands for month instead of year, for 
instance, the multiplication by 12 in the dominator of the above equation should not be 
considered. 
The condition necessary for the system’s future viability, in which the transition cost is 
internally financed via scheme participants, is confirmation that the ratio of pension 
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benefits under the proposed approach to the benefits level under a fully funded one, is 
equal or greater than the ratio of assets at the time of reform of the system’s implicit 
liabilities. Mathematically, 
sLiabilitieDiscountedTotal
AssetsDiscountedTotal
B
B
f
qa
=                                        (4.12) 
Where qaB : is the average benefits level under the Quasi Actuarial reform scenario. fB : 
Benefits when they are fully financed through participants own contributions. Such a 
condition applies only if the reform strategy is fully implemented at one point at time. 
Aside from the implications of this condition, this approach seems slightly similar to the 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system where a participant's benefits are directly 
linked to his own contributions. The contributions in such a scheme are awarded (indexed) 
with a notional interest rate, that is in its turn a major part of the benefit formula. However, 
choosing the appropriate notional interest is not an easy task, since there is no clear 
methodology on how such a rate is selected.  International experience has shown that there 
is no identical methodology in choosing the notional rate. For instance, within the notional 
part of the Italian pension scheme, contributions paid by participants are indexed with the 
growth rate of GDP and annuitizied for the remaining life expectancy at the time of 
retirement (Disney, 1999). Other countries, Sweden and Latvia, have tied the notional 
interest to the growth rate of the total wage bill covered by their schemes (Poland preferred 
the per capita income to other indexes). Nevertheless, those countries clearly have no real 
accounts or funds on their NDC scheme in which the rate of return can be considered 
among other options for the notional rate determination. However, the case of Jordan is 
slightly different, since the SSC scheme as previously mentioned has been launched on 
partially funded basis in which the system’s financial surpluses were continuously 
accumulating and an unspecified portion of the individual’s own contributions still exists 
in the fund. Therefore, considering the actual rate of return on fund assets would be logical 
to some extent, in the sense that it connects the system’s ongoing liabilities with the actual 
performance of the fund. Moreover, once the participants' old age benefits have some links 
with the actual performance of the fund, the participants would most likely supervise and 
evaluate the investment performance of their own contributions. This of course would 
positively influence the fund’s profitability.  
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Figure 4.14 shows some of the implications of transferring from the current system to a 
quasi-funded one. The notional interest considered for benefits calculation is the same as 
the rate of return on the pension buffer fund which is given only to the pensioner’s pre-
retirement accumulated contributions. Moreover, a means-tested income that equals the 
minimum wage in Jordan is also considered in our analyses. As expected, the post-reform 
outcomes imply a lower IRR on contributions when compared with the base line scenario 
and with the fully funded approach. 
However, this is not all. The implicit IRR accrued after implementing a NDC moves 
increasingly with the age at which the participant chooses to retire. Although this result is 
expected, the reflection of the IRR curve for the NDC from a decreasing path with respect 
to the age of retirement to an increasing one, calls for some optimistic implications. 
Interestingly, the gap between returns under the baseline scenario and those under the NDC 
apparently shows how the system would financially benefit after introducing our proposed 
approach.  
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Source: Author’s Calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Note: The notional rate of return considered for the reform scenario is 6%.  
Figure 4.14 IRR under the current law and reform scenario 
A further comparison between the proposed system and the existing one can take place in 
the context of replacement rates as well. As stated earlier in this section, this can be 
regarded as an important measure for policy designers to take into consideration, since it is 
easier for the majority of the scheme participants to recognize the differences in the level 
of replaced income rather than calculating or worrying about their implicit IRR. 
Empirically speaking, the model reports some interesting implications when we compare 
the RR awarded under the current scheme and those awarded under the proposed approach 
to reform. The replacement rates in either case are upward moving with the age of 
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retirement. However, the RR curve under the NDC scheme is convex to the X-axis while 
the curve that reflects the RR under the current rules is convex to the Y-axis. The 
mathematical explanation for the former case states that IRR increases in an accelerating 
margin with respect to the increase in the age of retirement. This, in theory and perhaps in 
reality, increases the incentive for participants to retire later ( Breyer and  Kifmann, 2001). 
Aside from the characteristics of both curves, the level of replaced income after 
implementing the proposed approach for those retiring at the normal age of retirement is 
roughly 40 percentage points less than under the current law. The latter conclusion implies 
a lower adequacy satisfaction when implementing the reform approach, but the satisfaction 
would be even lower if current rules kept unchanged.  
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Source: Author’s Calculations, Hazmomics Distributional Model.  
Figure 4.15 Replacement rate under the current law and reform scenario   
Adapting the proposed strategy might also have another impact in the context of 
intergenerational fairness. In a base line scenario, if we assume that the contribution rate is 
kept constant over the next fifty years, the main factor that affects the IRR, neglecting the 
possible consequences of the expected future financial shortfalls, would be the change in 
life expectancy. A fall in mortality rates must be carefully considered as one among other 
challenges in the face of the system. Since an increase in life expectancy involves a longer 
period of retirement, more benefits will be awarded. Accordingly, the IRR generated by the 
current law is upward moving with the increase in life expectancy, although there are no 
hopes, as we will see in the next chapter, that either the rate of contribution or the level of 
benefits would be preserved at its current level as the need for extra financial inflows to 
finance future expected imbalances will emerge.
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5. The Future Outlook of the SSC: Status Quo and 
Reform Assessments 
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, the study attempts to answer several policy oriented questions 
regarding a wide range of issues that would determine the future viability and 
compatibility of the SSC in Jordan. The most demanding issue in this context is how the 
scheme financial conditions would look like over the first half of this century if the current 
law remains unchanged. Without quantitative measures, the judgment on the future 
viability and appropriateness of the concerned scheme in our study as well as on the 
implications of any reform options would be unconvincing.  
Many pension specialist and academics have used actuarial methodologies to outperform 
their future forecasts regarding the financial sustainability, stability and distributional 
dimensions of pension schemes over long time horizons.
61
 In our context, the main 
purposes of using actuarial model are manifolds. First, such a methodological approach is 
well thought to afford us with a clear image about the periodical movements of the SSC's 
financial receipts as well as its expenditures. The need for these estimates is to assess the 
financial viability of the pension system on a year-by-year basis and to appraise their 
distributive implications on the scheme main members as there are no reform steps taking 
place. Second, estimating future financial flows can even be better understood when the 
different stages of pension systems life cycle, particularly partially funded ones, are clearly 
defined. Third, the projection model is crucially required to testify the theoretical 
perception concerning the optimal reform strategies in their general context, and to 
demonstrate how scheme-specific conditions would eventually change the applicability of 
some reform arguments.  
                                                                  
61 See for instance, Palacios and Rocha (1998) and Oksanen (2002). 
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5.2 The Population Projection Model 
5.2.1 Overview 
 As it is widely recognized, demographic parameters are among the most important 
factors that formulate and respond to the economic, environmental and social changes. The 
future prospects of the population age and sex structure, beside many others, devote 
considerable attention of many researchers and academics that might benefit to a different 
extent by putting them in greater use. For instance, commercial institutions benefit largely 
from the more accurate future population projections classified according to the 
socioeconomic categories such as the individuals' income distribution and their 
consumption preferences. These figures as they are actually used are employed by this sort 
of institutions to shape the future of their production and marketing strategies in such a 
way to maximize their profits. Governments might also be concerned with the same or 
different types of demographic data to set up their medium-long term fiscal and 
development plan (O'Neill et al., 2001).  
However, the current status of national population as well as its future prospects play a 
greater or a lesser role in our context. The age and gender distribution of a population is 
considered as one of the most significant elements that determine the future of many 
pension schemes around the globe. The interaction between some of the demographic 
elements and labour market parameters affect in several dimensions the social security 
schemes characteristics to which in their term they impress the future financial viability of 
these schemes.  
Theoretically and not so far empirically, population projections can be obtained by various 
techniques and methodologies. However, most of the long term oriented projections have 
employed what is called a Cohort Component Method (CCM). This method was formerly 
developed by the English economist Edwin Cannan (1895) and was first employed by 
Notestein (1945) to perform a global population projection.
62
 After him, the majority of 
population projection literatures have hinged essentially on this method, the thing which 
has made it the dominant framework to specifically project the periodical transition of the 
global population in the 20
th
 century. The projection method according to this approach 
                                                                  
62 The initial work of those authors was not reviewd by the author but cited from the Socioeconomic Data and 
Applications Center. of Columbia university. For detailed information about their work, see references. 
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proceeds by updating the population of each sex and age specific brackets according to the 
periodical assumptions about the components of the population change. The sources of 
population growth components regardless of their algebraic sign can be listed under two 
major groups. The first incorporates the natural changes of population size and structure as 
some people along different time intervals die and some infants are born.( While the 
second group of transitional components deals with the future possible geographical 
movement steps between the targeted population and the external ones as some inhabitants 
might decide to permanently go out to other countries and others might choose to 
immigrate into the targeted population (Schopflocher and Jin, 1998).
63
 
Excluding the impact of new births, the natural periodical transition would always have a 
negative impact on the size of any population unless the number of net migrants from the 
outside sources is enough to offset the number of death cases at the same time interval. 
However, when the number of new births is considered, the net impact of population 
transitional movement over any period depends mainly on the force effects of all growth 
components. 
Based upon this approach, the components of population periodical movements (Fertility, 
Mortality, in-out migration) are applied separately on each age- sex brackets. Along the 
annual time increments of the simulation process, population cohorts are periodically 
transferred to the next cohort group after the net natural increases is added or subtracted. 
The number of deaths among all cohorts can be obtained by multiplying the cohort sex 
groups by their parallel survival rates. Mathematically speaking, 
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63 See also Transport and Population Data Centre (2004). 
127                              5. The Future Outlook 
 
On the other hand, the number of new births is generated by applying the cohort specific 
fertility rates on the female population at childbearing ages. The representative age rang for 
childbearing females as often used by corresponding literatures starts at the age of 15 and 
ends up at the age of 49. The following formula depicts how new births are calculated in 
our model according to (CCM): 
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Where tB : New births in year t. 
 t f,iN : Female population at age (i) at time (t). 
 tiFr : Age-Time specific fertility rate. 
The net count for children aged below one can be obtained via applying extra ordinary 
steps. First, new births are distributed among both genders by the presumed sex allocation 
factor of new birth. Secondly, after sexual distribution of new birth being obtained, the 
resulted figures are adjusted by applying the corresponding survival and net migration rate. 
(Takahashi et al., 2002). Figure 5.1 shows in a simple manner the general methodological 
process for estimating the future population according to the (CCM):  
 
 
Source: The international Financial and Actuarial Services (2002). 
Figure 5.1: The general framework of CCM 
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5.2.2 Data and Assumptions 
 As a first attempt to implement this approach to projecting the Jordanian population 
over the entire simulation period, the required data is being obtained from their different 
national and international sources. The initial one-year-age and gender increments of the 
Jordanian population in 2003 were acquired from the Department of Statistics (DOS) of 
Jordan. The mortality rates used in the model are essentially based on the World Bank 
prospects about the future age- gender specific survival rates of the Jordanian population. 
Future assumptions regarding fertility and net migration rates are based to large extent on 
the United Nation (UN) population division country specific estimations (UN, 2004). The 
model relies basically on the "main variant" forecasts concerning fertility, mortality and 
migration rates, since they are based on the most likely evolution of each of them in the 
light of the trends observed in recent years( Ministry of treasury, Italy). 
These sources as Figure 5.2 depicts, estimate that Total Fertility Rate (TFR) will decline 
from currently 367% to 290% by the end of this decade. Afterward, TFR continues to 
decline until it reaches the level of 180% by the year 2050. Consequently, the average 
number of babies born to a Jordanian woman would almost half over the first five decades 
of this century.
64
 The following figure shows the estimated age specific fertility rates over 
the simulation period. 
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Source: Author's own representation with accordance to United Nations population division, 2003. 
Figure 5.2: Age specific fertility rate for 2003- 2050 
As one of the consequences of improving life and health standards, the World Bank vision 
of the future development in mortality rates seems quit optimistic. The average mortality 
                                                                  
64 The average babies born for each woman at the same period has reached 380% in Arab states, developing countries 
290% and 180% in OECD countries. For more detailed figures see UN (2004). 
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rate for females as the bank staffs expect would continue its declination until it reaches half 
of its current level by 2050. The average mortality rate for males is assumed to decrease as 
well but in a lower extent when compared with their counterpart females, since that is 
assumed to place on 5.2% by 2050 which is more than half its level in 2003 (7.8%). Figure 
3.3 shows how the proportion of those who deceased at a peculiar age and year would fall 
over the period of simulation. 
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Source: Author's own representation  in accordance with World Bank, 2003. 
Figure 5.3: Age- Sex based mortality rates (2003, 2050) 
No less important, life expectancies for both genders at each one-year age increments are 
crucially needed in our context as one of the inputs the model utilizes to canvass the 
implications of reform scenarios, since they pertain directly to the estimated life 
expectancies. Once survival and hence mortality rates being assumed or projected, the 
corresponding age-sex specific life expectancies can be computed accordingly. Since 
mortality rates at each age bracket are higher for males when compared with their 
counterpart females, the age specific remaining life expectancy for women always exceeds 
that of men. Aside from the sexual divergence of life expectancies, the male life 
expectancy at birth, as our projection model finds, would increase from 70.5 in 2003 up to 
76 years in 2050. The female life expectancy at birth, on the other hand, most likely would 
jump up to 81.1 by the year 2050, which is roughly 8 years above  its level in 2003. By 
looking at Table 5.1 one can recognize that in both terms the actual and relative ones, the 
life expectancies over the entire prediction period would  improve for both genders but 
relatively larger for those of women. This can be clearly attributed to the future prospects 
regarding the probability of dying for both genders, at which it is expected to decrease at 
each age after birth more proportionally for females than males. Concerning the remaining 
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life expectancy at the normal age of retirement, the men who reached the age of 60 at year 
2003 are expected to live for another 17.2 years until their death, while at the same year a 
women who has reached this age may live for another 18.6 years. Along our simulation, at 
the age of 60, both men and women are most likely to survive longer as time passes up. 
Again, the increase in the remaining life expectancies for females would surpass their male 
counterpart in absolute and proportional terms. 
Table 5.1: Gender life expectancy at birth and normal retirement age  
Year 2003 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Male 70,5 72,1 73,6 74,4 75,2 76,0
Female 73,2 74,8 76,8 78,1 79,5 81,1
Gender Average 71,9 73,5 75,2 76,2 77,4 78,5
Male 17,2 18,0 18,8 19,2 19,7 20,1
Female 18,6 19,6 19,9 21,6 22,6 23,8
Gender Average 17,9 18,8 19,4 20,4 21,1 22,0
At Normal Retirement Age, 60 for male and 55 for female. 
At Birth
 
Source: Author's Calculations. 
Note: For a detailed explanation on the methodology used to calculate the figures of the above table see Anderson (2001).  
Concerning the net national migration rates over the simulation period, the population 
division of the UN expects Jordan to have a slight excess of immigrants over emigrants 
during the first half of this decade and a negative trend thereafter. However, the author has 
adjusted these figures to reflect the recent development in the global political situation in 
general and the growing tensions in the Middle East. Jordan has already started to face an 
unexpected wave of immigrants from Iraq and western countries following the war on Iraq 
and of the social and legislative stresses on the eastern immigrants in U.S among other 
western countries. Thus, the author expects that net migration rate to Jordan will to reach 
double its level in 2003 over the coming four years. After 2007, the considered migration 
rates will remain similar to the expectation of the UN.  
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Source: 2003- 2007 assumed by the author and the rest correspond to the UN prospects. 
Figure 5.4: The assumed net migration rate over the simulation period (2003- 2050) 
5.2.3 Specific Model Methodology 
 The general approach of (CCM) as defined in advance, is being superseded by an 
adjusted technical methodology. This methodology is well thought out to contemplate the 
characteristic manner of the data that has been obtained from their different sources.  
The model uses a one- year cohort based matrices or both genders, in an attempt to have 
the needed sort of future population outcomes. The population for each gender during the 
simulation time interval is modelled according to a one- year step by step transition 
mechanism. The model transmits the cohorts that have already been born in year (t) to the 
following estimated year by applying the corresponding survival and migration rates.  
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Where (t) ranges from 2003 to 2049. 
The survival probabilities S are recomputed by incorporating mortality rates in year t in 
such a manner that it reflects the transition of half- year intervals by one-year increments. 
This can be done according to equation (4-4) by considering the mortality rate of the 
observed gender and age bracket: 
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Regarding the flow of new births, the model estimates them by incorporating the age 
specific fertility rates to the appropriate female population that is observed at the middle of 
year t and t+1.
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Thereafter, the outcome of equation (4.5) is conveyed forth into equation (4.6) to forecast 
the population aged below one at the middle of year t +1: 
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t
sGf  : refers to the distribution factor of new births among genders at time t, this is 
assumed to remain as its level in 2003. To the best of our knowledge, no external factors 
could have an influence on this factor; it's no more than Gods' will.  
After simulating the above corresponding equations with the data defined in section 5.2.2, 
the projection of the Jordanian population has shown some interesting outcomes that might 
afford us with some preliminary implications for the SSC. However, discussing such 
implications should not be considered unless the overall model sections are entirely 
outperformed. Figure5.5 displays a general overview of the foreseeable development of the 
Jordanian population structure all along the simulation period. The population of young 
people continues to increase rapidly during the coming next four years and afterward starts 
to grow steadily with a few fold of decline during the early years of the first half of the 
second decade. After 2023, the aggregate population for those who are aged 15 years and 
below commences to decline over the rest of the simulation period. However, the working 
age population as estimated by this model gives us some primarily optimistic hints 
requested for our context as it grows over the entire period of simulation. Such an 
optimistic view should not continue as it is initially seen as the simulations also depict an 
                                                                  
65 Applying age specific fertility rate is a common request of actuarial methodologies, see for instance Office of Chief 
Actuary (2000).   
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increasing trend of the old age population along the same interval of the increase in 
working age population. The net offset of both trends on the population dependency ratio 
is shown clearly in Figure5.5. The total impact of the transition process of the Jordanian 
population has resulted in the tripling of the ratio of old age people to the working one by 
the end of the simulation period. This rationalized apparently in the same figure, the 
concavity and convexity of the working age population and old aged population time 
trends, respectively, indicates that the former is most likely to grow in decreasing rates 
while the growth of the latter would be in increasing rates. 
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Source: Author's Estimation. 
Figure5.5: The estimated development in population size and parameters 
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The development of age and sex distribution of the whole Jordanian population as shown 
by the population pyramids in Figure 5.6 indicates a gentle transition from a classical 
pyramid shape that reflects a young population to wide-top pyramid which indicates a 
relatively older one. This of course comes to the space as the consequences of the 
anticipated mix of low births coinciding with continued improvements in life expectancies 
start to appear on   the population structure.  
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Source: Author's Estimation, Hazmomics Actuarial Model, Demographic Section. 
Figure 5.6: The development of the Jordanian population pyramids 
5.3 Employment Data, Assumptions and Projections 
 Data and assumptions regarding the labour market parameters and conditions are 
considered by many actuaries and financial experts as among the most important inputs 
requested for evaluating and modelling the long term financial characteristics of pension 
schemes. The structure and count of pension schemes members (Participants, employers, 
and pensioner) depends basically on the employment market parameters. Without clear 
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figures and prospects concerning these parameters, no one can guess how the future of 
pension schemes would look.  
Quantitative measures of employment markets link to a great extent to the demographic 
parameters, particularly, the population structure. For instance, the interaction between that 
structure and the labour participation rate would result in appropriate figures regarding the 
size of an active labour force.  
The initial data about the Jordan Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) distributed 
according to the age and sex increments is obtained from the DOS most recent labour 
market survey (2003). The data shows as commonly observed in many countries, 
especially in developing ones, that the average labour force participation rate for Jordanian 
females among all age increments is lower than of their counterpart males. In 2003, 
roughly 67% of males whose age is considered for regular employment were active, while 
only 11.2% of the female population at these ages were available for work. This can be 
vindicated by the cultural and traditional responsibilities of women in which they have to 
look after their homes, children and dependent elderly. However, this realism as the 
historical trend says will not continue, the relative stability of males LFPR and the 
continuing growth of female LFPR would most likely remove the gender disparity of the 
participation in economic activities. Saying that in figures, if LFPR continues to grow at 
the same drift of the last ten years (3.5% annually), 61% of the female working age 
population are inferred to share the active labour force by the end of the simulation period. 
The latter estimated level of participation appears similar to the average level observed 
currently in the OECD countries (OECD, 2004). Among the interpretations of such a 
development of female participation in market based producing activities that the assumed 
decline in fertility rates causes the child caring responsibilities to diminish accordingly. 
Several literatures have confirmed that the number of children affects the ability of women 
to participate in the labour market (Heckman and Willis, 1977). However, some 
economists argue that the increase in female participation in the labour market reduces 
their ability to get pregnant and also their capability to follow-up motherhood 
responsibilities (Harvey, 1996). 
The second step of our estimation proceeds by interacting the age specific LFPR for both 
genders with their analogous projected population to which the size and structure of active 
workers is then derived for the entire simulation period. The overwhelming increase in the 
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number of females available for work as Figure5.7 shows is attributed to the gradual and 
lasting augmentation in their participation rates and to the continuously growing 
population. The size of active males available for jobs is also projected to increase but to a 
lesser extent than females. In mathematical terms, the size of the female active labour force 
is estimated to grow by more than four percentage points annually, while the growth rate of 
the corresponding male population is not expected to outmatch one percentage point. The 
following formula shows illustratively how the size and structure of actively available 
persons from both genders is being estimated along the simulation period.  
t
s,i
70
16i
t
s,i
70
16i
t
s,i
t
s LFPRNALFALF ⋅== ∑∑
==
                                       (5.7) 
tALF : Active labour force at year t.
t
s,iN : Population of gender s, age i and year t. 
t
s,iLFPR : Labour force participation rate of gender s at age i and year t. 
Regarding employment, the model relies essentially on the official data published by the 
DOS, since they are the most convincing data for employment market in Jordan and the 
only data which performs the rates of employment on Gender- Age basis. The last 
employment survey has shown hat level of unemployment stands at approximately 14% 
among the Jordanians who are actively looking for work which is quit higher than the 
average observed rate of 12.2% in North Africa and Middle East region. More than one 
fifth of Jordanian women who were seeking jobs were not employed at the time of survey, 
compared with only 13% for men. Concerning future forecasts of employment according 
to their age and sex distribution the model employs several procedures in order to make 
them more certain. Some economists utilize the assumed ongoing differences between real 
economic and productivity growth rates as an approximate measure for estimating the 
future proportional increase in employment. Such a methodological approach assumes 
implicitly that the (capital/ labour) ratio remains constant along the course of simulation, 
but this as we think is a logical assumption that one can use to analyze the development in 
labour market conditions over a relatively shorter time interval. However, there are many 
reasons in which such a premise is not recommended for half century projections. For 
instance, the technological innovations and changes play an indispensable role in 
determining the intensity level of labour and capital in any economic activity. Also 
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administrative procedures especially efficiency based reform could have a significant 
influence on the combination between human capital and other types of capital, e.g. 
technology. Therefore, due to the high degree of uncertainty in which unemployment rates 
can move either way, the hypothesis of no change regarding the age-sex specific 
employment rate compared to their initial level seemed to be the most unbiased choice. 
(Ministry of Treasury, 1998). From that on, the size and the structure of employed persons 
can be obtained by applying the assumed age and gender specific employment rates on the 
corresponding estimated figures of the age and gender specific aggregate job-seeking 
population (Active labour force). 
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tEN : Employed population at year t.
t
m,fs,i
Er : Employment rate of genders at age i and year 
t. 
Applying the above equation on the assumed labour market future conditions has lead to an 
moderately decreasing unemployment rate from currently 13.3 % to 13% by the end of the 
simulation period.  
Figure5.7 graphically displays the projected outcomes of the age and gender based size of 
employment and the corresponding unemployment rates assorted by their procedural steps. 
It is worthy mentioning here that these figures were adjusted to preclude none Jordanian 
citizenships which have been excluded from the early mentioned labour force measures. 
The size of imported labour force has stabilized on an absolute level of 25 thousands over 
the last four years. This might be one of the recent and future expected developments in the 
Jordanian employment market characteristics in which some of work opportunities that 
have been historically occupied by foreign employees are being and will be substituted by 
Jordanian citizenships. Such a fact may be among the sequences of dropping down a wide 
range of cultural and social barriers as well as the government policy toward restricting the 
imports of foreign workers to allow for more chances for Jordanian job seekers. 
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 Source: Author's own calculations.  
Figure5.7: The future predicted in the labor force figures and parameters
140   5. The Future Outlook 
 
5.4 Economic and Financial Assumptions 
 Assumptions as to future economic and financial conditions are considered among 
the most important inputs required for the actuarial and financial projections. These types 
of data are substantial to estimate the growth rates in insured wages of covered 
participants, pension indexation and returns on fund assets, in addition to several others. 
The key economic and financial assumptions considered in our future simulations are: 
1. Inflation Rates. 
2. GDP growth rates.  
3. Real return on funds assets. 
4. Other financial and economic assumptions that are endogenously derived by the 
usage of above base assumptions. 
5.4.1  Inflation Rate 
 In formatting any financial and economic projections regardless their form and aim, the 
future image of the proportional variations in the price levels are always needed for adding 
nominal premiums over real terms. However, in our model inflation rate is used for various 
purposes. It incorporates future estimates of real return on funds assets to finally compute 
the nominal changes in the scheme reserves that are induced by investment.  They are also 
being utilized for predicting the annual growth rates of contributors corresponding wages 
and salaries as well as for indexing future pensions once they are presumed.  
By looking at the historical trend of inflation rates over the last ten years measured by the 
proportional changes in the cost of living index (Figure 5.8), one can indicate that the rate 
has fluctuated moderately between an upper range of 6.5% to a lower base of 0.6 % with a 
periodical average of 2.5%. However, the world economic outlook which presents 
economic  forecasts for two years visualizes that inflation rate in Jordan will jump to 3% 
and fall back to 1.8% in 2004 and 2005, respectively (IMF, 2004).  But since these 
forecasts comprise only short term perspectives, the reliance on those seems not 
comfortably consistent with the rational long-term modelling methodologies. From there 
on and as sort of simplification we assume that inflation remains on its average level over 
the simulation period. The dynamic expected fluctuations below and above this average 
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seem likely to split each other, especially if their direction continues to have the same 
observed historical trend.   
5.4.2  Economic Growth Rate  
 Figure 5.8 displays the extent in which the Jordanian economy has experienced 
capricious output growth rates. The maximum registered growth rate over the last ten years 
was almost as far as the minimum registered rate from the whole period average.  Among 
the logical explications for this sort of trend is the capacity of the economy to over-average 
the historical growth rates and also its capability to absorb the expected and unexpected 
negative shocks.  This of course discerns some implicit limits on formulating the future 
forecasts regarding this factor. The IMF (2004) predicts Jordan economy to recover in 
2004 and 2005 by real income growth of 5% and 5.5%, respectively. After considering 
these facts, the model employs ultimate changeable margins above and below the historical 
average starting up by the recovery level and ending down with the minimum registered 
growth level. Saying that in numbers, the assumed GDP growth is set to start by 5.5 % in 
2005 and gradually fall down to 2% by the end of the simulation period.  
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Source: Author's own representation based on Central Bank of Jordan, published statistics and IMF world economic 
outlook, April 2004.  
Figure 5.8: Real GDP growth rate and inflation rate during (1993- 2003)    
5.4.3  Real Return on Investment 
 As we have shown early in this thesis, the SSC fund had performed badly during the 
first fifteen years after it was established. The performance over the second half of last 
decade and the beginning of this century, however, has substantially improved. The 
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average real ROR during the former period was almost below zero while in the remaining 
years has reached roughly five percentage points above zero. By considering the historical 
performance figures and the most recently observed ones, it would be logic to assume that 
the real average profitability on the scheme accumulated reserves would average on 3.5 
percentage points over the entire prediction period. In the sensitivity analyses part of this 
chapter, below and above that rate scenarios are also being simulated.  
5.5 Scheme- Specific Inputs and Assumptions 
  Since the main fold of our model is to evaluate the sustainability conditions of SSC 
financial characteristics and to assess the proposed reform strategies on behalf of other 
theoretical approaches, a wide range of the scheme specific data is needed in order to do 
so. Required data is aligned according to the scheme member groups; contributors, 
beneficiaries and SSC administrators. Financial rights and obligations accrued to these 
groups are also crucially required for our projection procedures.  
At first glance, it is desirable to indicate some of the general assumptions that are 
considered in our simulations. Before presenting our model inputs, it's worthy mentioning 
here that detailed and disaggregated data concerning scheme agents are a common request 
for most of the actuarial model performed by worldwide literatures. These inputs as will be 
presented in the coming sections collaborates other variables to perform the future 
forecasts regarding some of the scheme indicators that are not exogenously expressed by 
the author. 
In regards to the first sort inputs, initial data on the scheme main members were obtained 
directly from the SSC internal database. The actual distribution of beneficiaries and 
contributors among one-year age and gender specific increments are presented in Figure 
5.9. Beneficiaries in their term are split up to into three major groups: i) old age 
beneficiaries ii) disability due to natural causes iii) other forms of beneficiaries which 
comprise the aggregate survivors of either naturally died beneficiaries or competent 
contributors. It also implicates the total number of disabled beneficiaries and their 
survivors whom disability was initially caused by work injuries or occupational disease. 
The branches of the latter groups are rationally linked to the number of OA beneficiaries 
on an annual basis considering the relation which had been observed over the last three 
years prior to start year of estimation. The number of OA beneficiaries as Figure 5.9 
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apparently shows is more of males than those of females among all age increments. Such a 
fact can be logically imagined by the same figure as the sexual status gap applies also for 
the stock of contributors. The interaction between both sorts of members is generally 
explained in the following paragraph. Nevertheless, the only leftover group of agents 
which is defined as the number of personnel who are responsible to run out the corporation 
is proportionally fixed to the number of contributors as initially observed in 2003.  
The future prospects vis-à-vis the first type of members is expressed by utilizing transition 
probability factors for each state of beneficiaries. These probabilities are set according to 
the scheme past experiences as well as their future outlook. The fractional values of these 
probabilities are always below or equal to one since they interpret the probability of getting 
retired in the current period for a stochastic contributor who was alive until the end of the 
previous period. These probabilities are expressed with respect to a one year age lagged 
contributors. Putting that in front, the estimated number of new retirees in each year is 
modelled by fractionizing the scale of contributors who were aged one year less a year 
before the current simulated year. For instance, the number of pensioners whose age is 
currently 45 years is among the contributors who have finished their forty-four years of 
age at year t-1. Consequently, the gender and age probability of retirement typifies random 
walk behavioural factors of contributors on behalf of the scheme eligibility conditions and 
constraints. Figure 5.9 depicts the initial probabilities for each gender classified by their 
ages as being employed by the model for both groups of beneficiaries, old age and 
disability.  
The initial gender-age based coverage ratios are also required for estimating the size and 
structure of contributors. The coverage ratios are defined by the proportion of the 
employed population that contributes to the SSC scheme and pays contributions from their 
career based compensations. These ratios are at first computed through interacting the age- 
gender specific distribution of the stock of contributors as exactly obtained from the SSC 
database with the counterpart employed population at the same year. The outcomes of 
implementing this methodology on Jordan seem a bit different than how they look in other 
countries. Such dissimilarity between Jordan and other countries appears as the coverage 
ratios for women in Jordan among all age increments were higher than those observed of 
men. However, this can be logically attributed to the traditional and cultural fingerprints on 
labour market characteristics and also due to some of the SSC law articles. Making this 
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Figure 5.9: Gender and age specific agents stock and transition probabilities  
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simpler, the SSC law states that the participation of paid employment is mandatory for 
firms hiring more than five employees. Coinciding with this fact, women prefer working 
with more labour intensive private firms over other activities that employ less than the 
SSC minimum mandatory floor. This happens due to the fact that employment 
opportunities in firms that are hiring more workers at the same job site are socially more 
competent for women. Therefore, the ratio of men who are working in voluntary 
participating firms (hires less than five employees) is much higher when compared with 
the corresponding ratio for women (DOS, 2003). Furthermore in this context, while the 
age distribution remains constant throughout the simulation period, the coverage ratio for 
males is expected to increase from the current level of 30% in the year 2003 male 
employed persons up to 61% by 2050. This prospect follows principally two main logical 
senses. First, the historical trend has shown that coverage ratio for males has grown 
periodically. Second, the proportion of employees who belong to the old- public pension 
system will diminish over time as one of the major consequences of suspending new civil 
servants and the new military personnel who hired after 1995 and 2003, respectively into 
the public pension system. However, the development in coverage ratios for each one 
year age brackets are being restricted in our model to the maximum level observed today 
in some OECD countries. Simulating the number of contributors in brief can be viewed 
in the following formula:  
t
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s,i ENCrNC ⋅=                                         (5.9)                     
Where 
t
s,iNC  stands for the number of contributors. 
t
s,iNC : The age-gender specific 
coverage ratio. t s,iEN : The age-gender specific employed population.  
Applying that on Jordan as Figure 5.9 illustratively shows, has resulted in an increasing 
number of contributors of both genders among all ages. This, as shall be shown latter in 
this chapter induces the capability of the scheme to raise operational funds and hence 
stimulates the accumulation of pension fund reserves. Staying align with our context, the 
aggregate number of contributors as the model estimates, would increase from a bit less 
than half a million participants in 2003 to almost 5 times that number by 2050. 
Considering genders separately, the number of males who have contributed to SSC 
during 2003 matches only one-fifth their estimated number by the end of the first half of 
this century. The sight looks more impressive for females, since both the increase in their 
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labour force participation rate and the increase in their population size leads mainly to the 
massive increase in their SSC participation estimates. In 2050, the projected number of 
women who are covered by the SSC law comprised almost six multiples of their number 
at the start year of estimation. Consequently, the females' proportion out of total SSC 
contributors is likely to increase at the expense of their counterpart male.  
In order to stylize the inputs and assumptions required for estimating the claims on the 
scheme and the financial rights owed for him through out the simulation period, set of 
procedures are considered step by step. Foremost, the initial distribution of the insured 
wages is obtained from the SSC's internal database according to the age and gender of 
their earners. Such a distribution is crucially employed to outperform the financial 
projections of our model by incorporating them with the periodically adjusted structure of 
contributors and hence count-down the contributions collected from each cohort. In 
addition to that, the age specific wage distribution is among the most important inputs 
used to project the pension benefits accrued under the outperformed scenarios. The 
estimates of their future growth rates, however, derived endogenously by the model 
through combining the assumed GDP growth rates, deflator index and the projected 
employment growth rates in such a way that restores the wage bill share of GDP 
throughout the simulation to its initial level in 2003. The assumption of a constant share 
of aggregate wages to the level of national output has been widely considered by many 
literatures. The outcomes of this mythological approach for the baseline scenario as 
Figure 5.10 presents, indicate how labour productivity and nominal wages growth rates 
would fluctuate over the coming four and half decades. The following equation displays 
how annual wage growth rates are calculated throughout the actuarial model: 
ttt
t
s,i ENgdRgdpWg −pi+=                                         (5.10)  
t
s,i
Wg : Annual wage growth rate. tRgdp : Real GDP growth rate at time t. tdpi : Inflation 
rate measured by the national product deflator. tENg : The proportional change in the 
number of total employment. 
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Source: Author's own estimation. Hazmomics Actuarial Model.  
Figure 5.10 The estimated trend in nominal and real growth rates of covered wages  
Another sort of inputs that are fundamentally required comprises the service credits 
considered for the calculations of participant pensions upon retirement. The approach 
which has been considered for this task weighs the age of the contributor at the time of 
retirement and also conceives the presumed average age at which the participant initially 
joins the scheme. The latter is being approximated by the weighted average age of new 
enrolled SSC participants in 2003. These credits, however, are constrained by the 
maximum possible difference between the years of estimation, the year in which the 
system has been established and the age upon pension is computed. For instance, if we 
want to explore the service credit for a pensioner whose age is 60 at retirement according 
to this methodology with an assumed age of participation of 25, the total difference of 35 
years of service credits, logically interpreting, such a length of service credit cannot be 
considered for that pensioner, given the fact that system age is only 23 years. To 
rationalize such a case, the assumed length of service credit is returned back to no more 
than the minimum of both measures which is 23 years. Nevertheless, as the simulation 
moves up simultaneously, the service credits adjust periodically to reflect scheme age, 
participant's age at retirement as well as the assumed age at which the participant joins 
the scheme.
66
 
Lastly, as regards the financing system of the SSC scheme, particularly in the absence of 
external funds, it is desirable to make the proportional levels of paid contribution, despite 
their orientations, unchanged during the simulation period unless either the aggregate 
revenues of the scheme or its reserves are not enough to cover all the financial 
                                                                  
66 See appendix to figure out how the assumed years of contribution for participants of both genders would develop 
across the simulation period. 
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obligations. If an overall deficit takes place in any of the simulated years, in the presence 
of inadequate reserves, the ongoing unfunded liabilities is set to be financed 
endogenously through proportionally raising the level of contributions on all insured 
participants.  
5.6 Reform Specific Assumptions 
 Before turning to the adjustment in some of the assumed parameters as a request of 
assessing reform strategies, an overall outlook to the unchanged assumptions is superior. 
To restore the social objectives of the SSC scheme in providing disability pension and 
survivors income guaranties, the way in which these benefits are calculated remains 
abiding under both reform scenarios. The contribution fees paid by the employers on 
behalf of their employees are also set constant across the simulation period. The 
additional contribution rate collected for health insurance intentions continues to be 
charged and listed under other income category. As in the base line scenario, if an overall 
deficit accrues in any year without any sufficient reserves to cover it, the unfunded deficit 
is modelled as to be endogenously and entirely financed through a reduction in OA 
benefits.  
Both reform scenarios have to be treated by their own specialty in order to accurately 
perform their assessments on the main aspects considered in our analyses. Concerning the 
financial and economic assumptions, the model treats them exactly as being assumed in 
the base line scenario since the changes in the scheme financing strategy would mainly 
affect the scheme itself rather than the whole economy. However, enforcing either reform 
strategies may have a great influence on some of the scheme assumptions. 
Both reform strategies are performed on the basis of gradual age-based transition 
mechanism. Retirement benefits as the model simulates, have relatively more elements of 
the reformed scheme for younger participants than for older ones. Such an approach is 
well thought out to adhere to the time left for participants to adjust their retirement 
behaviour which fundamentally follows the level of pensions and it also might be 
politically more acceptable. Putting the former argument in clear view, if either reform 
strategies intends to lower the pension level, and they actually will, then a participant 
whose age reaches the normal retirement age would be less able to postpone his 
retirement,  increase his contribution credits or raise his personal savings to stabilize the 
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promised level of benefits, and vice versa. Therefore, age specific allocation factors are 
carefully considered for benefit calculation once retirement is due. Moreover, as the 
reform age proceeds with time, the age specific allocation factors adjust annually by a 
one- year less age increments. These factors are clearly displayed in the following figure.  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.11 The simulated age-based transition mechanism to implement reform 
scenarios (Allocation Factor)  
As regards the Quasi- Actuarial approach, benefits are calculated by distributing out the 
nationalized contribution accounts over the remaining life expectancy estimated for each 
beneficiary at the time retirement. At the first year of effectuation, the actual 
contributions of each retiree are inflated by the average nominal rate of return raised by 
the pension fund during the whole period prior to reform. Beside these settings, the model 
considers the deviation of individual longevity that brings the actual length of life below 
the estimated one at retirement at the expense of pensioner, while extra lengths over the 
estimated are the responsibility of the scheme itself.  In a general mathematical view, 
pure Quasi- Benefits are calculated according to the following equation:  
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Where Bt : is the monthly pension benefit computed purely according to the Quasi- 
Actuarial formula. by : The starting year of reform. sc : Number of contributory years.  
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tCr : Contribution rate at year t. tY : Annual contributory income. nr  : Notional rate of 
return. tr : Actual rate of return on buffer fund reserves. tpi : Inflation rate measured by 
the cost of living index. by,eL : Life expectancy at retirement.  
To make the approach more reasonable with respect to proportional changes in the 
general price level, the model indexes the accumulated contributions at the time of 
retirement with the future expected rates of inflation. Without doing such an adjustment, 
the real value of assets could dramatically fall against the higher levels of inflation.  
However, the above equation shows only how benefits are calculated when the reform 
strategy is fully implemented at the time of transition. To make benefit determination 
consistent with our gradual transition mechanism, the allocation factor which has been 
defined in advance should be considered in this equation to attain the final level of age 
based benefits exactly as the model figures: 
t
s,i
t
i
t
s,i
t
i
t
s,i Bof)AF1(BpAFBg ⋅−+⋅=                                        ( 5.12)  
According to this generalized formula, the final pension 
t
s,iBg  due at participant 
retirement constitutes basically of the pros-reform benefit 
t
s,iBp  assigned be the 
allocation factor 
t
iAF  and the remaining residual from the old benefit formula
t
siBof , . For 
example, if the allocation factor equals zero at a given retirement age and projection year, 
benefits in such a case are fully determined by the old pension formula. The higher the 
allocation factor is, the more link between pensioners own contributions and benefits 
would exist.  
Regarding the fully funded scenario, the present value of benefits payable throughout the 
participant retirement life are thought to match exactly the discounted value of his 
accumulated contributions along his working life. The main difference between this 
approach and the latter on is that the investment returns on the accumulated contributions 
stop accruing at the time of retirement, while in the latter one it continues accruing on the 
rest of the accumulated contributions after retirement. Illustrating this mathematically, 
benefits according to the fully funded scenario are calculated by the following formula: 
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Where )1/(1 errz →+= , err → : denotes the average expected rate of return on the pension 
buffer fund from the time of retirement  until the year at which the pensioner is expected 
to die. The model performs such a rate as the historical average of the rate of return on 
pension reserve along the simulation period.
67
  
As among the expected outcomes of implementing either reform strategies is a reduction 
in the age specific replacement rates and  strengthening  the relation between pension 
benefits and contributions, the orientation toward retirement at early age is well thought 
to fall  gradually throughout the implementation period. By reaching forward the end of 
estimation period, the retirement rate for the minimum eligible age of retirement is 
estimated to fall by 50% from its initial level at the start of the simulation. The presumed 
level of reduction in the probability of retirement for a participant whose age is 46, for 
example, would be 50% lower than its level in the base line scenario. For reasons of 
comparability, although the incentives might differ between both assessed scenarios, the 
probabilities of retirement among all age increments are set indistinguishable. 
5.7 The Financial Model Methodology 
 The main purpose of the Financial Model (FM) is to assess the financial viability of 
the Jordanian pension scheme under a status quo conditions and the proposed reform 
approaches. The description of this model proceeds by tracking-in the development of the 
balance sheet components in which the net flows and stock balances are clearly defined. 
Therefore, the definitional process of our model constitutes three dependently structured 
sections:  
– Scheme Expenditures. 
– Scheme Revenues. 
– Net Reserve Balance. 
                                                                  
67 For more detailed view about the calculation of annuity see for instance Muksian (2003), Bodie and Merton (2000).  
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5.7.1  Scheme 's Expenditures 
  As it has been defined earlier this chapter, the pension expenditures comprise the 
cash outflows toward the insured population and the cost of running down the SSC 
activities likewise financing the insurable operational activities or the cost of managing 
the scheme reserves. 
ttt AxIxExp +=                                        (5.14) 
Where tExp  represents the scheme total expenditures. tIx : Insurable current liabilities. 
tAx : Administrative expenses.  
The schemes total liabilities typify the annual financial rights accrued to the scheme 
beneficiaries from different branches: Old-Age (OA), disability due to natural causes, 
disability due to work injuries and diseases, and survivors of all branches. Cost of OA 
beneficiaries are projected on an annual basis by incorporating the gender-age adjusted 
average wages and the corresponding number of OA beneficiaries. Performing this 
mathematically:  
t
OA,s,i
99
45i
t
OA,s,iOA,s,t ASNC •⋅= ∑
=
                                       ( 5.15) 
tC : Cost of Old-Age benefits in year t.
t
OAiN , : Stock of Old Age pensioner (OA) of age i at 
year t. t OAiAS , : Adjusted average salary for Old-Age beneficiaries of age i and time t.  
Precisely speaking, the age and gender adjusted salaries are educed by proportionally 
recomposing the previous salaries with the average salaries of the new pensioner in each 
of simulated year. Such a methodology takes into account the thoughtfulness of weighted 
composition of the stock and the flow of pensioner. In addition to that, if pension 
indexation is implemented by the scheme rules then average pensions are inflated 
periodically by the appropriate assumed index. 
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Worthy of mentioning here is that the average pension of flow pensioner comprises the 
age based estimated service credits, the pensioner reference salary at the time of 
retirement and number of dependents in the pension formula exactly as stated by the SSC 
current law. 
Here 
1t
1iN
−
−
 corresponds for the stock of pensioners in the previous year at age i-1. 
i
tm : 
Age specific mortality rate. 
tθ : Pension indexation factor. tiNfp : The flow of new 
pensioner.  
t
iS : Age specific computed salary.  
In order to ease the understanding of transition mechanism, its worthy to mention here 
that the age specific stock of Old-Age beneficiaries as well as disabled pensioner due to 
natural causes are updated on an annual basis via incorporating the proper survival rates 
on the stock of prior year pensioners and the probabilities of moving out from the stock 
of contributors toward the stock of pensioners.
68
 Mathematically, the transition formula is 
given by: 
( ) ( )[ ]( )t s,i12t s,i1i 1tt b,s,it s,i1t b,s,1it b,s,i m1)12m(1NcPrm1NpNp −−⋅⋅+−⋅= −−−−               (5.17) 
b denotes the pension branch: Old age or Disability. s the gender status. Pr : Age and 
gender specific probability of transition from active contributors to branch- specific 
pensioners.   
The product of branch based transition probabilities and the corresponding active 
contributors is sub-aggregated into equal monthly flows to consider the survival of new 
pensioners as the time they flow.  Simplifying that more, not all pensioners who retire 
during the predicted year will stay alive until the end of that year, unless the rounded 
result of multiplying the age corresponding mortality rate with the number of new retirees 
is less than to be mathematically considered.    
                                                                  
68 These probabilities have already been defined in section (5-2).  
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To estimate the annual cost of the naturally caused disability, the model tracks the 
development of average disability pensions for each age and sex increments, which is 
annually updated to reflect the adjustment in the accrued benefits of new disabled 
pensioners. The next step proceeds via multiplying the updated average pension of each 
age bracket (one year increments) by the corresponding number of disability pensioners. 
From there on, disability pensions are adjusted annually to reflect both, the development 
of the size and structure of disabled pensioners and the periodical adjustments of their 
average pensions. The following formula shows in quantitative terms how the annual cost 
of natural disabilities has been estimated within the model: 
t
ND,s,i
99
45i
t
ND,s,iND,s,t ASNC •
=
⋅=∑                                         (5.18)                             
Where NDstC ,,  stands for the periodical cost of natural disability d of gender s. 
t
NDsiN ,, : 
Stock of naturally disabled pensioners. t
OAsi
AS
,,
: The adjusted average pension of naturally 
disabled pensioners. The latter is computed exactly as done for the OA pension.    
Concerning the cost of other insurable expenditures, the model estimates them depending 
on two segments: the aggregate number of beneficiaries modelled as a fixed proportion of 
the covered population, and a combined fraction of OA and DA average benefit per 
pensioner. This is simply identified in this formula: 
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t
srCS : Cost of survivors. 
sr
sα : A factor which indicates the ratio of survivors' 
beneficiaries to the combined stock of OA and ND pensioners. 
sr
sµ : The rationing factor 
for average survivor benefits to the weighted combined average wage of OA and ND.  
Annual expenditures on disabled pensioner due to occupational causes can be calculated 
155                           5. The Future Outlook 
 
by implementing the same methodology except that parameters should then reflect 
occupational disability pensions and pensioners. 
Non insurable expenditures that make up the scheme total expenditures reflect explicitly 
the cost required to run out the scheme different activities. The commonly used approach 
to estimate these expenditures is by proportionally linking their floor with the level of 
annual total contributions. Hence, administrative expenditures all along the simulation 
time interval are assumed to be a fixed proportion tη of total contributions TC collected 
periodically.   
ttt TCAE ⋅η=                                      (5.20) 
5.7.2  Scheme's Revenues 
 The SSC has two main sources of finance, the receipts of participants' contributions 
and the rewards on investing the scheme accumulated funds. Regarding the former type 
of revenues, the SSC collects on a monthly basis a fixed proportion of the participants 
gross income as  insurance fees against Old-Age, disability and death. However, the 
proportional fees paid for the insurance against work injuries and occupational diseases 
(WI) are modelled as other insurable revenues. The distribution of insurance fees among 
employers and employees is framed separately in order to stimulate some the cost 
implications on hiring firms.  
( ) ( )[ ]
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Where IR denotes the insurance revenues;
t
e,OAν   refers to the contribution rate paid by 
the employer to insure his employee against OA, DA and D, while 
t
e,WEν  denotes the 
contribution rate needed for the insurance against work injuries. The same applies for 
t
WI,
t
c,OA νν  , but they represent the contribution rates that have to be paid by the insured 
participants rather than by their employers.   
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As regards non-insurable receipts (Investment rewards), the model estimate them 
endogenously on a periodical basis taking into account the timing of contribution flows 
and the way they are utilized due at time of payment. Generally,  the model treats  
investment returns according to the source they where generated by: ( )i  The return on the 
previous period accumulated reserves and ( )ii the interest rate on the monthly 
contribution flows out-weighted annually, since contribution flows are not transferred 
directly to the SSC investment fund but deposited in  bank accounts. Representing this 
mathematically:  
( )[ ]1r1
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dt
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                                       (5.22) 
Where 1tROR − : is the previous year annual rate of return on the SSC reserve investment. 
1tRv − : One year lagged-accumulated reserves. 
t
d
r : Monthly interest rate on short- term 
deposits. Here, for the sake of simplification the model assumes an equal distribution of 
insurable revenues among the months of the year. Anyhow, fluctuations over the average 
are quite possible to offset each others. 
Combining the last two equations together implies that the scheme total revenues are 
associated directly with the level of contribution rates, total wage bill, short term interest 
rate, the scheme accumulated reserves and the rate of return on them. 
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Once the system starts to face a negative operational balance, the last part of the last 
equation would vanish, and the only generator of investment reward would be the 
accumulated fund reserves.  
5.7.3  Buffer Fund Net Worth 
 At the end of each financial year, gross scheme surpluses or deficits are added or 
leaked out from the pension total accumulated reserves. Accordingly, the fund reserves 
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adjust periodically to the added investment rewards and net operational balance. The 
latter can be defined as the net cash flows originated by the scheme insurable activities in 
which it reflects the periodical insurance income but excluding the scheme total 
expenditures. Worth mentioning here is that any volatility in the value of fund assets are 
internally encountered in the value of investment returns.   
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As far as the scheme total revenues surpass the aggregate expenditures, the fund reserves 
would keep accumulating. However, if the total annual expenditure exceeds the scheme 
total receipts then the deficit would accordingly be financed internally through the 
reduction in the pension fund accumulated assets.  
5.8 Model's Outcomes 
5.8.1  Scheme's Expenditure. 
 After utilizing the corresponding parameters and assumptions, the actuarial model 
shows some unwished facts heeding the growth in scheme liabilities along the estimation 
period. The total expenditures that comprise insurable benefits and the cost needed to 
oversee the scheme activities, as indicated in Figure 5.12, would increase form 165 
million (m) JD to more than 23 billions (b) in 2050. The convexity of the expenditures 
curve which reflects the development of expenditures along the estimation period 
indicates that the marginal change of the scheme expenditures is increasing for each 
additional year of estimation.  
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Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics Actuarial Model. 
Figure 5.12: The projected development in the scheme total expenditures  
The insurable expenditures in which the old age benefits constitute the greatest portion of 
them would step-up increasingly from a base level of 148 million (m) JD in 2003 to 
roughly 23 billion (b) JD in 2050. This can be attributed to many factors of which the 
increase in the number of beneficiaries and the jump-up in the contributory credits 
considered for benefits calculations at the time of retirement, is among the most 
important stimulants.  The increase of the service credits considered for benefits 
calculation would be more than those observed in the benchmark year of our simulation.  
Today no one can retire with more than 25 years of contributory period, since just yet the 
system age has reached a quarter century. The only way a pensioner can have further 
service credits, is by Buying-in previous contributory years.
69
 The cost of natural and 
work caused disability pensions is also expected to increase along the simulation period 
but in a lesser extent than OA benefits. In the bench year of our estimation, the cost of 
this provision was less than 30 m JD which is about 6% of its estimated level in 45 years. 
As regards other insurable expenditures that are awarded in many fashions in which 
survivors and lump sum benefits comprise the major part, the simulation depicts that they 
will grow rapidly during the coming four and half decades with an average annual growth 
rate of 7%. The rate, however, is relatively less than the estimated growth rate of 
                                                                  
69 This, however, is constrained with a qualifying conditions: the additional period that is subject to opposition must be 
a real active working period, the insured participant cannot be compelled to the SSC law during this period, the insurer 
have to verify that this period has never been considered for the government pension and lastly, considering the 
working credits outside Jordan is only available for the insured participants who have a Jordanian citizenship.  
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administrative expenditures  that will step-up from 17 m JD in 2003 to almost about half 
billion in 2050.
70
 
Proportionally speaking, the relative grandness of OA benefits as the model estimates 
would increase gradually over the estimation period at the expense of other categories. 
Within less than fifty years, as apparently depicted in Figure 5.13, the ratio of OA 
expenditures to total scheme expenditures would rise from about 60% in 2003 to more 
than 90% in 2050. This of course denominates why any reform strategy should give more 
attention to this branch of insurable coverage over others. Such a prospect, however, is 
discussed in the coming sections in more details. 
Expenditure categorical distribution
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2003 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048
Year
OA DI Other Insurable Administrative
 
Source: Author's own estimations, Hazmomics actuarial model. 
Figure 5.13: The estimated development in the beneficiaries' structure   
Referring the scheme total expenditures to the size of the economy demonstrates the 
extent at which SSC would contribute to the future aggregate demand in Jordan. In 2003, 
the total scheme financial outflows have comprised for less than 2.5 % of GDP. Although 
the expectations regarding the future growth rates of Jordan economy seems quite 
optimistic, this ratio is expected to jump-up gradually until the end of our simulation. The 
model assumes that GDP will increase nominally by an average growth rate of 7.5% 
during the first three decades of this centaury. Combining that rate with our estimates of 
the average growth rate of scheme total expenditure (12%) during the same time interval, 
suggest that the portion of scheme expenditures to the level of GDP would reach 7.3% by 
2030. As for the last two decades of our estimations, this ratio would increase relatively 
more than the observed trend in the following twenty five years. This comes in fact since 
                                                                  
70 These expenditures comprise also the allowances reported in the SSC balance sheet.  
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our future prospect regarding the GDP annual growth rate suggest that it would slow 
down smoothly over the concerned period when it is compared with the corresponding 
rate during the first twenty-five years of our simulations. In addition to that, although the 
growth rate of scheme total expenditures would either slow down during the same period, 
the extent of drop in the GDP offsets the decline in the former rate.
71
 As a result, the total 
expenditure is expected to attain 15% of GDP by the year 2050. This corresponds about 
the estimated levels for OECD countries at the same year (Visco, 2001).  
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Figure 5.14 The estimated development in the scheme expenditures relative to GDP 
5.8.2 Scheme's Revenues 
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the SSC has two main sources of funds which 
are used in a way or another to finance the scheme’s ongoing financial obligations, and to 
accumulate and invest the remainder in order to face a part of its future expected 
unfunded liabilities. Starting the analysis with the most concerned part of our simulations, 
the model estimates that the insurable revenues that are periodically and proportionally 
charged from the base of participants insured salaries on behalf of the portion paid by 
their employers, either as an OA insurance fees or health coverage one, would continue 
growing all along the estimation period. The main engine of growth as the model utilizes 
can be generalized by the potential increase in the number of contributors. Such an 
increase would be fundamentally motivated by the growth in the working age population 
which is endogenously incorporated with the expected increase in the female labour force 
                                                                  
71 The assumed average growth rate of GDP during the 4th and 5th decade of this century is 5.4%, while the estimated 
annual growth rate in the scheme total expenditures stands at roughly 9.6%.  
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participation rate and also with the potential increase in the male's coverage ratio. 
Additionally, the nominal growth of the insured wages and salaries would move up the 
collected contributions by the same proportion.  
Aside from the changes of system member structure, the model estimates that general 
receipts from participants will continue growing all along the estimation period. By 2050, 
the insurable revenues are expected to surpass the level of 9 b JD which is 33 times its 
level in 2003. If these revenues were to increase annually by the same proportion, the 
required average growth rate in total contributions would be some thing around 8%. With 
regard to the investment revenues of the SSC buffer fund that are estimated through the 
integration of the assumed real rate of returns on investment, inflation rates and the level 
of accumulated reserves, they would keep growing but in a decreasing rate until the year 
2031. As in that year the reserves would be completely depleted and nothing will remain 
in the fund for investment. Afterward, the scheme revenue will consist entirely of the 
contribution proceeds collected from the schemes participants as will as from their 
employers on their behalf. The almost linearly and flatly sloping revenue trend curve, as 
depicted in Figure 5.15 specifies clearly how these revenues grow smoothly over the 
simulation period. In the first three decades of this century the extra revenues generated 
by the gradually up-moving female participation rate and male coverage ratio is slightly 
absorbed by the slow down in the growth rate of investment revenues. As for the rest of 
our simulation period, although the scheme loses one of its revenue source, the marginal 
revenue generated from the scheme participant commences increasing as an affect of 
integrating market conditions e.g. system coverage and participation rate, labour market 
parameters, with the scheme specific parameters.  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.15: The development of scheme revenues (2003-2050) 
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5.8.3  Financial Viability 
 Before going through the detailed analysis of our estimations for the scheme 
financial balances during the simulation period, three definitions that are widely used in 
pension literatures should initially be performed. The insurable balances as the first to 
define here allude the excess (shortage) of the periodical contributions collected from the 
scheme insured participants over the corresponding expenditures that are oriented 
towards financing the benefits of covered beneficiaries.  
The second type of pension scheme financial balances deals with the issue of to what 
extent the scheme insurable revenues can cover both the scheme periodical pension 
benefits and the cost needed to run the system activities. This is often referred to as the 
operating balance. Logically, deficit in insurable balance never comes before the 
existence of the operating one. The third and the most significant measure of schemes 
financial affordability is the total balance. The only difference between this measure and 
the operating one is that the former accounts for, in addition to insurable revenues that are 
collected from contributors, the investment revenues that are yielded by the accumulated 
reserves during periods that experience an existence of accumulated reserves.  
In regards to the forecasts of SSC future balances, the actuarial model demonstrates 
unhappy financial sounds although they are initially expected. During the first seven 
years of our estimation, or more precisely until the 2011 financial year, the scheme will 
continue attaining operational surpluses as the annual revenues paid by all participants 
surpass the combined value of pension benefits provided under the SSC provisions and 
the administrative cost needed to finance the scheme utilities. After the end of 2011 
financial year, the system starts to experience an operating deficit but continues to have 
insurable surpluses. Extra liabilities that are above the accrued insurable revenues imbibe 
a part of the buffer fund investment yields, or the accumulated reserves if the latter yields 
are non-positive. Afterwards, the operating gap continues in expansion until the system 
reaches a point where contribution proceeds will not only be insufficient to cover the total 
expenditures but also the insurable expenditures as well. Upon reaching this point, one 
can namely characterize the schemes financial conditions under insurable imbalances. 
This as our model finds start to appear and take place in 2016.  
What is worth mention here, although we have clarified that theoretically in the previous 
chapter, reserves during the above categorized financial stage keep on accumulating or 
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the system otherwise would run on aggregate imbalance basis. This is more likely to 
happen for the SSC by 2023 and from that date after when the total revenues that 
annually flow to the system as from contributions and investment returns fail to cover the 
scheme aggregate expenditures. Accordingly, the deficit would automatically be financed 
via the accumulated reserves in the SSC buffer fund. The most significant feature of this 
stage (stage 3) is that reserves keep decumulating all through the subsequent years until 
reserves are fully depleted by the year 2031. In stage four which is more likely to begin 
after 2031, neither any reserves are available nor are the contribution proceeds capable to 
finance the scheme total expenditures. The following Figure 5.16 indicates how the 
financial life cycle stages that have been theoretically defined in chapter four of this 
thesis would look like under the SSC status quo conditions. The insurable ratio in that 
figure denotes the ratio of insurable revenues at the cost of providing pension benefits. 
The aggregate ratio represents the ratio of pension total revenue to its total expenditures. 
Lastly, the reserve ratio indicates the level of accumulated reserve in the corresponding 
year to the level of reserves one year before.     
 
Source: Author' calculations, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.16: SSC status quo financial life cycle (2003- 2005) 
The unwanted sight of the development of the scheme financial balances can mainly be 
attributed by the gradual increase in system’s dependency ratio. The increase in this ratio, 
as Figure 5.17 depicts, is associated with a step-up in the implicit contribution rate 
needed to be charged if the scheme is financing all its ongoing expenditures fully and 
directly from the contributions paid by participants. All along the estimation period, the 
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scheme experiences an up going movement in system's dependency ratio as the number 
of accumulated pensioners increase more significantly than the quantity of covered 
workers does. The slope of the implicit contribution rate, however, is relatively lower 
than the corresponding slope of dependency from the beginning of the third decade of 
this century. Such a feature follows the fact that system OA average replaced income 
starts to fall smoothly during this period. Among the explanations of this characteristic, is 
that the impact of extra contributory years considered for benefits calculation is 
weakened via the maximum replacement rate imposed by the SSC law. Another factor 
which can attribute that feature originates mainly by the gradual fall of marginal benefits 
provided through the minimum floor of COLA allowances.
72
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.17: The development in some of the scheme parameters  
As can be gathered from the above analysis, SSC on a status quo basis is running on 
unhappy financial prospects. The present value of unfunded liabilities during our 
simulation period is forecast to match almost 170% of the current GDP.
73
 Without any 
external financial supports, one can say that SSC is only 29 years from financial collapse.  
5.9 Reform Assessments 
 In the following sections of this chapter we investigate how both reform approaches 
affect the future financial and distributional characteristics of the SSC. Although the 
                                                                  
72 To clarify more, the minimum COLA floor of 30 JD is kept constant all along our estimation period. thus, as the 
nominal level of reference salaries considered for pension calculation starts to grow, the 10% of that base would exceed 
the absolute level of 30 JD.      
73 The real rate of interest used to discount the future assets and liabilities is 2.5%. If we raise this rate to 4%, for 
instance, the ratio of unfunded liabilities would f
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basic assumptions regarding the design and structure of these approaches have already 
been defined in this chapter, it is worthwhile to call back some of the financial and 
solidarity criteria considered. Starting with solidarity features, both reform strategies keep 
on the   provisions that provide eligible participants with a similarly calculated disability 
pensions regardless their initial causes. These reforms involve also a survivor insurable 
coverage in which benefits provided by such a provision relate to the salaries and 
pensions of original beneficiaries, exactly as with no reform manner. More generally 
speaking, the new rules that each of the proposed strategies would imply, implement only 
for the OA provision and have nothing to do with other entailments.  
As regards the main financial features of these strategies, benefits in the fully funded 
approach as for first are determined via gradually substituting the fully funded benefits 
for part of the benefits that are determined according to the old benefit formula.
74
 
Contributions collected prior to the year of reform are credit with a notional ROR that 
reflects the average ROR achieved on the SSC’s buffer fund all along the entire period of 
scheme establishment. The same mechanism applies also when the Quasi Actuarial (QA) 
strategy is alternatively implemented except that benefits that are computed according to 
the old age formula are gradually replaced by QA based benefits instead of the fully 
funded ones. The strategy as well as the model, does not adjust for any benefits that have 
already accrued prior to the starting year of reform implementation. Only the flow of new 
beneficiaries is considered in the reform adjustments.  
5.9.1 Financial Sustainability 
 In the status quo scenario the model has shown that within less than fifty years, the 
SSC would experience all the financial life cycle stages of defined benefits schemes. 
Without any substantial reforms, the scheme would not be able to provide beneficiaries of 
the foreseen future with the same level of benefits that are promised under the current 
law, unless future participants take the responsibility and the effort to pay them these 
benefits.  
The above briefly listed possible implications, however, seem not really to happen when 
either strategies are simulated. As logically implied, both strategies have a prospected 
                                                                  
74 The gradual mechanism has been defined in section 5.2.3.  
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influence on the level of scheme expenditures but nothing concerning its revenues. This 
comes to bear as these strategies involve a potential reduction of benefits level among all 
ages of retirement.
75
 Figure 5.18 shows the estimated extent of the scheme outlays that 
are proportionally represented with respect to the level of nominal national output across 
the simulated years.  During the first 7 years after reform, expenditures associated with 
each reform strategy remain relatively on their level as when no reform takes place at all. 
The logical explanation of such an outcome relates mainly to the gradual mechanism in 
which these reforms are implemented. Over a longer term perspective, the potentials of 
these reforms incept brightening up as the gap between the scheme expenditures 
originated by the implementation of both strategies and the status quo estimated outlays 
continue increasing over the rest of our simulation period.  
By the end of the simulation period, the scheme financial outlays are expected to 
comprise 7% of GDP which is 2% points higher than if the quasi actuarial strategy is 
alternatively implemented. The considerable gap between the status quo expenditures and 
those that arise under the implementation of either strategy can be attributed to two main 
drivers. The first reflects the potential fall in the level of benefits that would increasingly 
take place as the gradual mechanism phases out. The second reason of such outcomes is 
ascribed mainly to the assumable fall in the retirement probabilities among ages that are 
below the normal age of retirement. The only reason why the estimated expenditures 
under the quasi actuarial strategy appear lower than those generated by the fully funded 
one, is that the latter strategy implies a higher extent of benefits level.       
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Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.18: The estimated development of the scheme expenditures under the 
status quo and reform scenarios, relative to GDP  
                                                                  
75 This clearly appears within the analysis in chapter 3 as we have implied that SSC current law provides most of the 
participants with an implicit rate of return on their contributions which is higher than that expected when either strategy 
is implemented.   
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Incorporating these results with the estimates of total revenues all along the simulation 
period exhibits felicitous facts regarding the financial viability of the scheme and 
indicates also for some useful prospected hints for the subsequent periods after 
simulation.   
As for the quasi actuarial strategy, financial balances appear with no deficit across the 
simulated years. Even thinking pessimistically about the second half of this century, 
financial balances are susceptible to continue without a negative trend. This can logically 
be inferred from Figure 5.19 since the plotted curves of these balances never appear 
slopping downward or stabilizing even at the end points of our simulation.  
In the fully funded scenario, however, the scheme is more likely to keep achieving 
surpluses over the simulation period but would not continue for a much more extended 
period. As Figure 5.19 shows, the plotted curve of the model estimates for the future 
surpluses veers less steeply by the end of our simulation period. As expected, the 
aggregate financial surpluses reproduced by this strategy are less than those observed in 
the former strategy.  This of course is due to the relatively more adequate level of pension 
benefits implied by this strategy than it is with the former one. 
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.19: Estimates of the scheme financial balance under status quo and reform 
scenarios 
Proportionally to GDP, the quasi actuarial reform option in more likely to generate huge 
reserves in the scheme buffer fund, expanding its viability for a longer term perspective. 
The initially observed level of SSC’s reserves that constituted a 27% of GDP in 2003, 
increases gradually across the simulation period until it reaches almost as much as three-
quarters level of national output by year 2050. The reserves rendered by the other reform 
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option, on the other hand, continue accumulating but in a lesser extent than we have seen 
in the case above. The maximum level of reserves that are induced by the fully funded 
reform strategy reach their maximum potential of 41 % points out of GDP by 2038, to 
gradually end by a lower level of 36% in 2050. This proportion will certainly keep 
diminishing as the scheme starts to bear aggregate financial imbalances. Such an outlook 
has been early guessed in the chapter before, since the transition to a fully funded 
scheme, in the absence of external support, would never imply an ever lasting 
sustainability. The transition cost has to be paid at some point. 
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Source: Author's calculation, Hazmomics actuarial model. 
Figure 5.20: Estimates of the scheme reserves relative to GDP under status quo and 
reform scenarios 
5.9.2 Participant's Intergenerational Adequacy 
 Having discussed the sustainability and viability implications of both reform 
strategies, a fair overview must be presented here to spot on their consequences with 
respect to adequacy measure. The level of  career income that is replaced with the 
pension benefits produced by these reforms depends mainly on the participant's earnings 
over his entire career life, length of employment, the life span after retirement, and the 
investment yield on the scheme buffer fund. The gradual diminishing reliance on the old 
system benefits rules makes the influences of these variables appear gradually as the age 
of reform goes further by time.  
Since the fully funded approach implies a greater extent of pension benefits than those 
guaranteed by the other approach, the level of adequacy seems more favorable from a 
pure participants perspective when they have to choose between either one of these 
approaches. Figure 5.21 reports apparently the estimated replacement rate and its 
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development over the simulation period if the system continues working under the 
current rules or has implemented one of the investigated reform approaches. Under the 
status quo conditions, participants who retire at the normal age of retirement during the 
coming seven years would receive proportionally higher pension benefits than what a 
pensioner gets today. This of course as we have mentioned before, is due to the fact that 
such a pensioner would have more service credits to be considered in benefits 
calculations. After 2011, however, the replacement rate stabilizes all along the estimation 
period since the rule of maximum replacement rate starts to influence pensions 
effectively.
76
  
Concerning the fully funded approach, the level of replacement rate during the coming 
seven years springs up but in a lesser extent than in the status quo case, since funded 
elements commence influencing the retirement benefits gradually. As the length of 
implementation extends subsequently, the replacement rate declines smoothly until it 
reaches few points above 40%. The case might be harsher for future pensioners when a 
quasi actuarial approach is alternatively implemented. Such a decline in the level of 
pension benefits when compared with the level of earning before retirement observed in 
the last two mentioned cases can mainly be attributed to vanishing generous components 
and increasing life expectancies for both genders.
77
      
What is worth mentioning here is that females would probably be more affected by either 
proposed strategies. This appears clearly in Figure 5.21 as when the fully funded 
approach is implemented males would end up with a bit more than 40% replacement 
while females receive few percentage points lower than that level. The same extent of 
divergence between both genders in replacement rates appears when the quasi actuarial 
system is alternatively implemented.  
Although the relative measure of adequacy shows never wanted facts about the 
consequences of both strategies, we still hold hopes that the SSC’s buffer fund future 
performance would close the gap, and participants would substitute part of the expected 
                                                                  
76 It has to be wondered, however, whether the benefits level remains constant at the time when SSC reserves are fully 
depleted. The important question to raise here, how policy makers would response to future deficits? In our analyses, 
nevertheless, we solve the problem hypothetically through the implementation of pure PAYG contribution financing 
strategy from the time the SSC defaults the accrued benefits provided by the law.    
77 The extent of decline of replacement rates in the proposed approaches is sensitive to the SSC buffer fund 
performance. in the above analyses the considered real rate of return is 3.5%. In the coming sections, however, further 
scenarios are performed regarding this rate.  
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losses in the level of adequacy through enhancing their own savings. This seems much 
favourable than the status quo as they might save nothing and should expect anything.   
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Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.21: The development of replacement rates under status quo and reform 
scenarios 
Alternatively to building guesses on the possibility that private saving would increase to 
substitute part of the losses in their future expected adequacy, we assumed that the 
scheme starts to charge additional contribution rates along the simulated period. During 
the first ten years after implementation and the next fifteen years afterward, we assume 
that the scheme starts to charge extra 1% and 2% as contribution rate, respectively. In 
2031, we modeled and additional 1% contribution over the remaining period of 
simulation. Before interpreting the expected outcomes of such a proposal, it is 
worthwhile to mention some of its advantages over the reliance on voluntary savings by 
participants. the first regards to the fact that participants might fail or underestimate the 
need of these savings. Second, if they really save enough for their future shortfalls in 
adequacy level, their voluntary savings could be always subject to withdrawal risks. 
Thirdly, as participants would most  likely utilize their voluntary savings in deposits 
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accounts, the returns on these accounts might prove lower than those can be achieved 
within the SSC’s buffer Fund.  
As shown in Figure 3.1, the proposed mechanism to increase aims at increasing the level 
of adequacy has proved some optimistic implications with respect to future generation. In 
the fully funded approach the proposed increase in contribution rate can increase the level 
of replacement of those who retire at the end of our simulation period to a bit more than 
sixty percent for male and forty percent for female. The view seems to be less affirmative 
in the case of quasi actuarial approach as the replacement rate for male retiring in 2050 
reaches almost forty two percentage points and twenty eight percentage points for female. 
However, as we have already stated above, females can gain a substantial increase in 
their adequacy level if they postpone retirement to reasonable ages. It is important to state 
in this context that the proposed change in contribution would can result in increasing the 
financial viability of the scheme and thus allow for higher degrees of funding. From there 
on, the level of adequacy can arrive on closer levels of the fully funded approach. 
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.22: The impact of charging extra rates of contribution on intergenerational 
adequacy 
172                           5. The Future Outlook 
 
5.9.3  Intergenerational Fairness 
  The issue of intergenerational fairness has taken considerable attention in pension 
literatures since it represents one of the most important dimensions considered for the 
judgment of the viability of pension schemes with respect to reform strategies. One can 
think about the issue of intergenerational adequacy which has been clarified in the 
previous section as a dimension of social generosity and this upcoming measure as a 
dimension of equity and financial generosity among subsequent generations.  
Before turning to analyze how status quo and reform scenarios conditions might 
influence the distribution of real wealth and net benefits between different SSC cohort 
participants, few facts are worth putting forward. Since our simulations have indicated 
that SSC scheme under the current law and future expected conditions would have no 
capital assets anymore to finance its ongoing obligations after the financial default in year 
2031, from there on, we have assumed that SSC solves this annually be charging the 
human capital (Contributors in our case) an additional rate of contribution to finance the 
deficit. For instance, if we want to compute the contributions paid by a participant who 
retires at the normal age of retirement at the beginning of 2033, given the fact that he has 
paid an additional contribution rate of 15% in 2033 as the SSC apposes on him to pay 
that portion to finance the aggregate deficit in that year, then the model computes his rate 
of return considering the current contribution rate for contributory years prior to 2031, 
and that of 2032 to compute contributions in that year. Second, we utilize the contribution 
paid by participants and the benefits they would get according to the three scenarios from 
the normal age of retirement until they reach the average life expectancy at that age to 
calculate the internal rate of return which they would probably get. 
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Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.23: The estimated implicit ROR on the contributions of different cohorts 
under the status quo and reform scenarios 
Figure 5.23 above shows how different cohorts who have already participated in the SSC 
or will participate in the future would earn a various rate of return on their contributions. 
Under status quo conditions the earlier and middle cohorts from both genders earn an 
eminent yield as for their participation in the system until the normal age of retirement 
stated in the current SSC law. Cohorts who had been born before 1972 for males and 
1976 for females are expected to experience such a huge returns on their own 
contributions if the current rules of the SSC are kept unchanged until the beginning of the 
third decade of this century. Middle cohorts, more particularly, males who were born 
between 1960 and 1972 and females who were born during 1957 and 23 years latter, get 
higher returns on their contributions since they would experience an increase in margins 
of life expectancies. Younger cohorts born after these years start to loose some of the 
preferential advantages given to their parents, since they might  have to start paying extra 
contributions that are needed to finance the annual liabilities accrued to future pensioners 
when the reserves of the buffer fund are fully exhausted. The start of drop in the ROR 
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given implicitly on the generational contributions appears earlier for male cohorts than 
female ones. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that participants of same cohort but 
of different genders would heterogeneously face the burden of financial shortfalls. This 
comes to bear due to the fact that the females' normal age of retirement is five years less 
than of male and hence they actually face fewer years of high contribution rates than  
males would face. For instance, female participants born in 1977 can retire on the normal 
basis by year 2031 without having paid any additional rate of contribution; given the fact 
that contribution rate would start increasing by 2032. Males with the same birth year, 
however, would be able to retire on the normal basis of retirement by 2035 and 
consequently they would have to pay additional proportion of their pre-retirement income 
during the last three years before retirement.  From there on, gender heterogeneity among 
participants of the same cohort is likely to appear in this context.    
As for identical cohorts in the status quo scenario, females keep getting higher returns on 
their contributions than males get. However, aside from gender distributional facts, the 
financial viability prospect for the periods that follow our estimated period assure us that 
the case would even be worse for the upcoming generations.
78
Although such a case is not 
affordable, the contributions requested for balancing in the pension outlays continue 
increasing or the benefits, alternatively, would need to be cut.
79
 
As can be cogitated from the same figure, rates of return that are implicitly awarded to 
pension contributions during the reform transition period and explicitly afterwards, tend 
to decrease gradually across the simulation period. The logical explanation for such an 
expected movement style reflects mainly the increasing of market based elements that 
come at the expense of the generous current law components. But since the fully funded 
approach has no transition and solidarity cost elements, the rate of return appears higher 
than those generated within the quasi actuarial approach.
80
 This however, most probably 
                                                                  
78 It is worthwhile to remind that our analysis assumes no external financial support for the system.  
79 These are only two ways in which future deficit can be recovered. However, there are many ways and combinations 
in which such a problem can find a solution. But we should recognize here these options are parametric rather than 
systematic. Particularly, these options have been discussed in the previous chapter.  
80 Since the fully funded approach aims at awarding the participants with an exact and actual yield on their own 
contributions, no proportional deductions are assumed to cover the unfunded liabilities of their parents. 
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would not last forever, although it might continue long enough, as the unfunded liability 
and the cost of solidarity has to be funded sometime.
81
  
Over a longer view, if the quasi actuarial approach is implemented then subsequent 
cohorts would continue to earn a stabilized rate of return on their contributions as long as 
the profitability of the SSC buffer fund remains stable rather than deteriorating. Such a 
perspective applies also for the fully funded approach but should never be viewed as for 
never-ending space. However, it should be noticed that increasing life expectancies as 
figures and prospectors estimate, would break a part of the stabilization of generational 
returns that might occur under either reform strategies. If we attempt to throw the ball in 
the court of future generations, a straight forward way to which they can overcome their 
expected losses is through delaying retirement proportionally and actuarially with the 
increase in life expectancies. However, the selection between these two approaches in the 
spectrum of intergenerational fairness depends mainly on the time interval considered by 
policy makers and on the extent in which a very much longer expected financial default 
would be exchanged with relatively small losses in the subsequent generation's rate of 
return. 
The most important point which has to be raised here is that continuing with the current 
scheme would surely land up with parents bequeathing a huge transferred debt to their 
children. Alternatively, both approaches considered here for reform, seem to offer more 
stabilized intergenerational equity and better financial viability than would occur if we 
continue on the basis of current law.   
5.10  Sensitivity Analyses 
  Having performed the financial projections, quantitative and qualitative measures of 
reform strategies according to the baseline assumptions, it is worth doing and performing 
the possible consequences that correspond to the change in some of the model main 
suppositions. Since our simulations spread over a long term time interval, some of the 
assumptions if not all might deviate from their baseline level. Nevertheless, this is 
common in all financial and economic models that aim at performing medium term and 
                                                                  
81 This is more imaginable when we look at the analyses of the case when the profitability of the buffer fund is double 
the base line scenario.  
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long term estimations, and our model is no exception to this context. To make the 
implications of sensitivity simulations more intelligible and general, we will simulate 
only the major variables to which their influences on the dimensions considered above 
are thought to be enough to stimulate thoughtful engagement and discussions.    
5.10.1 Rate of Return 
 It is agreed by many finance experts and economists that rates of return involve a 
large space of discretions in which it is useless to anticipate that their assumed levels 
would remain unchanged along five decades of simulation horizon. Therefore, the model 
performs the outcomes of utilizing another two scenarios regarding this factor. The first 
scenario, assumes that the SSC buffer fund would generate half the baseline scenario real 
rate of return, while the other one assumes double that level.  
Before exhibiting the outcomes of these scenarios, it would be useful to determine the 
possible extent and consequences of them rather than presenting the whole terminations. 
In the status quo scenario, the returns on the accumulated reserves affect directly the 
annual financial balance of the scheme, since these returns comprise one of the scheme 
two sources of ongoing revenues stream. On the other hand, it affects implicitly the level 
and time when additional contributions will be charged to the scheme participants, from 
the time to which SSC reserves are fully spent. The latter sort of influence serves 
basically the issue of scheme fairness among the participants of various generations.  
In the context of both reform strategies, rate of return on the SSC buffer fund affects not 
only the revenue streams of the system, but it also affects the streams of expenditures and 
hence the scheme financial balances. In addition to that, proportional returns on the 
scheme reserves influence explicitly both the level of replaced income as well as the 
returns awarded on the contributions of different cohorts.  
Starting our analyses with the aggregate financial implications of status quo conditions, 
the model explores how rates of return could substantially alter the length of SSC 
financial life cycle stages. The utilization of half baseline rate of return exhibits some 
uninvited consequences regarding the time occurrence of financial shortfalls and hence 
the depletion of the buffer fund reserves. By the year 2021, the scheme total outlays 
would not sufficiently be covered by its own ongoing revenues and from there on, the 
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scheme reserves start to exhaust gradually to finance the accrued deficits until they end 
by no balance by the year 2030. The difference between this case in the baseline case is 
apparent in Table 5.2 as the aggregate deficit and reserves depletion in the latter case 
happen 3 years after their appearance in the former one. The consequences of double 
baseline rate of return, on the other hand, seems as among the ever wanted scenarios 
since it helps the postponement of aggregate deficit and reserves depletion by 10 and 9 
years, respectively.
82
  
Concerning the reform strategies, it is clear enough that changing the value of assumed 
ROR would have a wider range of influence on the scheme future financial conditions. In 
addition to the dimensions considered in the status quo scenario, modifying the ROR 
presumption involves some adjustments of the future prospects about the scheme 
financial outlays. 
From a logical point of view, as the final level of contributions that are used to calculate 
the pension benefits of each participant upon retirement depends mainly on the 
profitability of the buffer fund, one should recognize why the scheme outlays respond 
directly to that rate. The main difference between both reform approach in respect to this 
aspect, however, is that the elasticity of insurable expenditures to the profitability of 
buffer fund occurs under the implementation of fully funded is greater than the 
corresponding elasticity when the quasi actuarial would have been alternatively 
implemented. 
Moreover, the responsiveness of scheme investment revenues to the ROR on the buffer 
fund would also differ between the two approaches of reform. The magnitude of this fact 
again can initially be explained by the expenditures side. Since the elasticity of 
expenditures to the buffer fund profitability is higher under the fully funded approach the 
annual operational balance in such a case would be smaller. Consequently, the add-on 
(withdraw) to the scheme accumulated reserves would be smaller (greater) than in the 
case to which the quasi actuarial strategy is alternatively enforced. From there on, the 
scheme investment revenues in the subsequent year that depend initially on the previous 
year reserves and the same year balances come lower  under the fully funded approach 
than in the quasi actuarial one.  
                                                                  
82 At the end of this paragraph, it should be noticed that the change in the assumed rate of return affects the scheme 
aggregate revenues only via influencing the investment revenues and has nothing to do with the insurable ones.  
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Table 5.2: Response of financial viability to rate of return  
Year Baseline
Half
Baseline 
Double
Baseline
Baseline
Half
Baseline 
Double
Baseline
2003 121 121 121 27 27 27
2004 178 143 247 28 28 29
2005 195 155 278 27 28 30
2006 203 158 302 27 28 31
2007 210 159 326 27 28 32
2008 211 153 346 26 28 33
2009 220 157 377 25 28 34
2010 227 156 407 25 28 35
2011 234 157 441 24 27 35
2012 233 147 469 23 27 36
2013 237 143 505 22 27 37
2014 245 142 548 22 26 37
2015 245 134 588 21 26 38
2016 230 109 616 20 25 38
2017 226 95 658 19 24 39
2018 219 78 703 18 24 39
2019 213 62 754 17 23 40
2020 179 17 781 16 22 40
2021 161 (-) 829 15 21 40
2022 131 (-) 871 14 20 41
2023 78 (-) 897 12 19 41
2024 (-) (-) 885 11 18 41
2025 (-) (-) 896 9 16 41
2026 (-) (-) 900 8 15 40
2027 (-) (-) 881 6 13 40
2028 (-) (-) 783 4 11 39
2029 (-) (-) 721 2 9 39
2030 (-) (-) 630 -      7 37
2031 (-) (-) 503 -      4 36
2032 (-) (-) 260 -      1 35
2033 (-) (-) 45 -      -         33
2034 (-) (-) (-) -      -         30
2035 (-) (-) (-) -      -         28
2036 (-) (-) (-) -      -         25
2037 (-) (-) (-) -      -         22
2038 (-) (-) (-) -      -         18
2039 (-) (-) (-) -      -         14
2040 (-) (-) (-) -      -         9
2041 (-) (-) (-) -      -         3
2042 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2043 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2044 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2045 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2046 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2047 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2048 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2049 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
2050 (-) (-) (-) -      -         -        
Reserves as % of GDPFinancial Balance (Million JD)
 
Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Let us now start interpreting some of the expected consequences of changing the ROR 
assumption on the financial viability of both proposed reform strategies. The fully funded 
approach surprisingly indicates that the increase in the reserve investment profitability 
could result in decreasing the course length of financial surpluses to which the scheme 
afterwards, turns to be a case of deficit. With a comparison to the baseline assumption, 
duplicating the assumed value of ROR helps the system to generate higher levels of 
financial balances over the medium term horizon, but turns down to lower levels over a 
longer term one. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that pension insurable outlays 
would increase proportionally more than the proportional gain in investment yields. In 
other words, pensioners get a higher rate of return on their contributions that the increase 
179                           5. The Future Outlook 
 
due to their retirement benefits, which cannot be offset by the correlative increase in the 
scheme non insurable revenues. Such a scenario quickly discerns what the end of a fully 
funded strategy would look like. It should be recognized, however, that all the financial 
shortages that come after the depletion of SSC reserves represent mainly the unfunded 
liabilities of those who would have retired entirely or partially on the basis of the old 
unreformed system. On the contrary, if they system investment policy performs 
inefficiently and yields as much as half of the baseline assumed ROR, then one can depict 
from Figure 5.24 that this might improve the financial sustainability of the system with 
respect to time, but will not last infinitely.
83
 
To the contrast of the implications that might appear due to changing the assumed ROR 
in the fully funded approach, the financial viability of the scheme when the quasi 
actuarial strategy is alternatively implemented seems to improve with respect to a higher 
level of returns and to deteriorate whenever the returns go down. Mathematically as well 
as logically, this can be ascribed by the fact that when the buffer fund investment 
profitability falls down, the non-insurable revenues fall proportionally more than the 
declination of insurable expenditure, and vice versa.  
                                                                  
83 This applies only for the aggregate scheme financial balances. We will see latter in this section how this would 
worsen the intergenerational fairness of the scheme participants.  
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Source: Author's own estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.24: The impact of buffer fund profitability on the scheme’s financial 
balances 
Another important dimension need to be considered in this context is how the principle of 
intergenerational adequacy and equity responses to changing in the ROR assumption. 
With regard to the intergenerational adequacy, the variations in buffer fund profitability 
play a crucial role in determining the level of participant's replacement rate upon 
retirement under both investigated reform strategies, since such profitability comprises 
one of the most important components of benefits formula. In the status quo scenario, 
benefits remain independent of ROR as long as the model assumes that unfunded 
ongoing liabilities are financed via enhancing the contributions of insured workers.  
Exploring the adequacy consequences of changing the assumable ROR in the fully 
funded scenario, as Figure 5.25 clearly depicts, discerns explicitly the extent to which 
pensioners replacement rates are sensitive to this factor. A good performing investment 
strategy of buffer fund that yields a double baseline assumed ROR substantially increases 
the level of pensioner adequacy measured by gross replacement rate.  Instead of ending-
up by almost three-fifth the last earned salary before retirement for males who retire in 
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2050 at the normal age of retirement when the ROR is on its baseline scenario, 
counterpart participants could get more than  double this level if the investment strategy 
would have performed twice the baseline performance. If on the other hand, the 
investment strategy fails to achieve the assumed baseline ROR and performs only as 
much as half that level, participants adequacy could fall to few percentage points above 
one-fifth the baseline level by the year 2050. What calls for attention in both cases is that 
the former case is less affordable in the very long run since we have seen that financial 
balances tend to go in deficit during the simulation period.
84
 The latter case, 
propositionally speaking, would also be far than favorable from a pure participant's point 
of view since it would land them up by an extremely low level of adequacy, although it is 
financially welcomed by the scheme sponsors.  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.25: The response of participant's replacement rate to variations in buffer 
fund’s profitability (Fully Funded)  
                                                                  
84 As these balances continue further in deficit, they would gradually deplete the scheme financial reserves in the 
foreseen future.   
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The case might even be worse for pensioners if the quasi actuarial strategy is alternatively 
implemented and the reserves of the scheme fail to generate more than half of the 
baseline presumed ROR, since by the end of our simulation period normally retiring 
males and females could not substitute more than 28% and 19% of their pre-retirement 
insured salaries, respectively. The contrary case in terms of ROR, on the other hand, 
elevates the hope of participants regarding the implementation of such strategy as it will 
provide them with relatively ad-equitable pensions when compared with those of their 
parents. This conclusion, however, seems more acceptable of male rather than for female 
participants. Since the latter participants do not tend to earn as much as half their pre-
retirement salary even under a very optimistic scenario concerning the ROR. The best 
way to which they can reach at least that level is through postponing their retirement age 
at the expense of their own leisure.  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model.  
Figure 5.26: The response of participant's replacement rate to variations in buffer 
fund’s profitability (Quasi Actuarial) 
Before turning to the issue of intergenerational equity, let us exploit the financial 
aggregate advantages that originate from achieving a high ROR on the SSC buffer fund 
to increase the degree of equity in the quasi actuarial approach. As we have already 
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indicated in the above analyses, a substantial increase in the profitability of the SSC 
buffer fund improves the financial viability of the scheme and it might make the scheme 
even more than funded. If this argument is true, then one can ask why we shouldn’t 
increase the level of equity in  a way that brings back the scheme to the line of fully 
funding and at the same time raises the adequacy of participants.  
A possible way to increase the degree of equity and at the same time keeping on the 
incentive implications of the quasi actuarial approach,
85
 is to annuitize the accumulated 
contributions of each participant at the time of retirement to the remaining life span with 
an annuity rate that comprise half the ROR estimated to occur on SSC the buffer fund.
86
 
Utilizing such a methodological presumption in our model discerns some hopes for 
participants who could fear from the great influence of implementing this reform 
approach on their retirement adequacy. Figure 5.27 shows how the adequacy of 
participants who retire at the normal age of retirement under a gradually implemented 
quasi actuarial reform develops over the simulation period and responses to variances in 
ROR. Instead of acquiring a pension that comprises almost three-fifth the pre-retirement 
salary of males who retire in 2050 under the case where a buffer performance stands on 
twice as much as the baseline assumed ROR and the equity principle is applied in the 
same manner of the baseline methodology, they could earn almost few percentage points 
less than their pre-retirement salary if the degree of equity belongs to the adjusted 
approach. This of course rams us on a general ratiocination that the optimal combination 
between equity and adequacy in reformed partially funded schemes depends mainly on 
the performance of the buffer fund.  
The females adequacy would also be increased if the ROR where high enough to increase 
the degree of equity in a quasi actuarial but in a lesser extent than males, since as we have 
already indicated, their normal retirement age is 5 years lower than of males and they also 
live longer than they. Accordingly, relatively lower levels of accumulated contributions 
would be distributed for a longer period of life span after retirement. In spite of these 
facts, females get almost 60% of their pre-retirement salary if the degree if equity would 
have increased in a quasi actuarial reform strategy.   
                                                                  
85 We have explained in the previous how a quasi actuarial approach involves a greater motivation for late retirement 
when compared with those associate within the fully funded approach. 
86 This is only an assumption; it might prove that the needed fraction should be lower or higher than half of that rate.  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model 
Figure 5.27: The response of pensioner's replacement rate to various degrees of 
equity 
The exploration of the responsiveness of ROR given on the contributions of participants 
form different cohorts to the variances in buffer fund ROR calls for some comebacks. In 
a status quo scenario, changing the assumed future ROR on SSC buffer fund influences 
the participants own profitability through affecting the time of reserve depletion and thus 
the need to step-up the contribution rate. As we have already shown, increasing the 
assumed ROR delays the need of rising contributions since it helps the scheme to raise 
more revenues and hence slows down the reserves depletion, and vice versa. 
In both reform strategies, the implications of changing the rate of buffer fund profitability 
on the distribution of ROR among different cohorts appear more explicitly than it is 
implicitly recognized in the status quo scenario. The disparity between early born cohorts 
and latter ones, with respect to implicit ROR given on their contributions, vanishes 
whenever the profitability of utilizing the scheme reserves increases, and widen with its 
declination.  
The hope about both reform scenarios, aside from their future sustainability, is that they 
involve a smoothly falling ROR across subsequent cohorts as long as the investment of 
the scheme reserves performing virtuously. This desired feature can be portrayed in 
figure as the curves that represent the implicit ROR given on the contributions of 
subsequent cohort slopes gradually under both simulated reform scenarios where the 
profitability of the scheme investment comprises double the baseline assumptions. On the 
other hand, later cohorts in the status quo scenario seem as the pure looser in terms of the 
ROR they get implicitly on their contributions, even though the scheme generates a 
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proportionally high return on its revenues. For instance, a male participant who was born 
in 1974 gets 2 percentage points more than a counterpart male who was born 15 years 
latter. Under the status quo scenario, such a spread gradually propagates among cohorts 
with more than 30 years of age gap. The fact looks even better when the fully funded 
scenario is alternatively considered, since the generational ROR curves slope more flatly 
than those of the quasi actuarial approach. 
The most prominent fear of both reform approaches, however, originates whenever the 
scheme performs badly in terms of the level of profitability it generates on its 
accumulated reserves. One dimensional aspect of anxiety is that future pensioners would 
experience a steeply falling ROR on their own pension contributions. These unwanted 
consequences can be obviated by introducing some guaranty tools such as providing 
participants with a minimum ROR on their contributions. What should always be 
recognized for such a solution, however, is that any sort of guaranty would come at the 
expense of scheme future financial viability.
87
 
At the end of this spectrum, although reform strategies that involve a direct link between 
pensions and contributions tend to provide vulnerable sorts of intergenerational equity, 
they would in the worst cases entail a more stabilized intergenerational equity trends if 
the perspective expands for a longer term horizon. 
 
 
 
 
.   
 
                                                                  
87 Risks that involve shortages in the future financial resources to cover the corresponding outlets are often defined as 
default risks. See for instance,  
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Source: Author's estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model. 
Figure 5.28: The response of generational ROR to the profitability of SSC buffer fund 
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5.10.2 Coverage Ratio 
 As indicated at earlier sections of this chapter, age and gender specific coverage 
ratios are extremely needed in the process of projecting future financial conditions for 
pension provisions. They integrate the corresponding counts of actively employed 
inhabitants to generate detailed figures concerning the participants who are covered under 
the umbrella of pension insurance.  
Before performing the quantitative outcomes of changing the main hypotheses regarding 
the fraction of employed persons covered by the SSC, it is worthwhile to explain why this 
sort of alteration is needed in this context. First, it should be recognized to what extent 
pension crises could come earlier or later than we have already estimated in the baseline-
status quo scenario as a result of changing the future prospects about the scheme agents' 
structure, namely the dependency ratio. The second significant reason for requesting such 
an analysis is to judge the stability of the consequences and reform implications that have 
already emerged in our baseline scenario with respect to variations in the  pension 
coverage ratio. 
To explore the possible consequences of adjusting the coverage ratio all along the 
simulation period, we presumably modify the annual growth rate of male coverage ratio to 
half of its baseline rate. Applying this adjustable rate to our simulation model has resulted 
in an increase in the average coverage ratio of all one-year age brackets from 30% in 2003 
to almost 43% by 2050, instead from 30% to 60% in the baseline scenario assumption, 
respectively.  
Logically speaking before quantitatively evaluating, such an adjustment would involve a 
potential impact on two main dimensional aspects for the future of SSC. The first appears 
through decreasing the prospected figures concerning the development in the number of 
insured workers and hence the insurable revenues of the scheme. Consequently, the second 
influence takes place on the number of new pensioners since they are generated via 
applying the age specific retirement rate on the corresponding number of insured 
participants. This of course, brings down the insurable outlays toward future pensioners 
when compared with their estimated levels according to the baseline scenario assumptions. 
The net impact of these consequences on the scheme financial viability depends mainly on 
the elasticity of the scheme revenues and expenditures in each status scenario to the change 
in the number of participants.   
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Switching to the quantitative outcomes of changing our concerned assumption, Figure 5.29 
shows how the schemes future viability of the scheme under the status quo and reform 
scenarios conditions would be influenced by reducing the future figures about the males 
coverage ratio.  
Interestingly, the sensitivity analysis of the status quo conditions belittles the aggregate 
influence of falling coverage ratio on the scheme buffer reserves. This can apparently be 
seen in the below figures regardless of system experiences. The simulation of the same 
future trend in the baseline scenario of males' coverage ratio or the reduced one, shows that 
the scheme's reserves would be fully depleted by 2033. Aside from the issue of reserves 
depletion, the observed gap between the total scheme outlays that accrue under the 
basically assumed coverage ratios and those accrued after reducing these ratios gradually 
increases until it reaches almost 2% of GDP in 2050. The revenues on the other hand, 
would also gradually fall across the simulated period as a result of reducing the estimates 
of the future development in male coverage ratios. This however would be in a lesser 
extent than it might appear in expenditures side since the model has indicated that the 
influence of the latter adjustment on revenues reaches its maximal drop of almost one 
percentage point of GDP by 2050. 
88
 
The greatest influence of changing such prospects appears more significantly in the case 
where either reform strategies are implemented. This can mainly be attributed by the fact 
that the elasticity of scheme revenues under both reform scenarios is greater than of 
expenditures. For instance, by 2050 the revenues under the status quo reform scenario 
decreases by almost two percentage points of GDP if the future male's coverage ratios 
would have stabilized on the reduced baseline levels.  While the influence of such an 
adjustment in coverage ratios on the scheme total expenditures could not surpass one 
percentage year by the same year of comparison. Consequently, the reserves of the scheme 
as result of being relatively pessimistic about the future development in male's coverage 
ratio drop gradually and increasingly along the simulated period. However, the scale of 
drop seems greater in the case of funded reform scenario than the observed level in the 
quasi actuarial one as the proportional drop of the expenditures in the former case is lower 
and that of revenues is higher. 
 
                                                                  
88 This applies only among our simulated years. It is more likely that the extent of drop increases after 2050.  
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Generally interpreting, the coverage ratio plays an imperative role in determining the 
possible degree of equity that can be implemented in any reform strategy aims at 
increasing the link between pension contributions and benefits. More particularly for the 
SSC, the ever wanted increase in the level of coverage should not be considered as one of 
the substantial solutions to postpone the financial collapse of the scheme while keeping it 
on the rules of the current law.  
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Source: Author’s estimation, Hazmomics actuarial model. 
Figure 5.29: The development of the scheme financial conditions when reducing the coverage ratio prospects 
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6. Conclusions 
 The study evidently depicts that the JSSC suffers from severe weaknesses and 
structural problems. The current SSC law, from a pure adequacy perspective, provides 
extremely generous compensations for almost all participants receiving benefits from the 
majority provisions provided by the SSC. As in other countries, but in a greater extent, the 
current law favors females over males and low income over higher income earners. The 
elasticity of replacement rate with respect to the age of retirement, gives no strong reason 
why participants shouldn’t retire earlier than the normal age of retirement. Regardless of the 
level of income and the gender status, most of the participants who fulfill the minimum 
vesting period for early retirement, can replace half of their pre retirement income with a 
lifelong retirement income if they decided to retire at the age of forty-five. In terms of 
international standard, this is extremely generous. As regards disability, it seems that the 
current law provides acceptable levels of disability income for participants who become 
disabled during their participation in the scheme after having fulfilled the minimum vesting 
period for such a provision. The implication of this feature, however, shouldn’t serve a big 
attention as in the case of old age provision, for several reasons. Among them is that 
receiving such a kind of benefits is neither the control of participants but rather the control 
of the scheme sponsors, and more particularly of an independent medical committee. the 
second reason for  no big policy attention refer to low number of those who receive 
disability pension when  compared with the number of beneficiaries from old age provision 
as well as other provisions. 
Concerning the financial measures of generosity, the distributional model has reported never 
wanted implications of the current law. Foremost, the Old-Age provision pays an extremely 
high implicit rate of return (ROR) on pension contributions that by far exceeds either the 
rate of return generated on the SSC buffer fund or of stock traded in Amman Stock 
Exchange market. There are also clear signs of ROR heterogeneity with respect to several 
factors, among which are the participants earning level, gender status, vesting period and 
age of retirement. The extent of preferable treatment of low income earners over higher 
ones with regard to money's worth measures, however, does not imply any further 
challenges. To the contrary of thereof, the view might change if the perception that high 
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income earners do really live longer than those who earn much less, does really apply in 
Jordan. In addition to that, the Net Present Value measure verifies that ROR wouldn’t be the 
best measure of generosity in this respect as the net present value of those who are earning 
more is much greater than others, even though the implicit ROR on their pension 
contributions is lower. The greatest attention, however, should directly be oriented towards 
the most worrying outcomes of generosity measure. The negative elasticity of implicit ROR 
on contributions with respect to the age of retirement and the vesting period not only 
motivates early retirement, but it also encourages participants to game the scheme by 
contributing for relatively shorter vesting periods. 
On the static basis, proposed reform strategies, the fully funded and the quasi actuarial 
system, have proved some optimistic outcomes in terms of the two concepts of generosity. 
The only advantage of quasi actuarial over the funded reform approach is that the former 
provide  a greater extent of motivation for postponing the age of retirement and it allows 
also for internally financing the transition cost of the scheme as well as providing some risk 
pooling (solidarity element) among the scheme participants. 
The analysis of the scheme overall future financial conditions shows that the scheme is not 
anymore at the beginning of a long financial march but rather at the mid of a shorter one. If 
the rules of the current law kept unchanged along the foreseeable future, the scheme would 
most likely suffer subsequent financial challenges. After 2011, the system would start to 
experience a continuous deficit in its operating balance in which scheme aggregate 
expenditures couldn’t entirely be covered by its insurable revenues. Five years later, not 
only the insurable revenues would not be able to finance the operating expenses but they 
would also fail to cover the insurable outlays accrued to different types of beneficiaries. 
However, the deficit in the annual insurable balance could still be financed via the 
investment revenues generated on the scheme accumulated reserves until the end of the 
2022 financial year. After that, the increase in aggregate deficit could still be financed 
through the gradual exhaustion of the scheme reserves until they are fully depleted by 2031.  
If the scheme sponsors decide to finance the continuing deficit in the scheme total outlays 
via imposing extra rates of contribution on the scheme working participants (on PAYG 
basis), then the total contributions rate is likely to  increase gradually from fewer percentage 
points above one-fifth their monthly salary in 2032 to more than forty percentage points by 
2050.  
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The simulation of an age-based gradual transition mechanism to either fully funded scheme 
with a fair degree of equity and a quasi actuarial with a lower one shows that the system 
financial viability would substantially improve. But the lower levels of benefit implied 
within the quasi actuarial approach when compared with those implied according to the 
funded approach would maintain the scheme viability for a longer term horizon infinitely. 
While in the fully funded approach, the possibility for the scheme to remain infinitely 
solvent is logically unrealistic, for two reasons. The first concerns the transition cost that has 
to be paid sometime and the second relates directly to the solidarity principle of the scheme 
in which adequate benefits have to be provided for all participants who fulfill certain 
requirements and some security based provisions such as disability that should remain 
unclosed.  
The most debatable consequences are those which relate to the adequacy and 
intergenerational equity measures. In the status quo scenario, retirement benefits are 
assumed to remain unchangeable as future deficits are modeled to be internally financed 
through charging extra contributions from the working participants. Thus, the level of 
adequacy appears constant from the beginning of the coming decade and so forth. The 
adequacy implied in both reform scenarios, however, would likely to decrease all along the 
simulated period and stabilize afterward. The level of adequacy connoted in the fully funded 
approach is higher than those appear in the other proposed strategy. But as has been 
mentioned above, once the scheme is likely to become insolvent in sometime in the future, 
the level of adequacy might fall again. Frankly interpreting, subsequent retirees would 
experience a chronological decline in their retirement adequacy levels than those would 
imply if the current SSC law remains unchanged, though this presumption is less possible to 
subsist. But it is theoretically possible that when participants recognize such a declining 
trend early in their career life would save more to substitute the expected losses in their 
future adequacy (Flavin, 1981; Hubbard, 1986). However, it might be proved that 
mandating participants to contribute more to the scheme is a better substitute than leaving 
them save voluntary. Such a conclusion can be attributed to several reasons, among them, is 
that mandatory savings to prevent participants from to myopic behavior and also they might 
generate a higher rate of return when compared with rates that are given on regular deposit 
account.  
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As regards the intergenerational fairness under the status quo and reform scenarios 
conditions, the simulations have clearly shown that the equity of males who are born after 
1974 and females after 1979 would dramatically drop if the scheme continues working 
under the rules of current law. Although the decrease in participants equity appears for 
earlier cohorts when either reform strategy is alternatively implemented, the marginal 
decrement in participant equity among future subsequent cohorts are lower. Again, the 
higher equity degrees implied in the fully funded scenario when they are compared with the 
quasi actuarial are less likely to remain stable in a longer term perspective. The sensitivity 
analysis is also used to estimate how the above measures respond to changes in the baseline 
assumptions. The possibility to spread the transition cost among more subsequent 
generations and hence more equity degree inherent in the reform strategy, mainly depends 
on the volume of accumulated reserves, the scheme unfunded liability, investment 
profitability, retirement probabilities and the increase future participation, among others. 
For instance, the increase in the rate of return generated on the scheme reserves would likely 
improve the assets and liability position of the scheme and thus allow a space for the 
transition cost to be distributed more gradually.  
The conclusion that Feldstein and Samwick (1996) have reached regarding the possibility to 
switch the American  unfunded pension scheme to funded pension with a minor increase in 
contribution rate and stable level of benefits cannot be considered as a general theory for 
reforming unfunded schemes but rather a scheme specific-option and possibility. The 
potential rates of return on pension reserves, the assets and liability position, as well as other 
important variables considered in their study do not similarly exist in other country 
schemes. Direct evidence on the scheme specific conditions of reform, is the main elements 
that helped Chile to successfully proceed with its reform experience. Acuña and Iglesias 
(2001) report that the increase of income from copper surpluses, the large growth of income 
tax receipts and the revenues from privatizing public entities have helped Chile to pay-off 
its pension unfunded liability.   
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Appendix 1: The development of the SSC financial conditions   
Other
Pension
Contributions
Other
Contributions
Investment
Revenues
Insurance Administrative Total
Insurable
Balance
Operational
 Balance
Overall
Balance
1980 4,1 0,6 0,1 4,8 0 0,3 0,3 4,7 4,4 4,5
1981 10,2 1,4 0,6 12,2 0,4 0,5 0,9 11,2 10,7 11,3
1982 21,3 2,6 1,5 25,4 1,2 0,7 1,9 22,7 22 23,5
1983 24,2 2,9 2,9 30,0 2,6 0,9 3,5 24,5 23,6 26,5
1984 32,2 3,9 4 40,1 3,6 0,9 4,5 32,5 31,6 35,6
1985 34,1 4,3 5,4 43,8 5,3 1,5 6,8 33,1 31,6 37
1986 40 5 8,1 53,1 7,4 1,3 8,7 37,6 36,3 44,4
1987 38,8 4,7 11,3 54,8 9,1 1,5 10,6 34,4 32,9 44,2
1988 40,5 4,9 14,2 59,6 11 1,8 12,8 34,4 32,6 46,8
1989 42,2 5,2 20,1 67,5 14,6 2 16,6 32,8 30,8 50,9
1990 44,6 5,5 25,5 75,6 17,7 2,5 20,2 32,4 29,9 55,4
1991 47 5,6 31,3 83,9 18,2 2,6 20,8 34,4 31,8 63,1
1992 54,1 6,5 29,7 90,3 20,2 3,2 23,4 40,4 37,2 66,9
1993 63,4 7,6 35,7 106,7 23,4 4,2 27,6 47,6 43,4 79,1
1994 70,6 8,6 39,9 119,1 28,4 5,2 33,6 50,8 45,6 85,5
1995 79,6 9,8 49,7 139,1 32,9 5 37,9 56,5 51,5 101,2
1996 91,6 11,2 62,8 165,6 41,5 5,5 47 61,3 55,8 118,6
1997 104,3 12,9 76,7 193,9 50,2 6 56,2 67 61 137,7
1998 110,7 13,7 76,4 200,8 57,5 6,4 63,9 66,9 60,5 136,9
1999 124,6 15,4 103,2 243,2 66,6 7,3 73,9 73,4 66,1 169,3
2000 132,4 16,3 85,5 234,2 79,5 7 86,5 69,2 62,2 147,7
2001 154,2 17,9 72,6 244,7 104,3 7,7 112 67,8 60,1 132,7
2002 181,6 20,1 37,7 239,4 132,1 11,2 143,3 69,6 58,4 96,1
2003 190 21 68,6 279,6 153,7 12,1 165,8 57,3 45,2 113,8
 Scheme's Financial Measures (Million JD)
Year
Expenditures
Financial IndicatorsInsurance Revenues
Total
Revenues
Scheme's Revenues
 
Source: Author's own representation based on SSC's annual reports, different issues.  
 
Appendix 2: The ROR on market and SSC sectoral portfolios 
SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market SSC Market
1986 3 3,3 1,3 4,2 2 3,5 3,9 6,8 2,4 3,8
1987 2,5 4,2 0,8 4,5 1,7 3 6 8,1 1,9 4,3
1988 1,8 4,6 0,9 4 1,4 2,7 4,9 7,2 1,5 4,3
1989 3,9 5,3 1,1 3,5 1,4 4,4 2,5 8,6 3,1 4,6
1990 4,7 7,3 2,1 2,9 1,4 4,5 2,7 7,9 3,8 5,3
1991 4,8 6,8 2,5 3,5 3,2 5 2,7 9,2 4,2 5,4
1992 5 6,7 4,9 3,9 3,3 5,2 10,8 9,5 4,5 5,5
1993 2 6,2 3,7 3,9 9,3 6 5,4 10 2,8 5,3
1994 1,7 4,6 3,9 3,4 7,4 5 7,6 7,4 2,7 4,2
1995 2 4,1 3,3 3 7,5 3,9 6,5 6,8 2,8 3,7
1996 3,2 4,3 2,8 2,9 5,6 2,1 3,6 4,2 3,4 3,4
1997 1,9 3,7 2,3 2,5 4,7 0,9 10,5 3,3 2,4 2,5
1998 3,1 4,1 2,3 3,1 4,6 1,2 4,2 2,8 2,4 2,9
Average 3 5 2 3 4 4 5 7 3 4
Insurance PortfolioIndustrial Banking Service 
Year
 
Source: Author's own calculations and representation based on Zaghloul (2003). 
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Appendix 3: Pension insurance indicators in selected countries 
Country
Insured
Participant
Employer Male Female Male Female Male Female
Algeria 5,5 8 68,7 71,8 60 55 50 45
Bahrain 5 7 72,1 76,3 60 65 c c
Egypt 13 17 66,7 69,9 60 60 c c
Jordan 5,5 9 69,7 72,5 60 55 45 45
Kuwait 10 20 74,9 79 50 50 45 45
Lebanon 0 8,5 71,9 75,1 64 64 60 60
Libya 3,75 10,5 69,2 73,3 65 60 c c
Morroco 3,96 7,93 66,8 70,5 60 60 c c
Oman 5 8 70,2 73,2 60 55 c c
Saudi Arabia 9 9 71,1 73,7 60 55 c c
Sudan 8 17 55,6 58,4 60 55 45 45
Syria 7 14 70,6 73,1 60 55 55 50
Tunisia 3,68 7,37 69,6 72,7 60 60 50 50
Yemen 6 9 60,7 62,9 60 55 50 45
Average Arab 6,1 10,9 68,4 71,6 59,9 57,4 50 48
Austria 10,25 12,55 75 81,5 65 60 c c
Belgium 7,5 8,86 75,7 81,9 65 63 60 60
Cyprus 6,3 6,3 76 80,5 65 65 63 63
France 6,65 9,8 75,2 82,8 60 60 c c
Germany 9,75 9,75 75 81,1 65 65 60 60
Greece 6,67 13,33 75,9 81,2 65 60 60 55
Italy 8,89 23,81 75,5 81,9 65 60 c c
Norway 7,8 14,1 76 81,9 67 67 c c
Sweden 7 11,91 77,6 82,6 65 65 61 61
Switzerland 11,9 11,9 75,9 82,3 65 63 c c
Turkey 9 11 68 73,2 55 50 c c
UK 11 12,8 75,7 80,7 65 60 c c
Average Europe 8,6 12,2 75,1 81,0 63,9 61,5 54 52
Contribution Rate 
 Pension Insurance Indicators  in Selected Countries
Life Expectancy at Birth
Normal Retirement 
Age
Earliest Retirement Age
 
Source: Author's own representation based on: ISSA (2004) for the selected European countries; ISSA (2003a) for the 
selected Arab-African countries; ISSA (2002) for the selected Arab-Asian Countries.  
c: The country has no early pensionable age, has one only for specific groups, or information is not available.  
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Appendix 4: The development in the scheme's revenues under status quo conditions  
Year Male Female Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 3054 2477 102 28 130 62 17 80 210 44 254 117 372
2005 3141 2557 112 32 144 68 20 88 232 49 280 139 419
2006 3238 2639 123 36 159 75 22 97 256 54 309 152 461
2007 3338 2721 135 40 175 83 24 107 282 59 341 165 506
2008 3489 2846 148 44 192 90 27 118 310 65 375 178 553
2009 3660 2978 163 50 213 100 30 130 343 72 415 192 607
2010 3833 3115 179 55 234 109 34 143 377 79 457 206 663
2011 4019 3256 197 62 258 120 38 158 416 87 503 221 724
2012 4217 3403 216 68 284 132 42 174 458 96 554 236 789
2013 4415 3556 236 76 311 144 46 190 502 105 607 250 857
2014 4635 3719 259 84 343 158 51 209 552 116 668 265 933
2015 4863 3893 283 93 376 173 57 230 605 127 732 281 1013
2016 5106 4079 308 103 411 188 63 251 663 139 801 296 1098
2017 5367 4275 337 113 450 206 69 275 725 152 877 311 1188
2018 5637 4484 367 125 492 224 76 301 793 166 959 325 1284
2019 5935 4704 401 138 539 245 84 330 869 182 1051 338 1389
2020 6252 4931 438 152 590 268 93 361 950 199 1150 351 1501
2021 6585 5169 477 167 644 292 102 394 1038 218 1255 362 1618
2022 6933 5416 519 184 703 317 112 429 1132 237 1370 372 1742
2023 7291 5670 563 201 764 344 123 467 1231 258 1489 380 1869
2024 7668 5936 610 221 830 373 135 507 1338 281 1619 384 2003
2025 8060 6212 659 242 901 403 148 551 1452 305 1757 383 2139
2026 8468 6495 712 265 976 435 162 597 1573 330 1903 376 2278
2027 8889 6791 766 290 1056 468 177 645 1702 357 2058 363 2422
2028 9318 7093 824 316 1140 503 193 697 1837 385 2222 343 2566
2029 9764 7407 884 346 1230 540 211 752 1981 416 2397 310 2708
2030 10221 7730 947 377 1325 579 231 810 2134 448 2582 267 2849
2031 10682 8060 1013 412 1425 619 252 871 2296 482 2778 210 2989
2032 11157 8405 1082 450 1532 661 275 936 2469 518 2987 139 3125
2033 11642 8754 1153 490 1643 705 299 1004 2648 556 3203 45 3248
2034 12141 9109 1229 533 1762 751 326 1077 2839 596 3435 0 3435
2035 12652 9475 1309 580 1889 800 354 1154 3043 639 3681 0 3681
2036 13166 9851 1391 629 2021 850 384 1235 3255 683 3939 0 3939
2037 13685 10232 1475 682 2157 901 417 1318 3476 730 4205 0 4205
2038 14209 10620 1560 739 2299 953 451 1405 3703 777 4481 0 4481
2039 14744 11018 1645 798 2444 1006 488 1493 3937 826 4764 0 4764
2040 15282 11428 1734 863 2597 1060 527 1587 4183 878 5062 0 5062
2041 15832 11853 1826 932 2758 1116 569 1685 4443 933 5376 0 5376
2042 16382 12289 1919 1005 2924 1172 614 1787 4711 989 5700 0 5700
2043 16948 12734 2014 1083 3097 1231 662 1893 4989 1047 6037 0 6037
2044 17569 13243 2118 1161 3279 1294 710 2004 5282 1109 6391 0 6391
2045 18266 13852 2231 1238 3470 1364 757 2120 5590 1174 6764 0 6764
2046 19002 14492 2354 1318 3672 1439 806 2244 5916 1242 7159 0 7159
2047 19773 15162 2484 1402 3886 1518 857 2375 6260 1314 7575 0 7575
2048 20574 15866 2620 1489 4109 1601 910 2511 6620 1390 8010 0 8010
2049 21400 16592 2762 1580 4342 1688 965 2653 6995 1469 8464 0 8464
2050 22175 17278 2900 1667 4568 1772 1019 2791 7359 1545 8904 0 8904
Scheme's Total Revenues (Million JD)
Other
Insurance
Revenues
Total
Insurance
Revenues
OA Contributions by Employer         OA Contributions by Employee                   
Investment 
 Revenues
Total
Revenues
  Status Quo's Revenues
            Insurance Revenues
Annual Insured 
Salary (JD) 
Total OA
Contributions
 
Source: Author's estimation 
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Appendix 5: Scheme's estimated expenditures under the Status Quo conditions 
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 113 11 124 25 2 27 29 180 19 199 2,6
2005 136 15 151 25 2 27 32 210 21 231 2,8
2006 160 19 179 25 2 28 35 242 23 265 2,9
2007 188 23 212 26 3 29 38 278 25 303 3,1
2008 225 28 253 27 3 29 41 323 28 351 3,3
2009 257 34 290 27 3 30 44 364 31 395 3,4
2010 293 41 334 27 3 30 48 412 33 445 3,6
2011 331 48 379 28 3 32 52 463 37 499 3,7
2012 381 57 438 29 4 33 56 527 40 567 3,9
2013 428 66 494 30 4 34 60 588 43 631 4,0
2014 477 76 553 30 4 35 65 653 47 701 4,2
2015 532 89 622 32 5 37 70 729 51 780 4,3
2016 607 105 711 33 5 38 76 826 56 881 4,5
2017 675 120 795 34 6 40 82 916 61 977 4,6
2018 748 136 885 36 6 42 88 1014 65 1080 4,8
2019 826 155 981 38 7 45 95 1121 71 1192 4,9
2020 932 179 1111 40 8 48 102 1261 77 1338 5,2
2021 1027 203 1230 42 8 51 110 1391 83 1473 5,3
2022 1137 230 1367 45 9 54 119 1539 89 1629 5,5
2023 1265 261 1526 49 10 59 127 1712 96 1808 5,7
2024 1437 298 1735 52 11 64 137 1935 103 2038 6,0
2025 1590 337 1927 56 12 68 147 2142 110 2252 6,2
2026 1755 378 2133 60 14 74 157 2364 118 2482 6,4
2027 1942 427 2369 66 16 82 168 2619 125 2744 6,6
2028 2202 488 2690 71 17 88 180 2958 133 3091 7,0
2029 2428 546 2974 77 19 96 192 3262 141 3402 7,3
2030 2678 611 3289 83 21 104 205 3598 148 3747 7,5
2031 2953 685 3637 92 23 116 218 3972 156 4128 7,8
2032 3323 777 4100 100 26 126 233 4459 164 4623 8,2
2033 3650 868 4519 108 29 137 248 4903 171 5074 8,5
2034 3998 967 4965 117 32 148 264 5377 181 5558 8,8
2035 4370 1085 5454 129 35 165 281 5900 194 6094 9,1
2036 4889 1227 6116 140 39 179 298 6593 207 6800 9,6
2037 5343 1361 6703 151 43 194 317 7214 221 7435 9,9
2038 5839 1508 7347 163 47 210 336 7892 236 8128 10,3
2039 6375 1676 8051 180 52 232 355 8637 251 8888 10,7
2040 7110 1872 8982 193 57 250 375 9607 266 9873 11,2
2041 7730 2052 9783 207 62 269 396 10448 283 10731 11,6
2042 8388 2248 10636 222 67 289 418 11343 300 11643 11,9
2043 9073 2474 11547 242 75 317 441 12305 318 12622 12,3
2044 10009 2736 12745 258 81 339 465 13549 336 13885 12,9
2045 10758 2983 13740 274 88 362 489 14592 356 14948 13,2
2046 11541 3256 14797 292 96 387 515 15699 377 16076 13,5
2047 12366 3580 15946 317 106 422 542 16910 399 17309 13,9
2048 13510 3966 17476 336 114 450 570 18495 422 18917 14,5
2049 14374 4307 18681 356 123 479 599 19759 445 20205 14,7
2050 15271 4708 19978 385 136 521 628 21127 469 21596 15,1
Natural Disability
Other 
Insurance 
Expenditures
Scheme's Expenditures (Million JD)
Total 
Insurance 
Expenditures
Adminstrative
Expenditures
and Allowances
Insurance Expenditures
Total
Expenditures
Total 
Expenditure
s as % of 
GDP
Old Age 
 
Source: Author's own estimation. 
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Appendix 6: Scheme's estimated financial indicators under the Status Quo conditions 
Year
Operational 
 Balance
Insurable 
 Balance
Total
Balance
Surpluss or
Deficit as
% of GDP Reserves
Reserves 
as %  
of GDP
2004 61 80 178 2,4 2107 28,0
2005 55 76 195 2,4 2302 28,3
2006 51 75 203 2,3 2505 28,3
2007 45 70 210 2,2 2715 28,3
2008 32 60 211 2,0 2926 28,1
2009 28 59 220 2,0 3146 27,9
2010 21 54 227 1,9 3372 27,7
2011 14 50 234 1,8 3607 27,4
2012 -2 38 233 1,6 3840 27,0
2013 -13 30 237 1,5 4077 26,5
2014 -21 27 245 1,5 4322 26,1
2015 -35 16 245 1,4 4567 25,6
2016 -66 -10 230 1,2 4797 24,9
2017 -85 -25 226 1,1 5023 24,3
2018 -106 -40 219 1,0 5242 23,6
2019 -125 -54 213 0,9 5455 22,8
2020 -172 -95 179 0,7 5634 22,0
2021 -201 -118 161 0,6 5796 21,1
2022 -242 -152 131 0,4 5926 20,1
2023 -302 -206 78 0,2 6004 19,0
2024 -402 -299 -17 -0,1 5987 17,8
2025 -478 -367 -95 -0,3 5892 16,3
2026 -562 -444 -186 -0,5 5706 14,8
2027 -669 -543 -306 -0,7 5401 13,2
2028 -852 -719 -509 -1,2 4892 11,2
2029 -991 -850 -680 -1,5 4211 9,0
2030 -1152 -1003 -885 -1,8 3326 6,7
2031 -1340 -1183 -1129 -2,1 2197 4,2
2032 -1630 -1466 -1491 -2,7 706 1,3
2033 -1869 -1698 -1824 -3,1 -   -    
2034 -2123 -1942 -2123 -3,4 -   -    
2035 -2413 -2219 -2413 -3,6 -   -    
2036 -2862 -2654 -2862 -4,0 -   -    
2037 -3230 -3008 -3230 -4,3 -   -    
2038 -3648 -3412 -3648 -4,6 -   -    
2039 -4124 -3873 -4124 -4,9 -   -    
2040 -4812 -4545 -4812 -5,5 -   -    
2041 -5354 -5072 -5354 -5,8 -   -    
2042 -5943 -5643 -5943 -6,1 -   -    
2043 -6585 -6268 -6585 -6,4 -   -    
2044 -7494 -7157 -7494 -6,9 -   -    
2045 -8184 -7828 -8184 -7,2 -   -    
2046 -8917 -8540 -8917 -7,5 -   -    
2047 -9734 -9335 -9734 -7,8 -   -    
2048 -10907 -10485 -10907 -8,3 -   -    
2049 -11740 -11295 -11740 -8,6 -   -    
2050 -12691 -12223 -12691 -8,9 -   -    
Status Quo's Financial Indicators (Million JD)
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 7: Scheme's member structure under the Status Quo conditions.  
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 371053 127701 498754 45313 6478 51791 13.805                1575 15380 11618
2005 395614 138679 534293 50128 7566 57694 13.828                1631 15459 12445
2006 422168 150329 572497 54970 8645 63615 13.859                1693 15552 13335
2007 449374 162932 612306 60184 9825 70009 13.896                1759 15655 14263
2008 470763 173646 644409 65743 11101 76844 13.923                1832 15755 15010
2009 494888 185432 680320 71131 12498 83629 13.964                1912 15876 15847
2010 518651 197581 716232 76963 14087 91050 14.009                1994 16003 16683
2011 543225 210161 753386 82801 15732 98533 14.066                2086 16152 17549
2012 568395 223453 791848 88929 17591 106520 14.141                2188 16329 18445
2013 593015 236784 829799 95601 19533 115134 14.230                2301 16531 19329
2014 619946 250878 870824 102383 21641 124024 14.346                2423 16769 20284
2015 645464 265524 910988 109766 24091 133857 14.483                2550 17033 21220
2016 671198 279959 951157 117624 26625 144249 14.646                2691 17337 22156
2017 696975 294776 991751 125989 29294 155283 14.844                2840 17684 23101
2018 723274 309955 1033229 134738 32126 166864 15.073                2996 18069 24067
2019 751481 325712 1077193 143603 35148 178751 15.346                3165 18511 25091
2020 778922 341806 1120728 153009 38462 191471 15.661                3344 19005 26105
2021 805431 358479 1163910 162993 41996 204989 16.028                3539 19567 27111
2022 832138 376513 1208651 174136 45808 219944 16.453                3752 20205 28153
2023 857373 394483 1251856 186584 49920 236504 16.923                3976 20899 29160
2024 883387 413317 1296704 199792 54273 254065 17.448                4217 21665 30205
2025 908653 433057 1341710 213779 59205 272984 18.023                4475 22498 31253
2026 933697 452612 1386309 228362 64348 292710 18.666                4749 23415 32292
2027 958011 473982 1431993 244258 69925 314183 19.371                5041 24412 33356
2028 982316 495782 1478098 261488 75968 337456 20.138                5342 25480 34430
2029 1006064 518586 1524650 279201 82377 361578 20.952                5675 26627 35514
2030 1029885 542611 1572496 297979 89208 387187 21.824                6028 27852 36629
2031 1053729 568341 1622070 317571 96316 413887 22.750                6405 29155 37783
2032 1077559 595153 1672712 338018 104050 442068 23.735                6809 30544 38963
2033 1100792 621812 1722604 359426 112459 471885 24.769                7236 32005 40125
2034 1125141 650114 1775255 381121 121220 502341 25.858                7689 33547 41352
2035 1149618 679626 1829244 403233 130637 533870 27.003                8163 35166 42609
2036 1174198 709597 1883795 426561 140676 567237 28.203                8659 36862 43880
2037 1197670 740900 1938570 451166 151268 602434 29.439                9168 38607 45156
2038 1219669 772941 1992610 476835 162562 639397 30.701                9704 40405 46414
2039 1239986 805209 2045195 503456 174162 677618 31.987                10267 42254 47639
2040 1260586 838875 2099461 531073 185949 717022 33.295                10855 44150 48903
2041 1281581 873495 2155076 559579 198243 757822 34.623                11465 46088 50199
2042 1301274 908964 2210238 588508 211062 799570 35.954                12112 48066 51484
2043 1320332 944878 2265210 617245 224284 841529 37.282                12799 50081 52764
2044 1339197 974250 2313447 645773 237598 883371 38.605                13516 52121 53888
2045 1357340 993456 2350796 674435 252009 926444 39.927                14266 54193 54758
2046 1376504 1010668 2387172 702859 267341 970200 41.255                15036 56291 55605
2047 1395794 1027246 2423040 730982 283359 1014341 42.578                15830 58408 56441
2048 1414968 1042766 2457734 757986 300287 1058273 43.903                16643 60546 57249
2049 1434102 1057962 2492064 784461 317393 1101854 45.226                17491 62717 58048
2050 1453314 1072217 2525531 810631 335087 1145718 46.550                18363 64913 58828
Other Provisions
Old Age
BeneficiariesContributors
Natural Disability 
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 8: Scheme's estimated revenues under Quasi Actuarial approach 
Year Male Female Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 3054 2477 101 28 130 62 17 79 209 44 253 117 370
2005 3161 2573 112 31 143 68 19 87 230 48 278 139 417
2006 3258 2655 123 35 158 75 21 96 254 53 307 152 459
2007 3360 2739 135 39 174 82 24 106 280 59 338 165 503
2008 3512 2865 148 43 191 90 26 117 308 64 372 179 551
2009 3685 2998 163 48 211 100 30 129 340 71 412 194 605
2010 3859 3136 179 54 233 109 33 142 375 79 453 209 663
2011 4048 3279 196 60 256 120 37 157 413 87 500 226 726
2012 4247 3428 216 67 282 132 41 172 455 95 550 244 794
2013 4448 3582 236 74 309 144 45 189 498 104 603 264 867
2014 4670 3748 259 82 340 158 50 208 548 115 663 285 948
2015 4901 3923 283 91 373 173 55 228 601 126 727 308 1035
2016 5146 4111 309 100 409 189 61 250 658 138 796 333 1129
2017 5410 4310 337 110 447 206 68 273 721 151 872 360 1232
2018 5684 4521 367 122 489 224 74 299 788 165 953 390 1343
2019 5985 4743 402 134 536 246 82 328 864 181 1045 423 1468
2020 6305 4973 439 148 587 268 90 358 945 198 1143 460 1603
2021 6643 5214 478 163 641 292 99 391 1032 216 1248 499 1748
2022 6995 5465 520 179 699 318 109 427 1126 236 1362 544 1906
2023 7357 5722 564 196 760 344 120 464 1224 257 1481 594 2074
2024 7739 5991 611 215 826 373 132 505 1331 279 1610 648 2258
2025 8137 6271 661 236 897 404 144 548 1445 303 1748 707 2454
2026 8551 6558 713 258 971 436 158 594 1565 328 1893 771 2664
2027 8977 6858 768 283 1051 470 173 642 1693 355 2048 843 2891
2028 9412 7165 826 309 1135 505 189 694 1828 384 2212 922 3134
2029 9866 7484 887 337 1224 542 206 748 1972 414 2386 1006 3392
2030 10329 7812 950 369 1319 581 225 806 2125 446 2571 1099 3670
2031 10798 8148 1016 403 1419 621 246 867 2286 480 2766 1202 3968
2032 11280 8498 1086 440 1526 664 269 932 2458 516 2974 1314 4288
2033 11774 8852 1158 479 1636 708 293 1000 2637 553 3190 1435 4625
2034 12281 9214 1234 521 1755 754 318 1073 2828 594 3422 1567 4988
2035 12800 9587 1315 567 1881 803 346 1150 3031 636 3667 1712 5378
2036 13325 9969 1398 615 2013 854 376 1230 3243 681 3924 1870 5793
2037 13853 10358 1482 667 2150 906 408 1314 3463 727 4190 2040 6230
2038 14387 10753 1568 723 2290 958 442 1400 3690 775 4465 2224 6689
2039 14933 11159 1654 781 2435 1011 477 1488 3924 824 4747 2425 7172
2040 15481 11577 1743 845 2588 1065 516 1582 4169 875 5045 2641 7686
2041 16043 12011 1837 912 2749 1122 558 1680 4429 930 5359 2871 8229
2042 16605 12456 1931 985 2915 1180 602 1782 4697 986 5683 3119 8802
2043 17184 12910 2027 1061 3088 1239 648 1887 4975 1044 6020 3387 9407
2044 17771 13377 2127 1143 3269 1300 698 1998 5267 1106 6373 3675 10048
2045 18409 13913 2233 1226 3459 1365 749 2114 5573 1170 6743 3982 10725
2046 19141 14545 2355 1305 3660 1439 798 2237 5897 1238 7135 4313 11448
2047 19910 15209 2484 1389 3873 1518 849 2367 6240 1310 7550 4670 12220
2048 20712 15910 2620 1476 4096 1601 902 2503 6599 1385 7984 5056 13040
2049 21543 16636 2762 1566 4328 1688 957 2645 6973 1464 8437 5467 13903
2050 22323 17326 2900 1654 4554 1772 1011 2783 7337 1540 8878 5911 14789
Investment 
 Revenues
Other
Insurance
Revenues
Total
Insurance
Revenues
            Insurance Revenues (Million JD)
OA Contributons by
Employer 
OA Contributions by
Employee                      Total OA
Contributions
Total
Revenues
Average-Annual
Insured Salary
(JD) 
 
Source: Author's own estimation
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Appendix 9: Scheme's estimated expenditures under Quasi Actuarial approach 
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 112 11 124 25 2 27 29 180 19 199 2,6
2005 135 15 150 25 2 27 31 209 21 230 2,7
2006 157 18 175 25 2 28 34 237 23 260 2,9
2007 180 21 202 26 3 29 37 268 25 293 3,0
2008 211 26 237 27 3 29 40 306 28 334 3,1
2009 236 30 266 27 3 30 44 339 30 370 3,2
2010 264 35 299 27 3 30 47 376 33 410 3,3
2011 292 40 332 28 3 32 51 415 37 451 3,3
2012 329 46 375 29 4 33 55 463 40 503 3,5
2013 360 52 412 30 4 34 60 505 44 549 3,5
2014 392 58 450 30 4 35 65 549 48 597 3,5
2015 426 66 492 32 5 37 70 598 52 651 3,6
2016 473 75 548 33 5 38 75 661 57 718 3,7
2017 512 83 595 34 6 40 81 716 63 778 3,7
2018 553 91 644 36 6 42 87 773 68 841 3,7
2019 592 101 693 38 7 45 94 832 75 906 3,7
2020 648 113 761 40 7 47 102 910 81 991 3,8
2021 692 124 815 42 8 50 109 975 89 1064 3,8
2022 741 135 877 45 9 54 118 1048 97 1145 3,8
2023 798 148 947 49 10 59 126 1132 106 1238 3,8
2024 877 163 1040 52 11 63 136 1239 115 1354 3,9
2025 938 178 1116 56 12 68 145 1329 125 1454 3,9
2026 999 192 1191 60 13 73 156 1420 136 1556 3,9
2027 1065 209 1274 66 15 81 167 1522 147 1669 4,0
2028 1164 229 1393 71 17 88 178 1659 160 1819 4,1
2029 1237 246 1483 77 18 95 190 1769 173 1942 4,1
2030 1314 264 1578 83 20 104 203 1885 187 2072 4,1
2031 1396 285 1681 92 23 115 217 2013 202 2216 4,1
2032 1514 310 1824 100 25 125 231 2180 219 2399 4,2
2033 1604 333 1937 108 28 136 246 2319 236 2555 4,2
2034 1695 356 2051 117 31 148 262 2461 254 2715 4,2
2035 1788 385 2173 130 35 164 279 2616 274 2890 4,2
2036 1933 417 2350 140 38 178 297 2825 296 3120 4,3
2037 2043 445 2489 151 42 193 315 2996 318 3314 4,3
2038 2163 475 2638 163 45 209 333 3181 341 3522 4,3
2039 2290 511 2801 180 51 231 353 3385 366 3751 4,4
2040 2481 548 3029 193 55 249 373 3651 392 4043 4,5
2041 2623 581 3204 207 60 268 394 3865 420 4285 4,5
2042 2771 615 3386 222 66 288 416 4089 449 4539 4,5
2043 2921 658 3579 243 73 316 439 4333 480 4813 4,5
2044 3143 703 3845 259 79 338 462 4645 513 5158 4,6
2045 3296 742 4038 275 86 361 487 4887 547 5434 4,6
2046 3449 786 4235 292 93 386 513 5134 585 5718 4,6
2047 3610 843 4453 318 103 421 539 5413 624 6037 4,7
2048 3853 905 4759 336 112 448 568 5774 666 6440 4,7
2049 4006 957 4964 356 121 477 597 6037 710 6748 4,7
2050 4161 1024 5185 386 133 518 625 6329 756 7084 4,7
Old Age 
Insurance Expenditures (Million JD)
Total
Expenditures
Total
Expenditures
as % of GDP
Total 
Insurance 
Expenditures
Adminstrative
Expenditures
and
Allowances
Natural Disability Other
Insurance
Expenditures
 
Source: Author's own estimation 
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Appendix 10: Scheme's financial indicators under the Quasi Actuarial approach 
(Million JD) 
Year
Operational 
Balance
Insurable 
Balance Total Balance
Surpluss or 
Deficit as % 
of GDP
Reserves
Reserves as
% of GDP
2004 60 79 177 2,3 2106 28,0
2005 55 76 194 2,4 2300 28,2
2006 54 77 206 2,3 2506 28,3
2007 53 78 218 2,3 2724 28,4
2008 46 74 225 2,2 2949 28,4
2009 51 81 244 2,2 3193 28,3
2010 53 87 262 2,2 3456 28,3
2011 59 95 285 2,2 3740 28,4
2012 58 99 303 2,1 4043 28,4
2013 66 110 329 2,1 4372 28,4
2014 79 127 364 2,2 4736 28,6
2015 91 143 398 2,2 5135 28,7
2016 93 151 426 2,2 5561 28,9
2017 110 172 470 2,3 6031 29,1
2018 130 199 520 2,3 6551 29,4
2019 158 233 581 2,4 7132 29,8
2020 173 255 633 2,5 7765 30,3
2021 208 296 707 2,6 8472 30,8
2022 242 339 786 2,7 9259 31,4
2023 271 377 865 2,7 10123 32,1
2024 286 401 934 2,8 11058 32,8
2025 327 452 1033 2,9 12091 33,6
2026 374 509 1145 3,0 13236 34,4
2027 419 566 1262 3,1 14497 35,3
2028 436 596 1358 3,1 15856 36,2
2029 492 665 1498 3,2 17354 37,2
2030 550 737 1650 3,3 19003 38,3
2031 607 809 1809 3,4 20812 39,5
2032 637 856 1951 3,5 22763 40,7
2033 703 939 2138 3,6 24901 41,9
2034 781 1035 2347 3,7 27248 43,3
2035 858 1133 2570 3,8 29818 44,7
2036 893 1188 2762 3,9 32580 46,1
2037 973 1291 3013 4,0 35593 47,6
2038 1049 1390 3273 4,1 38867 49,2
2039 1113 1479 3538 4,2 42404 50,8
2040 1128 1521 3769 4,3 46173 52,5
2041 1211 1631 4082 4,4 50255 54,2
2042 1294 1743 4413 4,5 54668 56,0
2043 1370 1850 4757 4,6 59425 57,8
2044 1392 1905 5067 4,7 64492 59,7
2045 1502 2049 5483 4,8 69975 61,7
2046 1626 2210 5939 5,0 75914 63,7
2047 1739 2364 6410 5,1 82324 65,9
2048 1790 2456 6846 5,2 89169 68,1
2049 1956 2666 7422 5,4 96591 70,5
2050 2082 2838 7993 5,6 104585 73,0
Quasi Actuarial Financial Indicators
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 11: Scheme's members structure under the Quasi Actuarial approach 
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 368312 127701 496013 45263 6471 51734 13.803    1575 15378 11554
2005 392693 133987 526680 49933 7540 57473 13.823    1627 15450 12268
2006 419048 145245 564293 54575 8551 63126 13.849    1688 15537 13144
2007 446054 157421 603475 59515 9643 69158 13.881    1749 15630 14057
2008 467285 167772 635057 64738 10815 75553 13.906    1818 15724 14793
2009 491231 179163 670394 69708 12085 81793 13.946    1897 15843 15616
2010 514820 190898 705718 75027 13523 88550 13.987    1977 15964 16439
2011 539208 203054 742262 80279 14989 95268 14.041    2066 16107 17290
2012 564196 215900 780096 85708 16631 102339 14.110    2165 16275 18171
2013 588635 228778 817413 91573 18321 109894 14.193    2271 16464 19040
2014 615364 242395 857759 97419 20141 117560 14.302    2388 16690 19980
2015 640697 256545 897242 103724 22245 125969 14.437    2511 16948 20900
2016 666244 270489 936733 110345 24395 134740 14.596    2646 17242 21820
2017 691827 284805 976632 117316 26639 143955 14.788    2791 17579 22749
2018 717934 299474 1017408 124515 28986 153501 15.010    2943 17953 23699
2019 745931 314695 1060626 131639 31473 163112 15.277    3105 18382 24705
2020 773170 330247 1103417 139118 34169 173287 15.588    3276 18864 25702
2021 799483 346362 1145845 146928 37023 183951 15.952    3462 19414 26691
2022 825994 363783 1189777 155562 40078 195640 16.371    3668 20039 27714
2023 851038 381148 1232186 165214 43332 208546 16.835    3881 20716 28702
2024 876866 399338 1276204 175282 46713 221995 17.351    4112 21463 29727
2025 901947 418413 1320360 185836 50545 236381 17.921    4358 22279 30756
2026 926796 437307 1364103 196585 54448 251033 18.559    4620 23179 31774
2027 950932 457956 1408888 208132 58632 266764 19.256    4899 24155 32818
2028 975059 479011 1454070 220634 63120 283754 20.010    5188 25198 33870
2029 998637 501045 1499682 233201 67808 301009 20.818    5507 26325 34933
2030 1022275 524259 1546534 246318 72779 319097 21.680    5847 27527 36024
2031 1045950 549123 1595073 259892 77838 337730 22.596    6208 28804 37155
2032 1069599 575026 1644625 273721 83314 357035 23.569    6596 30165 38309
2033 1092658 600783 1693441 288133 89253 377386 24.594    7007 31601 39446
2034 1116827 628130 1744957 302430 95357 397787 25.672    7445 33117 40646
2035 1141118 656651 1797769 316661 101893 418554 26.806    7904 34710 41876
2036 1165526 685601 1851127 331554 108779 440333 27.994    8385 36379 43119
2037 1188821 715843 1904664 347144 115954 463098 29.219    8878 38097 44366
2038 1210656 746806 1957462 363285 123527 486812 30.473    9398 39871 45596
2039 1230821 777977 2008798 379819 131189 511008 31.747    9941 41688 46792
2040 1251271 810515 2061786 396723 138818 535541 33.046    10511 43557 48026
2041 1272114 843949 2116063 413989 146696 560685 34.364    11101 45465 49290
2042 1291885 878225 2170110 431275 154817 586092 35.685    11724 47409 50549
2043 1310881 912918 2223799 448123 163120 611243 36.998    12383 49381 51800
2044 1329610 949033 2278643 464374 171292 635666 38.308    13080 51388 53077
2045 1347943 978869 2326812 480455 180056 660511 39.623    13809 53432 54199
2046 1366971 997284 2364255 495809 189326 685135 40.943    14553 55496 55071
2047 1386349 1014623 2400972 510913 198859 709772 42.256    15323 57579 55927
2048 1405524 1030608 2436132 524740 208898 733638 43.573    16117 59690 56746
2049 1424530 1045856 2470386 537850 218688 756538 44.884    16944 61828 57543
2050 1443609 1060616 2504225 550496 228713 779209 46.199    17796 63995 58332
Natural Disability Old Age
Contributors Beneficiaries
Other
Provisions
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 12: Scheme's estimated revenues under the Fully Funded approach 
Year Male Female Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 3054 2477 101 28 130 62 17 79 209 44 253 117 370
2005 3161 2573 112 31 143 68 19 87 230 48 278 139 417
2006 3258 2655 123 35 158 75 21 96 254 53 307 152 459
2007 3360 2739 135 39 174 82 24 106 280 59 338 165 503
2008 3512 2865 148 43 191 90 26 117 308 64 372 179 551
2009 3685 2998 163 48 211 100 30 129 340 71 412 193 605
2010 3859 3136 179 54 233 109 33 142 375 79 453 208 662
2011 4048 3279 196 60 256 120 37 157 413 87 500 224 724
2012 4247 3428 216 67 282 132 41 172 455 95 550 242 792
2013 4448 3582 236 74 309 144 45 189 498 104 603 260 863
2014 4670 3748 259 82 340 158 50 208 548 115 663 280 943
2015 4901 3923 283 91 373 173 55 228 601 126 727 301 1028
2016 5146 4111 309 100 409 189 61 250 658 138 796 324 1120
2017 5410 4310 337 110 447 206 68 273 721 151 872 348 1220
2018 5684 4521 367 122 489 224 74 299 788 165 953 374 1328
2019 5985 4743 402 134 536 246 82 328 864 181 1045 403 1448
2020 6305 4973 439 148 587 268 90 358 945 198 1143 435 1578
2021 6643 5214 478 163 641 292 99 391 1032 216 1248 468 1717
2022 6995 5465 520 179 699 318 109 427 1126 236 1362 506 1868
2023 7357 5722 564 196 760 344 120 464 1224 257 1481 547 2028
2024 7739 5991 611 215 826 373 132 505 1331 279 1610 591 2201
2025 8137 6271 661 236 897 404 144 548 1445 303 1748 638 2385
2026 8551 6558 713 258 971 436 158 594 1565 328 1893 688 2582
2027 8977 6858 768 283 1051 470 173 642 1693 355 2048 744 2793
2028 9412 7165 826 309 1135 505 189 694 1828 384 2212 804 3016
2029 9866 7484 887 337 1224 542 206 748 1972 414 2386 867 3254
2030 10329 7812 950 369 1319 581 225 806 2125 446 2571 936 3507
2031 10798 8148 1016 403 1419 621 246 867 2286 480 2766 1010 3776
2032 11280 8498 1086 440 1526 664 269 932 2458 516 2974 1090 4064
2033 11774 8852 1158 479 1636 708 293 1000 2637 553 3190 1174 4363
2034 12281 9214 1234 521 1755 754 318 1073 2828 594 3422 1264 4685
2035 12800 9587 1315 567 1881 803 346 1150 3031 636 3667 1361 5028
2036 13325 9969 1398 615 2013 854 376 1230 3243 681 3924 1465 5389
2037 13853 10358 1482 667 2150 906 408 1314 3463 727 4190 1574 5764
2038 14387 10753 1568 723 2290 958 442 1400 3690 775 4465 1690 6155
2039 14933 11159 1654 781 2435 1011 477 1488 3924 824 4747 1813 6561
2040 15481 11577 1743 845 2588 1065 516 1582 4169 875 5045 1943 6988
2041 16043 12011 1837 912 2749 1122 558 1680 4429 930 5359 2075 7434
2042 16605 12456 1931 985 2915 1180 602 1782 4697 986 5683 2214 7897
2043 17184 12910 2027 1061 3088 1239 648 1887 4975 1044 6020 2361 8381
2044 17771 13377 2127 1143 3269 1300 698 1998 5267 1106 6373 2515 8887
2045 18409 13913 2233 1226 3459 1365 749 2114 5573 1170 6743 2671 9414
2046 19141 14545 2355 1305 3660 1439 798 2237 5897 1238 7135 2835 9971
2047 19910 15209 2484 1389 3873 1518 849 2367 6240 1310 7550 3010 10560
2048 20712 15910 2620 1476 4096 1601 902 2503 6599 1385 7984 3194 11178
2049 21543 16636 2762 1566 4328 1688 957 2645 6973 1464 8437 3382 11819
2050 22323 17326 2900 1654 4554 1772 1011 2783 7337 1540 8878 3583 12460
OA Contributons by Employer OA Contributions by Employees  
Total OA
Contributions
Other
Insurance
Revenues
Total
Insurance
Revenues
Investment
Revenues
Total
Revenues
 Annual Insured Salary               (JD) 
            Insurance Revenues (Million JD)
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 13: Scheme's estimated expenditures under the Fully Funded approach 
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 112 11 124 25 2 27 29 180 19 199 2,6
2005 135 15 150 25 2 27 31 209 21 230 2,7
2006 157 18 176 25 2 28 34 238 23 261 2,9
2007 182 22 204 26 3 29 37 270 25 296 3,0
2008 214 26 241 27 3 29 40 310 28 338 3,2
2009 241 31 272 27 3 30 44 345 30 376 3,3
2010 271 36 307 27 3 30 47 385 33 418 3,4
2011 302 41 343 28 3 32 51 426 37 462 3,4
2012 341 48 390 29 4 33 55 477 40 518 3,6
2013 377 54 431 30 4 34 60 524 44 568 3,6
2014 412 61 473 30 4 35 65 572 48 620 3,7
2015 451 70 521 32 5 37 70 627 52 680 3,7
2016 504 80 584 33 5 38 75 697 57 754 3,8
2017 550 89 638 34 6 40 81 759 62 821 3,9
2018 597 99 695 36 6 42 87 824 67 891 3,9
2019 643 110 753 38 7 45 94 892 74 965 4,0
2020 709 123 833 40 7 47 102 982 80 1062 4,1
2021 762 136 898 42 8 50 109 1058 87 1145 4,1
2022 823 150 973 45 9 54 118 1144 95 1239 4,1
2023 893 165 1058 49 10 59 126 1243 103 1347 4,2
2024 988 183 1171 52 11 63 136 1370 112 1482 4,3
2025 1065 201 1266 56 12 68 145 1479 122 1601 4,4
2026 1143 219 1361 60 13 73 156 1591 132 1723 4,4
2027 1228 240 1468 66 15 81 167 1716 143 1859 4,4
2028 1354 265 1619 71 17 88 178 1885 154 2040 4,6
2029 1451 287 1738 77 18 95 190 2024 166 2190 4,6
2030 1555 311 1866 83 20 104 203 2173 179 2353 4,7
2031 1667 339 2006 92 23 115 217 2338 193 2531 4,7
2032 1823 372 2195 100 25 125 231 2551 208 2760 4,8
2033 1949 403 2352 108 28 136 246 2734 224 2958 4,9
2034 2078 435 2513 117 31 148 262 2923 240 3163 4,9
2035 2211 475 2686 130 35 164 279 3130 258 3387 5,0
2036 2412 521 2933 140 38 178 297 3407 276 3684 5,1
2037 2573 562 3135 151 42 193 315 3642 296 3938 5,2
2038 2748 606 3354 163 45 209 333 3897 316 4212 5,2
2039 2936 658 3594 180 51 231 353 4177 337 4514 5,3
2040 3208 715 3923 193 55 249 373 4544 359 4903 5,5
2041 3421 766 4186 207 60 268 394 4848 382 5230 5,5
2042 3645 819 4464 222 66 288 416 5168 406 5573 5,6
2043 3874 885 4759 243 73 316 439 5513 431 5944 5,7
2044 4202 955 5157 259 79 338 462 5957 457 6414 5,8
2045 4442 1020 5462 275 86 361 487 6310 484 6794 5,9
2046 4684 1091 5775 292 93 386 513 6673 513 7186 5,9
2047 4940 1179 6119 318 103 421 539 7079 543 7623 6,0
2048 5311 1279 6590 336 112 448 568 7605 576 8181 6,1
2049 5560 1364 6924 356 121 477 597 7997 609 8606 6,2
2050 5814 1468 7283 386 133 518 625 8426 642 9068 6,2
Natural Disability Other
Insurance
Expenditures
Scheme's Expenditures (Million JD)
Total
Expenditures
Total
Expenditures
as % of GDP
Total
Insurance
Revenues
Adminstrative
Expenditures
and Allowances
Insurance Expenditures
Old Age 
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 14: Scheme's financial indicators under the Fully Funded approach 
Year
Operational    
    Balance 
Insurable
Balance 
Total
Balance 
Surpluss or
Deficit as %
of  GDP Reserves
Reserves
as % of
GDP
2004 60 79 177 2,3% 2106 28,0%
2005 55 76 194 2,4% 2300 28,2%
2006 53 76 205 2,3% 2505 28,3%
2007 50 76 215 2,2% 2720 28,3%
2008 42 70 221 2,1% 2941 28,3%
2009 45 75 238 2,1% 3179 28,2%
2010 45 78 253 2,1% 3432 28,1%
2011 47 84 272 2,1% 3704 28,1%
2012 44 84 285 2,0% 3989 28,0%
2013 47 91 307 2,0% 4296 27,9%
2014 56 104 336 2,0% 4632 27,9%
2015 62 114 363 2,0% 4995 27,9%
2016 57 114 381 2,0% 5376 27,9%
2017 67 129 415 2,0% 5791 28,0%
2018 79 147 453 2,0% 6244 28,1%
2019 98 172 501 2,1% 6745 28,2%
2020 102 182 536 2,1% 7281 28,4%
2021 125 212 593 2,2% 7875 28,6%
2022 147 242 652 2,2% 8527 28,9%
2023 160 263 706 2,2% 9233 29,3%
2024 156 268 746 2,2% 9980 29,6%
2025 176 298 814 2,3% 10794 30,0%
2026 203 335 891 2,3% 11685 30,4%
2027 225 367 969 2,4% 12654 30,8%
2028 210 364 1015 2,3% 13668 31,2%
2029 236 403 1104 2,4% 14772 31,7%
2030 262 442 1198 2,4% 15970 32,2%
2031 283 476 1293 2,5% 17263 32,8%
2032 266 474 1356 2,4% 18619 33,3%
2033 288 511 1461 2,5% 20080 33,8%
2034 318 558 1582 2,5% 21662 34,4%
2035 344 602 1705 2,6% 23367 35,0%
2036 310 586 1775 2,5% 25142 35,6%
2037 327 623 1901 2,5% 27043 36,2%
2038 333 649 2023 2,6% 29066 36,8%
2039 320 657 2134 2,6% 31200 37,4%
2040 235 594 2178 2,5% 33378 37,9%
2041 229 611 2304 2,5% 35682 38,5%
2042 216 622 2431 2,5% 38112 39,0%
2043 190 620 2551 2,5% 40663 39,6%
2044 80 537 2595 2,4% 43258 40,0%
2045 78 562 2749 2,4% 46007 40,5%
2046 86 599 2922 2,5% 48928 41,1%
2047 73 617 3084 2,5% 52012 41,6%
2048 -41 534 3153 2,4% 55165 42,2%
2049 -5 604 3377 2,5% 58543 42,7%
2050 -16 626 3567 2,5% 62109 43,3%
Fully Funded Financial Indicators
 
Source: Author's own estimation.  
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Appendix 15: Scheme's members structure under the Fully Funded approach 
Year Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
2004 368312 127701 496013 45263 6471 51734 13.803  1575 15378 11554
2005 392693 133987 526680 49933 7540 57473 13.823  1627 15450 12268
2006 419048 145245 564293 54575 8551 63126 13.849  1688 15537 13144
2007 446054 157421 603475 59515 9643 69158 13.881  1749 15630 14057
2008 467285 167772 635057 64738 10815 75553 13.906  1818 15724 14793
2009 491231 179163 670394 69708 12085 81793 13.946  1897 15843 15616
2010 514820 190898 705718 75027 13523 88550 13.987  1977 15964 16439
2011 539208 203054 742262 80279 14989 95268 14.041  2066 16107 17290
2012 564196 215900 780096 85708 16631 102339 14.110  2165 16275 18171
2013 588635 228778 817413 91573 18321 109894 14.193  2271 16464 19040
2014 615364 242395 857759 97419 20141 117560 14.302  2388 16690 19980
2015 640697 256545 897242 103724 22245 125969 14.437  2511 16948 20900
2016 666244 270489 936733 110345 24395 134740 14.596  2646 17242 21820
2017 691827 284805 976632 117316 26639 143955 14.788  2791 17579 22749
2018 717934 299474 1017408 124515 28986 153501 15.010  2943 17953 23699
2019 745931 314695 1060626 131639 31473 163112 15.277  3105 18382 24705
2020 773170 330247 1103417 139118 34169 173287 15.588  3276 18864 25702
2021 799483 346362 1145845 146928 37023 183951 15.952  3462 19414 26691
2022 825994 363783 1189777 155562 40078 195640 16.371  3668 20039 27714
2023 851038 381148 1232186 165214 43332 208546 16.835  3881 20716 28702
2024 876866 399338 1276204 175282 46713 221995 17.351  4112 21463 29727
2025 901947 418413 1320360 185836 50545 236381 17.921  4358 22279 30756
2026 926796 437307 1364103 196585 54448 251033 18.559  4620 23179 31774
2027 950932 457956 1408888 208132 58632 266764 19.256  4899 24155 32818
2028 975059 479011 1454070 220634 63120 283754 20.010  5188 25198 33870
2029 998637 501045 1499682 233201 67808 301009 20.818  5507 26325 34933
2030 1022275 524259 1546534 246318 72779 319097 21.680  5847 27527 36024
2031 1045950 549123 1595073 259892 77838 337730 22.596  6208 28804 37155
2032 1069599 575026 1644625 273721 83314 357035 23.569  6596 30165 38309
2033 1092658 600783 1693441 288133 89253 377386 24.594  7007 31601 39446
2034 1116827 628130 1744957 302430 95357 397787 25.672  7445 33117 40646
2035 1141118 656651 1797769 316661 101893 418554 26.806  7904 34710 41876
2036 1165526 685601 1851127 331554 108779 440333 27.994  8385 36379 43119
2037 1188821 715843 1904664 347144 115954 463098 29.219  8878 38097 44366
2038 1210656 746806 1957462 363285 123527 486812 30.473  9398 39871 45596
2039 1230821 777977 2008798 379819 131189 511008 31.747  9941 41688 46792
2040 1251271 810515 2061786 396723 138818 535541 33.046  10511 43557 48026
2041 1272114 843949 2116063 413989 146696 560685 34.364  11101 45465 49290
2042 1291885 878225 2170110 431275 154817 586092 35.685  11724 47409 50549
2043 1310881 912918 2223799 448123 163120 611243 36.998  12383 49381 51800
2044 1329610 949033 2278643 464374 171292 635666 38.308  13080 51388 53077
2045 1347943 978869 2326812 480455 180056 660511 39.623  13809 53432 54199
2046 1366971 997284 2364255 495809 189326 685135 40.943  14553 55496 55071
2047 1386349 1014623 2400972 510913 198859 709772 42.256  15323 57579 55927
2048 1405524 1030608 2436132 524740 208898 733638 43.573  16117 59690 56746
2049 1424530 1045856 2470386 537850 218688 756538 44.884  16944 61828 57543
2050 1443609 1060616 2504225 550496 228713 779209 46.199  17796 63995 58332
Beneficiaries
Other
Provisions
Natural Disability Old Age
Contributors
 
Source: Author's own calculation.
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